Friday, November 07, 2008

A BIT OF OBAMA'S HISTORY AND WHY WE HAVE A CHANCE


THE ABSURD TIMES


The Hope of Obama

Barack Obama's resounding victory has brought even this cynical observer of Democratic Party politics to dare to hope, believing that -- as a child of the Eisenhower era -- I will soon be witnessing the most progressive presidential administration of my lifetime.

 

This hope, which I fully realize may prove to be naive, rests upon Obama's personal history as a community organizer, his base of support in the party's left wing, and the remarkable shift in internal Democratic Party politics in recent years.

 

Obama's Background

 

There are a number of aspects of Obama's personal history which would seem to indicate empathy for those less fortunate. One, of course, is the fact that he is a black man in a racist society. Another is that he grew up in Indonesia (a poor Asian country) and Hawaii (the most racially diverse and economically stratified state.)

 

More significant, however, is Obama's political history:

 

Though the desperate lies and hyperbole from the Right regarding Obama's supposed far-left roots and radical associates are easily dismissible, Obama does come out of a progressive grassroots tradition.

 

At Occidental College in the early 1980s, he became immersed in the anti-apartheid movement. His first public speech was at an event sponsored by the Students for Economic Democracy, part of a national student advocacy group set up by former California State Senator and progressive activist Tom Hayden. Though there have certainly been student activists from the late 1960s who later moved well to the right, left-wing campus activism was not nearly as trendy during Obama's college years, which were during the heyday of the Reagan Era, when College Republicans were often the largest and most visible political group on many campuses.

 

Upon graduating from Columbia University, while most of his classmates were pursuing lucrative careers elsewhere, Obama began working in working-class black neighborhoods of South Chicago as an organizer for the Developing Communities Project, then reeling from the collapse of the steel industry. His salary was only $13,000 a year, plus $2,000 to purchase a beat-up Honda Civic for transportation, recognizing, in his words, "There was something more than making money and getting a fancy degree."

 

Rejecting Chicago's tradition of taking advantage of personal connections with elected officials to elicit a few crumbs, Obama instead embraced the organizing tradition of Saul Alinsky and other community activists of confronting officials with resolute citizens demanding accountability.

 

Later, as the first African-American president of the Harvard Law Review, Obama was recruited by hundreds of top corporate law firms and was offered a prestigious clerkship for a federal appeals court, but he turned them all down to return to South Chicago to continue working to empower people to challenge the system. (By contrast, his fellow Ivy League law school grad Hillary Clinton was then in Arkansas serving on the board of Wal-Mart.)

 

In the buildup to the 1992 elections, as an alternative to the national Democratic Party's emphasis on fighting for the small number of undecided voters in the middle, Obama -- as director of Project Vote! -- instead worked to expand the party's progressive base through registering traditionally underrepresented poor and minority voters, resulting in unexpectedly large Democratic victories in Illinois that year.

 

This history is indicative of someone who not only is cognizant of the impact government policies have on disadvantaged segments of society, but who recognizes that power ultimately comes from below.

 

Obama's Progressive Base

 

From the beginning of the race for the Democratic presidential nomination, it was obvious that Obama's policy positions were not nearly as progressive as those of Dennis Kucinich or even John Edwards, and Obama did not differentiate himself much on major issues in the subsequent contests with Hillary Clinton. At the same time, public opinion polls indicated that, with some minor exceptions, Obama supporters overwhelmingly identified with the left wing of the party -- and in particular, with the peace movement -- than did Clinton supporters.

 

Though Obama's position regarding current Iraq policy was only marginally better than Clinton's, it was his strong and principled anti-war stance prior to the invasion that made the critical difference in the minds of millions of Democratic voters. The very week in October 2002 when Clinton -- in a desperate effort to justify her vote to authorize unprecedented war powers to President Bush -- was standing on the floor of the Senate falsely claiming that Saddam Hussein had somehow redeveloped his chemical and biological weapons arsenal and his nuclear weapons program and that he was supporting al Qaeda terrorists, Obama was speaking at an anti-war rally in Chicago, noting that Saddam did not at that time pose a threat to the United States or his neighbors and that a U.S. invasion of Iraq could end up being a disaster for both the United States and the region.

 

Obama's honest and prescient understanding of Iraq prior to the invasion gives hope that as president he will be less inclined to engage in such acts of reckless militarism. Indeed, he has insisted that "I don't want to just end the war, but I want to end the mindset that got us into war in the first place."

 

Even if one is to assume that Obama is more hawkish than his early opposition to the war would indicate, he surely recognizes that he owes his nomination -- and therefore his election -- to those who opposed the invasion of Iraq and who voted for him based in large part because of his anti-war position.

