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THE ABSURD TIMES
One of you posted an excellent comment and I thought it deserved a more prominent place.
I agree with all of it, although much of it has to do with his murders. The most absurd thing about McCain, as our contirbuter notes, is his own decision, we are told, to remain a prisoner of war. What is to stop him from saying "I did it, why not other U.S. Citizens?"
My comment is about McCain. In Viet Nam he was one of those fly boys who dropped millions of bombs on the north VN population, right? And they did it for quite a while with impunity until finally China or russia supplied the north with missles to bring down the bombers, right? And so they got a few prisoner airboys before they changed strategy to high altitude bombing. Since they were just bombing civilians and not strategic targets, that worked fine. So, how does that make him a war hero??? Then he doesn't have sense enough to use his get out of jail card. Does that show good judgement?? He speaks with this phoney soft voice while privately he is known to have anger management issues.
Meanwhile, he is an article about another Iriqi leader who actually deserves respect. When Saddam learned that his eldest son killed this man's father, Saddam almost killed him (Uday) and said "You might just as well killed me." This is the one Shia leader who did not hide out in Iran.
Muqtada al-Sadr and the American Dilemma in Iraq
April 09, 2008 By *Patrick Cockburn*
Source: TomDispatch <http://www.tomdispatch.com>
Source: TomDispatch <http://www.tomdispatch.com>
Patrick Cockburn's ZSpace Page </zspace/patrickcockburn>
Join ZSpace <https://www.zcommunications.org/zsustainers/signup>
Muqtada al-Sadr is the most important and surprising figure to emerge in
Iraq since the U.S. invasion. He is the Messianic leader of the
religious and political movement of the impoverished Shia underclass
whose lives were ruined by a quarter of a century of war, repression,
and sanctions.
Iraq since the U.S. invasion. He is the Messianic leader of the
religious and political movement of the impoverished Shia underclass
whose lives were ruined by a quarter of a century of war, repression,
and sanctions.
From the moment he unexpectedly appeared in the dying days of Saddam
Hussein's regime, U.S. emissaries and Iraqi politicians underestimated
him. So far from being the "firebrand cleric" as the Western media often
described him, he often proved astute and cautious in leading his
followers.
Hussein's regime, U.S. emissaries and Iraqi politicians underestimated
him. So far from being the "firebrand cleric" as the Western media often
described him, he often proved astute and cautious in leading his
followers.
During the battle for Najaf with U.S. Marines in 2004, the U.S. "surge"
of 2007, and the escalating war with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council,
he generally sought compromise rather than confrontation. So far from
being the inexperienced young man whom his critics portrayed -- when he
first appeared they denigrated him as a /zatut/ (an "ignorant child," in
Iraqi dialect) -- he was a highly experienced political operator who had
worked in his father's office in Najaf since he was a teenager. He also
had around him activist clerics, of his own age or younger, who had
hands-on experience under Saddam of street politics within the Shia
community. His grasp of what ordinary Iraqis felt was to prove far surer
than that of the politicians isolated in the Green Zone in Baghdad.
of 2007, and the escalating war with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council,
he generally sought compromise rather than confrontation. So far from
being the inexperienced young man whom his critics portrayed -- when he
first appeared they denigrated him as a /zatut/ (an "ignorant child," in
Iraqi dialect) -- he was a highly experienced political operator who had
worked in his father's office in Najaf since he was a teenager. He also
had around him activist clerics, of his own age or younger, who had
hands-on experience under Saddam of street politics within the Shia
community. His grasp of what ordinary Iraqis felt was to prove far surer
than that of the politicians isolated in the Green Zone in Baghdad.
*A Kleptocracy Comparable to the Congo*
Mass movements led by Messianic leaders have a history of flaring up
unexpectedly and then subsiding into insignificance. This could have
happened to Muqtada and the Sadrists but did not, because their
political and religious platform had a continuous appeal for the Shia
masses. From the moment Saddam was overthrown, Muqtada rarely deviated
from his open opposition to the U.S. occupation, even when a majority of
the Shia community was prepared to cooperate with the occupiers.
unexpectedly and then subsiding into insignificance. This could have
happened to Muqtada and the Sadrists but did not, because their
political and religious platform had a continuous appeal for the Shia
masses. From the moment Saddam was overthrown, Muqtada rarely deviated
from his open opposition to the U.S. occupation, even when a majority of
the Shia community was prepared to cooperate with the occupiers.