 

Indeed, exit polls from the primaries indicate that the majority of Obama supporters were to the left of their candidates' stated positions on most major foreign and domestic policy issues. Surely Obama is aware of this. And, just as leading Republican elected officials who may not personally care that much about such issues as abortion or gay rights nevertheless feel a need to satisfy their base by making appointments and supporting policies that will appease them, Obama is likely to recognize this reality as well.

 

Another good sign is that no serious presidential candidate in recent decades has ever raised such a high percentage of his or her contributions from small donors. Unlike the Clintons and other leading Democratic presidential contenders whose election campaigns were primarily supported directly or indirectly by powerful corporate interests, Obama's donor base is far more diverse.

 

Countervailing Tendencies

 

Admittedly, there are huge qualifiers to all of the above.

 

For example, Obama has also received enormous contributions from those with strong corporate ties and other special interests, to which he will likely also feel beholden. His refusal to support a single-payer health care system and his calls for increasing the already-bloated military budget are but two examples of where he may feel a need to formulate policies based more upon powerful corporate interests than his electoral base.

 

Furthermore, Obama's selection of Joe Biden, an early and ardent supporter of the invasion of Iraq and other dangerous and militaristic foreign policies, as his vice presidential running mate was nothing less than a slap in the face to this anti-war constituency and could be an ominous sign of the kind of people he would appoint to key foreign policy positions. (See my articles "Biden's Foreign Policy 'Experience'" and "Biden, Iraq, and Obama's Betrayal.") One the one hand, Obama's core foreign policy advisers have included some of the more critical, innovative and enlightened members of the foreign policy establishment, such as Joseph Cirincione, Lawrence Korb, Susan Rice, Richard Clarke and Samantha Power. On the other hand, his advisers have also included the likes of Dennis Ross, Anthony Lake and Merrill McPeak, whose commitment to international law and human rights have proven to be very weak.

 

Even if one were to assume the best in terms of Obama's political inclinations and policy agenda, he will be under enormous pressure from the Pentagon, corporate interests, Congressional Republicans and many Congressional Democrats to move to the right. The corporate media will likely be on the attack against even a hint of progressive policy initiatives, and Obama could be on the defensive from the outset. Progressives may feel obliged to focus more on defending Obama's policies -- as inadequate as some of them may be -- from such attacks than pushing him to the left.

 

This has led many to assume that the election of Barack Obama after eight years of Bush would simply be a repeat of the false hope from Bill Clinton's election in 1992 after 12 years of Republican rule.

 

However, the Democratic Party rank and file is far more engaged and -- according to recent polls -- significantly more liberal politically than it was 16 years ago. Indeed, the Progressive Democrats of America is now at least as influential within the party as the Democratic Leadership Council. People are fired up and not in the mood for Bush Lite. More Americans volunteered for and were otherwise personally mobilized on behalf of Obama's campaign than any electoral campaign in history, doing so on the belief that real change would be the result, and are therefore not willing to settle for either the status quo or the status quo ante.

 

There is also a new generation of Congressional Democrats, many of whom are significantly more liberal than when Clinton came to office. And there is little risk that they will lose their majorities any time soon, as was the case less than two years after Clinton became president.

 

In short, the election of Barack Obama as president of the United States, along with an expanded Democratic majority in Congress, may be the best electoral result that progressives can reasonably hope for, given the reality of the American political and economic system. That's a huge qualifier, to be sure. But it is not insignificant. Indeed, given the power of the American president, even a small difference can make a big difference in the lives of millions of people.

 

Some commentators have noted that the only other Democrats elected by such a clear majority in the past century were Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson, whose administrations -- despite the distraction of wars -- did more than any other presidents in advancing the rights of less fortunate. It is also important, however, that both administrations were prodded by progressive mass movements demanding it.

 

The key is whether the activist community is willing to continue on the offensive and take advantage of what may be an unprecedented opening in Washington to affect real change. This is an opportunity that must not be squandered.

 

 

Stephen Zunes is a professor of Politics and chair of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of San Francisco and serves as a senior policy analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus.

TIME FOR INFLUENCING OBAMA

THE ABSURD TIMES

    I'll post a few economic suggestions later, but this is part of it.

Yes We Can! It’s Time for a Just Economy for All!

There is no doubt the election of Barack Obama is a watershed. An 8-year-long national nightmare is coming to an end. But there is a tremendous amount of damage to repair.

 

Foremost is addressing the economic crisis that is upon us and which touches on every concern from the environment and healthcare to wars and energy.

 

So now that the election is over, the next fight begins.

 

The wealthy and corporate interests who dished out billions of dollars this election season will be swarming over Washington to get their agendas passed. The energy giants will demand "clean coal," nuclear power and offshore drilling. More big corporations facing bankruptcy because of their corruption and greed will demand taxpayer bailouts.

Military contractors and weapon peddlers will push the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The super-rich will cry poverty and demand more tax cuts. HMOs and insurance companies will promote bogus healthcare "reforms" so they can forestall universal healthcare. And they won't take no for an answer.

But things are different this time. We have the ideas on our side. The public is politically engaged. And we can hold accountable the politicians we put into office. Because the "free market" has proven a farce and the right is in disarray, there is a huge opening to pass policies that can benefit all Americans. As the economy sinks, only concerted public action can revive it.

We need to band together and organize powerful new movements across this country.
 
We need to organize in the workplace. We need to organize in the schools. We need to organize in the streets, in our neighborhoods, in our communities. And we need to be clear about what we're for: A Just Economy for All Americans. One that creates 21st Century productive jobs, instead of relying on debt-driven consumption to sustain the economy.

 

We can end our addiction to oil. We can end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. We can solve the healthcare crisis. We can revive our communities, rebuild our infrastructure, invest in education, slow global warming and transition to a clean, green economy.

We need to bring pressure to bear on all levels of government - local, state and national - to enact programs of reconstruction and relief, and to restructure the finance sector.

Here's how we can start:

*Sign the call to action and send it around to everyone you know, urging them to add their name to the call and join this new movement.
*Set up an organizing committee in your town or city. We need to bring together labor, housing groups, healthcare activists, environmentalists, business owners and all concerned citizens to help draft a plan to dig our way out of this mess.
*Organize a teach-in on the economic crisis and community-based solutions. (Go to bailoutmainstreet.com for suggestions on how to organize a teach-in.)
*Use the teach-in to begin organizing for a day of local action in your community. We are calling for a day of nationally coordinated local actions to push for economic policies that benefit everyone.
*And we need to start organizing for a big mobilization in Washington, D.C., following the inauguration, to push our demands for a fair, just economy of the future, instead of the failed trickle-down economy of the past.

Just like the 1930s, this unprecedented crisis has given us the opportunity to fix America and create a productive, sustainable economy for all. Let's get to work!

 

SIGNERS

Noam Chomsky

Professor of Linguistics, MIT

 

Howard Zinn

Author A People's History of the United States

 

Marilyn Clement

National Coordinator Healthcare-NOW

 

Naomi Klein

Author The Shock Doctrine and No Logo

 

Medea Benjamin

Co-founder CODEPINK and Global Exchange

 

Arun Gupta

The Indypendent

 

Frances Fox Piven

Distinguished Professor CUNY Grad Center, author Regulating the Poor

 

Brooke Lehman

Bluestockings Bookstore

 

Stanley Aronowitz

Distinguished Professor of Sociology, CUNY and author
Against Schooling and for an Education that Matters

 

Organizations listed for identification purposes only.

Keynes and the Bailout, Part 1.

THE ABSURD TIMES


    It is now about time that all the Laffer, or laughable, curve, supply side, neo-con, economic crap be tanked.  First, from Wikkepedia,  the basis for what we need to do:

Keynesian economics

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In economics Keynesian economics (pronounced /ˈkeɪnziən/, also Keynesianism and Keynesian Theory), is based on the ideas of twentieth-century British economist John Maynard Keynes. According to Keynesian economics the state can stimulate economic growth and improve stability in the private sector - through, for example, interest rates, taxation and public projects.

The theories forming the basis of Keynesian economics were first presented in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, published in 1936.

In Keynes's theory, some micro-level actions of individuals and firms can lead to aggregate macroeconomic outcomes in which the economy operates below its potential output and growth. Many classical economists had believed in Say's Law, that supply creates its own demand, so that a "general glut" would therefore be impossible. Keynes contended that aggregate demand for goods might be insufficient during economic downturns, leading to unnecessarily high unemployment and losses of potential output. Keynes argued that government policies could be used to increase aggregate demand, thus increasing economic activity and reducing high unemployment and deflation. Keynes's macroeconomic theories were a response to mass unemployment in 1920s Britain and in 1930s America.

Keynes argued that the solution to depression was to stimulate the economy ("inducement to invest") through some combination of two approaches :

  • a reduction in interest rates.
  • Government investment in infrastructure - the injection of income results in more spending in the general economy, which in turn stimulates more production and investment involving still more income and spending and so forth. The initial stimulation starts a cascade of events, whose total increase in economic activity is a multiple of the original investment.[1]

A central conclusion of Keynesian economics is that in some situations, no strong automatic mechanism moves output and employment towards full employment levels. This conclusion conflicts with economic approaches that assume a general tendency towards an equilibrium. In the 'neoclassical synthesis', which combines Keynesian macro concepts with a micro foundation, the conditions of General equilibrium allow for price adjustment to achieve this goal.

The New classical macroeconomics movement, which began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, criticized Keynesian theories, while New Keynesian economics have sought to base Keynes's idea on more rigorous theoretical foundations.

More broadly, Keynes saw his as a general theory, in which utilization of resources could be high or low, whereas previous economics focused on the particular case of full utilization.

Contents

[hide]

[edit] Keynes and the Classics

Keynes sought to distinguish his theories from "classical economics," by which he meant the economic theories of David Ricardo and his followers, including John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, F.Y. Edgeworth, and A. Cecil Pigou. A central tenet of the classical view, known as Say's law, states that “supply creates its own demand.” Say's Law can be interpreted in two ways. First, the claim that the total value of output is equal to the sum of income earned in production is a result of a national income accounting identity, and is therefore indisputable. A second and stronger claim, however, that the "costs of output are always covered in the aggregate by the sale-proceeds resulting from demand" depends on how consumption and saving are linked to production and investment. In particular, Keynes argued that the second, strong form of Say's Law only holds if increases in individual savings exactly match an increase in aggregate investment. (cf. General Theory, Ch.1,2)

Keynes sought to develop a theory that would explain determinants of saving, consumption, investment and production. In that theory, the interaction of aggregate demand and aggregate supply determines the level of output and employment in the economy.

Because of what he considered the failure of the “Classical Theory” in the 1930s, Keynes firmly objects to its main theory--adjustments in prices would automatically make demand tend to the full employment level.

Neo-classical theory supports that the two main costs that shift demand and supply are labor and money. Through the distribution of the monetary policy, demand and supply can be adjusted. If there were more labor than demand for it, wages would fall until hiring began again. If there was too much saving, and not enough consumption, then interest rates would fall until people either cut their savings rate or started borrowing.

[edit] Wages and spending

During the Great Depression, the classical theory defined economic collapse as simply a lost incentive to produce. Mass unemployment was caused only by high and rigid real wages.

To Keynes, the determination of wages is more complicated. First, he argued that it is not real but nominal wages that are set in negotiations between employers and workers, as opposed to a barter relationship. First, nominal wage cuts would be difficult to put into effect because of laws and wage contracts. Even classical economists admitted that these exist; unlike Keynes, they advocated abolishing minimum wages, unions, and long-term contracts, increasing labor-market flexibility. However, to Keynes, people will resist nominal wage reductions, even without unions, until they see other wages falling and a general fall of prices.

He also argued that to boost employment, real wages had to go down: nominal wages would have to fall more than prices. However, doing so would reduce consumer demand, so that the aggregate demand for goods would drop. This would in turn reduce business sales revenues and expected profits. Investment in new plants and equipment—perhaps already discouraged by previous excesses—would then become more risky, less likely. Instead of raising business expectations, wage cuts could make matters much worse.

Further, if wages and prices were falling, people would start to expect them to fall. This could make the economy spiral downward as those who had money would simply wait as falling prices made it more valuable—rather than spending. As Irving Fisher argued in 1933, in his Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, deflation (falling prices) can make a depression deeper as falling prices and wages made pre-existing nominal debts more valuable in real terms.

[edit] Excessive saving

Classics on Saving and Investment.

To Keynes, excessive saving, i.e. saving beyond planned investment, was a serious problem, encouraging recession or even depression. Excessive saving results if investment falls, perhaps due to falling consumer demand, over-investment in earlier years, or pessimistic business expectations, and if saving does not immediately fall in step, the economy would decline.

The classical economists argued that interest rates would fall due to the excess supply of "loanable funds". The first diagram, adapted from the only graph in The General Theory, shows this process. (For simplicity, other sources of the demand for or supply of funds are ignored here.) Assume that fixed investment in capital goods falls from "old I" to "new I" (step a). Second (step b), the resulting excess of saving causes interest-rate cuts, abolishing the excess supply: so again we have saving (S) equal to investment. The interest-rate fall prevents that of production and employment.

Keynes had a complex argument against this laissez-faire response. The graph below summarizes his argument, assuming again that fixed investment falls (step A). First, saving does not fall much as interest rates fall, since the income and substitution effects of falling rates go in conflicting directions. Second, since planned fixed investment in plant and equipment is mostly based on long-term expectations of future profitability, that spending does not rise much as interest rates fall. So S and I are drawn as steep (inelastic) in the graph. Given the inelasticity of both demand and supply, a large interest-rate fall is needed to close the saving/investment gap. As drawn, this requires a negative interest rate at equilibrium (where the new I line would intersect the old S line). However, this negative interest rate is not necessary to Keynes's argument.

Keynes on Saving and Investment.

Third, Keynes argued that saving and investment are not the main determinants of interest rates, especially in the short run. Instead, the supply of and the demand for the stock of money determine interest rates in the short run. (This is not drawn in the graph.) Neither changes quickly in response to excessive saving to allow fast interest-rate adjustment.

Finally, because of fear of capital losses on assets besides money, Keynes suggested that there may be a "liquidity trap" setting a floor under which interest rates cannot fall. (In this trap, bond-holders, fearing rises in interest rates (because rates are so low), fear capital losses on their bonds and thus try to sell them to attain money (liquidity).) Even economists who reject this liquidity trap now realize that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero (or slightly higher). In the diagram, the equilibrium suggested by the new I line and the old S line cannot be reached, so that excess saving persists. Some (such as Paul Krugman) see this latter kind of liquidity trap as prevailing in Japan in the 1990s.

Even if this "trap" does not exist, there is a fourth element to Keynes's critique (perhaps the most important part). Saving involves not spending all of one's income. It thus means insufficient demand for business output, unless it is balanced by other sources of demand, such as fixed investment. Thus, excessive saving corresponds to an unwanted accumulation of inventories, or what classical economists called a general glut[2]. This pile-up of unsold goods and materials encourages businesses to decrease both production and employment. This in turn lowers people's incomes—and saving, causing a leftward shift in the S line in the diagram (step B). For Keynes, the fall in income did most of the job by ending excessive saving and allowing the loanable funds market to attain equilibrium. Instead of interest-rate adjustment solving the problem, a recession does so. Thus in the diagram, the interest-rate change is small.

Whereas the classical economists assumed that the level of output and income was constant and given at any one time (except for short-lived deviations), Keynes saw this as the key variable that adjusted to equate saving and investment.

Finally, a recession undermines the business incentive to engage in fixed investment. With falling incomes and demand for products, the desired demand for factories and equipment (not to mention housing) will fall. This accelerator effect would shift the I line to the left again, a change not shown in the diagram above. This recreates the problem of excessive saving and encourages the recession to continue.

In sum, to Keynes there is interaction between excess supplies in different markets, as unemployment in labor markets encourages excessive saving—and vice-versa. Rather than prices adjusting to attain equilibrium, the main story is one of quantity adjustment allowing recessions and possible attainment of underemployment equilibrium.

[edit] Active fiscal policy

As noted,[clarify] the classicals wanted to balance the government budget. To Keynes, this would exacerbate the underlying problem: following either policy[clarify] would raise saving (broadly defined) and thus lower the demand for both products and labor. For example, Keynesians see Herbert Hoover's June 1932 tax increase as making the Depression worse.[citation needed][clarify]

Keynes's ideas influenced Franklin D. Roosevelt's view that insufficient buying-power caused the Depression. During his presidency, Roosevelt adopted some aspects of Keynesian economics, especially after 1937, when, in the depths of the Depression, the United States suffered from recession yet again following fiscal contraction. But to many the true success of Keynesian policy can be seen at the onset of World War II, which provided a kick to the world economy, removed uncertainty, and forced the rebuilding of destroyed capital. Keynesian ideas became almost official in social-democratic Europe after the war and in the U.S. in the 1960s.

Keynes's theory suggested that active government policy could be effective in managing the economy. Rather than seeing unbalanced government budgets as wrong, Keynes advocated what has been called countercyclical fiscal policies, that is policies which acted against the tide of the business cycle: deficit spending when a nation's economy suffers from recession or when recovery is long-delayed and unemployment is persistently high—and the suppression of inflation in boom times by either increasing taxes or cutting back on government outlays. He argued that governments should solve problems in the short run rather than waiting for market forces to do it in the long run, because "in the long run, we are all dead." [2]

This contrasted with the classical and neoclassical economic analysis of fiscal policy. Fiscal stimulus (deficit spending) could actuate production. But to these schools, there was no reason to believe that this stimulation would outrun the side-effects that "crowd out" private investment: first, it would increase the demand for labor and raise wages, hurting profitability; Second, a government deficit increases the stock of government bonds, reducing their market price and encouraging high interest rates, making it more expensive for business to finance fixed investment. Thus, efforts to stimulate the economy would be self-defeating.

The Keynesian response is that such fiscal policy is only appropriate when unemployment is persistently high, above what is now termed the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment, or "NAIRU". In that case, crowding out is minimal. Further, private investment can be "crowded in": fiscal stimulus raises the market for business output, raising cash flow and profitability, spurring business optimism. To Keynes, this accelerator effect meant that government and business could be complements rather than substitutes in this situation. Second, as the stimulus occurs, gross domestic product rises, raising the amount of saving, helping to finance the increase in fixed investment. Finally, government outlays need not always be wasteful: government investment in public goods that will not be provided by profit-seekers will encourage the private sector's growth. That is, government spending on such things as basic research, public health, education, and infrastructure could help the long-term growth of potential output.

Invoking public choice theory, classical and neoclassical economists doubt that the government will ever be this beneficial and suggest that its policies will typically be dominated by special interest groups, including the government bureaucracy. Thus, they use their political theory to reject Keynes' economic theory.

A Keynesian economist might point out that classical and neoclassical theory does not explain why firms acting as "special interests" to influence government policy are assumed to produce a negative outcome, while those same firms acting with the same motivations outside of the government are supposed to produce positive outcomes.

In Keynes' theory, there must be significant slack in the labor market before fiscal expansion is justified. Both conservative and some neoliberal economists question this assumption, unless labor unions or the government "meddle" in the free market, creating persistent supply-side or classical unemployment.[clarify] Their solution is to increase labor-market flexibility, e.g., by cutting wages, busting unions, and deregulating business.

Deficit spending is not Keynesianism. Governments had long used deficits to finance wars. Keynesianism recommends counter-cyclical policies to smooth out fluctuations in the business cycle. For example, raising taxes to cool the economy and to prevent inflation when there is abundant demand-side growth, and engaging in deficit spending on labor-intensive infrastructure projects to stimulate employment and stabilize wages during economic downturns.[clarify] Classical economics, on the other hand, argues that one should cut taxes when there are budget surpluses, and cut spending—or, less likely, increase taxes—during economic downturns. Keynesian economists believe that adding to profits and incomes during boom cycles through tax cuts, and removing income and profits from the economy through cuts in spending and/or increased taxes during downturns, tends to exacerbate the negative effects of the business cycle.

[edit] "Multiplier effect" and interest rates

Two aspects of Keynes' model had implications for policy:

First, there is the "Keynesian multiplier", first developed by Richard F. Kahn in 1931. Exogenous increases in spending, such as an increase in government outlays, increases total spending by a multiple of that increase. A government could stimulate a great deal of new production with a modest outlay if:

  1. The people who receive this money then spend most on consumption goods and save the rest.
  2. This extra spending allows businesses to hire more people and pay them, which in turn allows a further increase consumer spending.

This process continues. At each step, the increase in spending is smaller than in the previous step, so that the multiplier process tapers off and allows the attainment of an equilibrium. This story is modified and moderated if we move beyond a "closed economy" and bring in the role of taxation: the rise in imports and tax payments at each step reduces the amount of induced consumer spending and the size of the multiplier effect.

Second, Keynes re-analyzed the effect of the interest rate on investment. In the classical model, the supply of funds (saving) determined the amount of fixed business investment. That is, since all savings was placed in banks, and all business investors in need of borrowed funds went to banks, the amount of savings determined the amount that was available to invest. To Keynes, the amount of investment was determined independently by long-term profit expectations and, to a lesser extent, the interest rate. The latter opens the possibility of regulating the economy through money supply changes, via monetary policy. Under conditions such as the Great Depression, Keynes argued that this approach would be relatively ineffective compared to fiscal policy. But during more "normal" times, monetary expansion can stimulate the economy, mostly by encouraging construction of new housing.

[edit] Keynes and redistribution

Keynesians and redistributionists tend to associate with each other. Keynes, in the twenties, wrote about a hydro-electric project. In his opinion it would have been better if the rewards of the project had gone to the worker-builders rather than to the investors who had financed the project.[citation needed]

Keynesians believe that fiscal policy should be directed towards the lower-income segment of the population, because that segment is more likely to spend the money, contributing to demand, than to save it.

[edit] Postwar Keynesianism

After Keynes, Keynesian analysis was combined with neoclassical economics to produce what is generally termed the "neoclassical synthesis" which dominates mainstream macroeconomic thought. Though it was widely held that there was no strong automatic tendency to full employment, many believed that if government policy were used to ensure it, the economy would behave as classical or neoclassical theory predicted.

In the post-WWII years, Keynes's policy ideas were widely accepted. For the first time, governments prepared good quality economic statistics on an ongoing basis and had a theory that told them what to do. In this era of new liberalism and social democracy, most western capitalist countries enjoyed low, stable unemployment and modest inflation.

It was with John Hicks that Keynesian economics produced a clear model which policy-makers could use to attempt to understand and control economic activity. This model, the IS-LM model is nearly as influential as Keynes' original analysis in determining actual policy and economics education. It relates aggregate demand and employment to three exogenous quantities, i.e., the amount of money in circulation, the government budget, and the state of business expectations. This model was very popular with economists after World War II because it could be understood in terms of general equilibrium theory. This encouraged a much more static vision of macroeconomics than that described above.[citation needed]

The second main part of a Keynesian policy-maker's theoretical apparatus was the Phillips curve. This curve, which was more of an empirical observation than a theory, indicated that increased employment, and decreased unemployment, implied increased inflation. Keynes had only predicted that falling unemployment would cause a higher price, not a higher inflation rate. Thus, the economist could use the IS-LM model to predict, for example, that an increase in the money supply would raise output and employment—and then use the Phillips curve to predict an increase in inflation.[citation needed]

Through the 1950s, moderate degrees of government demand leading industrial development, and use of fiscal and monetary counter-cyclical policies continued, and reached a peak in the "go go" 1960s, where it seemed to many Keynesians that prosperity was now permanent. However, with the oil shock of 1973, and the economic problems of the 1970s, modern liberal economics began to fall out of favor. During this time, many economies experienced high and rising unemployment, coupled with high and rising inflation, contradicting the Phillips curve's prediction. This stagflation meant that the simultaneous application of expansionary (anti-recession) and contractionary (anti-inflation) policies appeared to be necessary, a clear impossibility. This dilemma led to the end of the Keynesian near-consensus of the 1960s, and the rise throughout the 1970s of ideas based upon more classical analysis, including monetarism, supply-side economics[citation needed] and new classical economics. At the same time Keynesians began during the period to reorganize their thinking (some becoming associated with New Keynesian economics); one strategy, utilized also as a critique of the notably high unemployment and potentially disappointing GNP growth rates associated with the latter two theories by the mid-1980s, was to emphasize low unemployment and maximal economic growth at the cost of somewhat higher inflation (its consequences kept in check by indexing and other methods, and its overall rate kept lower and steadier by such potential policies as Martin Weitzman's share economy)[3].

[edit] Criticism

The impact of Keynesianism can be seen by the wave of economists who have based their analysis on a criticism of Keynesianism.

One school began in the late 1940s with Milton Friedman. Instead of rejecting macro-measurements and macro-models of the economy, the monetarist school embraced the techniques of treating the entire economy as having a supply and demand equilibrium. However, they regarded inflation as solely being due to the variations in the money supply, rather than as being a consequence of aggregate demand. They argued that the "crowding out" effects discussed above would hobble or deprive fiscal policy of its positive effect. Instead, the focus should be on monetary policy, which was largely ignored by early Keynesians.

Monetarism had an ideological as well as a practical appeal: monetary policy does not, at least on the surface, imply as much government intervention in the economy as other measures. The monetarist critique pushed Keynesians toward a more balanced view of monetary policy, and inspired a wave of revisions to Keynesian theory.

Another influential school of thought was based on the Lucas critique of Keynesian economics. This called for greater consistency with microeconomic theory and rationality, and particularly emphasized the idea of rational expectations. Lucas and others argued that Keynesian economics required remarkably foolish and short-sighted behavior from people, which totally contradicted the economic understanding of their behavior at a micro level. New classical economics introduced a set of macroeconomic theories which were based on optimising microeconomic behavior, for instance real business cycles.

Keynesian ideas were criticized by free market economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek. Hayek's most famous work The Road to Serfdom, was written in 1944. Hayek taught at the London School of Economics from 1931 to 1950. Hayek criticized Keynesian economic policies for what he called their fundamentally collectivist approach, arguing that such theories, no matter their presumptively utilitarian intentions, require centralized planning, which Hayek argued leads to totalitarian abuses. Keynes seems to have noted this concern, since, in the foreword to the German version of the 'The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money', he declared that "the theory of aggregated production, which is the point of ['The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money'], nevertheless can be much easier adapted to the conditions of a totalitarian state [eines totalen Staates] than the theory of production and distribution of a given production put forth under conditions of free competition and a large degree of laissez-faire." [4]

Another criticism leveled by Hayek against Keynes was that the study of the economy by the relations between aggregates is fallacious, and that recessions are caused by micro-economic factors. Hayek claimed that what starts as temporary governmental fixes usually become permanent and expanding government programs, which stifle the private sector and civil society. Keynes himself described the critique as "deeply moving", which was quoted on the cover of the Road to Serfdom.

[edit] Methodological Disagreement and Different Results that Emerge

Beginning in the late 1950s New Classical Macroeconomists began to disagree with the methodology employed by Keynes and his successors. Keynesians emphasized the dependence of consumption on disposable income and, also, of investment on current profits and current cash flow. In addition Keynes posited a Phillips curve that tied nominal wage inflation to unemployment rate. To buttress these theories Keynesians typically traced the logical foundations of their model (using introspection) and buttressed their assumptions with statistical evidence.[5] New Classical theorists demanded that Macroeconomic be grounded on the same foundations as Microeconomic theory, profit-maximizing firms and utility maximizing consumers.[5]

The result of this shift in methodology produced several important divergences from Keynesian Macro economics:[5]

  1. Independence of Consumption and current Income (life-cycle permanent income hypothesis)
  2. Irrelevance of Current Profits to Investment (Modigliani-Miller theorem)
  3. Long run independence of inflation and unemployment (natural rate of unemployment)
  4. The inability of monetary policy to stabilize output (rational expectations)
  5. Irrelevance of Taxes and Budget Deficits to Consumption (Ricardian Equivalence)

[edit] Keynesian responses to the critics

The heart of the 'new Keynesian' view rests on microeconomic models that indicate that nominal wages and prices are "sticky," i.e., do not change easily or quickly with changes in supply and demand, so that quantity adjustment prevails. This is a practice which, according to economist Paul Krugman "never works in theory, but works beautifully in practice."[citation needed] This integration is further spurred by the work of other economists which questions rational decision-making in a perfect information environment as a necessity for micro-economic theory. Imperfect decision making such as that investigated by Joseph Stiglitz underlines the importance of management of risk in the economy.

Over time, many macroeconomists have returned to the IS-LM model and the Phillips Curve as a first approximation of how an economy works. New versions of the Phillips Curve, such as the "Triangle Model", allow for stagflation, since the curve can shift due to supply shocks or changes in built-in inflation. In the 1990s, the original ideas of "full employment" had been modified by the NAIRU doctrine, sometimes called the "natural rate of unemployment." NAIRU advocates suggest restraint in combating unemployment, in case accelerating inflation should result. However, it is unclear exactly what the value of the NAIRU should be—or whether it even exists.

Wednesday, November 05, 2008

Keep an Eye Out

THE ABSURD TIMES


The election is over now, and perhaps we can relax for awhile. On the right panel of the blog is the countdown until Bush leaves.

However, no matter how nice it is to be rid of so many Republicans, Obama is still a politician. Let us not get carried away.

One of you sent me a nice parable to illustrate:

While walking down the street one day a US senator is tragically hit by a truck and dies.

His soul arrives in heaven and is met by St. Peter at the entrance.

'Welcome to heaven,' says St. Peter. 'Before you settle in, it seems there is a problem. We seldom see a high official around these parts, you see, so we're not sure what to do with you.'

No problem, just let me in,' says the man. Well, I'd like to, but I have orders from higher up. What we'll do is have you spend one day in hell and one in heaven. Then you can choose where to spend eternity.'


Really, I've made up my mind. I want to be in heaven, says the senator.

'I'm sorry, but we have our rules.'

And with that, St. Peter escorts him to the elevator and he goe’s down , down, down to hell. The doors open and he finds himself in the middle of a green golf course. In the distance is a clubhouse and standing in front of it are all his friends and other politicians who had worked with him.

Everyone is very happy and in evening dress. They run to greet him, shake his hand, and reminisce about the good times they had while getting rich at the expense of the people.
They play a friendly game of golf and then dine on lobster, caviar and champagne.

Also present is the devil, who really is a very friendly & n
ice guy who has a good time dancing and telling jokes. They are having such a good time that before he realizes it, it is time to go.

Everyone gives him a hearty farewell and waves while the elevator rises...

The elevator goes up, up, up and the doo r reop ens on heaven where St. Peter is waiting for him.

'Now it's time to visit heaven.'

So, 24 hours pass with the senator joining a group of contented souls moving from cloud to cloud, playing the harp and singing. They have a good time and, before he realizes it, the 24 hours have gone by and St. Peter returns.

'Well, then, you've spent a day in hell and another in heaven.

Now choose your eternity.'

The senator reflects for a minute, then he answers: 'Well, I would never have said it before, I mean heaven has been delightful, but I think I would be better off in hell.'

So St. Peter escorts him to the elevator and he goes down, down, down to hell.


Now the doors of the elevator open and he's in the middle of a barren land covered with waste and garbage.

He sees all his friends, dressed in rags, picking up the trash and putting it in black bags as more trash falls from above.

The devil comes over to him and puts his arm around his s houlder. 'I don't understand,' stammers the senator. 'Yesterday I was here and there was a golf course and clubhouse, and we ate lobster and caviar, drank champagne, and danced and had a great time. Now there's just a wasteland full of garbage and my friends look miserable.
What happened?'

The devil looks at him, smiles and says, 'Yesterday we were campaigning…



Today you voted.'



Monday, November 03, 2008

After The Election

THE ABSURD TIMES





It seems fairly certain now that we will be rid of the reactionary and oppressive forces of greed that are the trademark of the present Republican Party. In other words, its own contradictions have caused it to crumble.
Its rise started with Nixon, of all people, and his focus on "ordinary people." Democrats in the south had abandoned the party in favor of the Republicans because of its whiteness. Many of the working class elsewhere abandoned the Democratic party because of the "hippies" and their lifestyle and reaction to the Vietnam war. The "HardHats" became "Reagen Republicans." Bush the Decider was the born again Christian. All of this was used to garner votes in support of corporatization, big business, and a pro-billionaire agenda.
That agenda led to jobs being lost, houses being foreclosed, and so on (who is going to buy the mass-produced stuff if they all have no income?)
Coming full circle, now an African-American will be the President and an example of racial equality. All the so-called neo-conservativism, and neo-liberalism, has failed. Pragmatism will begin to take its place and dissent with rest with what I hereby designate as Neo-Bohemianism. A future article will take this theme up.