As the years passed, however, disillusion with the occupation grew among
the Shia until, by September 2007, an opinion poll showed that 73% of
Shia thought that the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq made the security
situation worse, and 55% believed their departure would make a
Shia-Sunni civil war less likely. The U.S. government, Iraqi
politicians, and the Western media habitually failed to recognize the
extent to which hostility to the occupation drove Iraqi politics and, in
the eyes of Iraqis, delegitimized the leaders associated with it.
the Shia until, by September 2007, an opinion poll showed that 73% of
Shia thought that the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq made the security
situation worse, and 55% believed their departure would make a
Shia-Sunni civil war less likely. The U.S. government, Iraqi
politicians, and the Western media habitually failed to recognize the
extent to which hostility to the occupation drove Iraqi politics and, in
the eyes of Iraqis, delegitimized the leaders associated with it.
All governments in Baghdad failed after 2003. Almost no Iraqis supported
Saddam Hussein as U.S. troops advanced on Baghdad. Even his supposedly
loyal Special Republican Guard units dissolved and went home. Iraqis
were deeply conscious that their country sat on some of the world's
largest oil reserves, but Saddam Hussein's Inspector Clouseau-like
ability to make catastrophic errors in peace and war had reduced the
people to a state in which their children were stunted because they did
not get enough to eat.
Saddam Hussein as U.S. troops advanced on Baghdad. Even his supposedly
loyal Special Republican Guard units dissolved and went home. Iraqis
were deeply conscious that their country sat on some of the world's
largest oil reserves, but Saddam Hussein's Inspector Clouseau-like
ability to make catastrophic errors in peace and war had reduced the
people to a state in which their children were stunted because they did
not get enough to eat.
The primal rage of the dispossessed in Iraq against the powers-that-be
exploded in the looting of Baghdad when the old regime fell, and the
same fury possessed Muqtada's early supporters. Had life become easier
in Shia Iraq in the coming years, this might have undermined the Sadrist
movement. Instead, people saw their living standards plummet as
provision of food rations, clean water, and electricity faltered.
Saddam's officials were corrupt enough, but the new government cowering
in the Green Zone rapidly turned into a kleptocracy comparable to
Nigeria or the Congo. Muqtada sensed the loathing with which the
government was regarded, and dodged in and out of government, enjoying
some of the fruits of power while denouncing those who held it.
exploded in the looting of Baghdad when the old regime fell, and the
same fury possessed Muqtada's early supporters. Had life become easier
in Shia Iraq in the coming years, this might have undermined the Sadrist
movement. Instead, people saw their living standards plummet as
provision of food rations, clean water, and electricity faltered.
Saddam's officials were corrupt enough, but the new government cowering
in the Green Zone rapidly turned into a kleptocracy comparable to
Nigeria or the Congo. Muqtada sensed the loathing with which the
government was regarded, and dodged in and out of government, enjoying
some of the fruits of power while denouncing those who held it.
Muqtada's political intelligence is undoubted, but the personality of
this highly secretive man is difficult to pin down. While his father and
elder brothers lived he was in their shadow; after they were
assassinated in 1999 he had every reason to stress his lack of ability
or ambition in order to give the /mukhabarat/ [Saddam Hussein's secret
police] less reason to kill him. As the son and son-in-law of two of
Saddam Hussein's most dangerous opponents, he was a prime suspect and
his every move was watched.
this highly secretive man is difficult to pin down. While his father and
elder brothers lived he was in their shadow; after they were
assassinated in 1999 he had every reason to stress his lack of ability
or ambition in order to give the /mukhabarat/ [Saddam Hussein's secret
police] less reason to kill him. As the son and son-in-law of two of
Saddam Hussein's most dangerous opponents, he was a prime suspect and
his every move was watched.
When Saddam fell, Muqtada stepped forward to claim his forbears'
political inheritance and consciously associated himself with them on
every possible occasion. Posters showed Muqtada alongside Sadr I and
Sadr II [Muqtada's father-in-law and father, both assassinated by
Saddam] against a background of the Iraqi flag. There was more here than
a leader exploiting his connection to a revered or respected parent.
Muqtada persistently emphasized the Sadrist ideological legacy:
puritanical Shia Islam mixed with anti-imperialism and populism.
political inheritance and consciously associated himself with them on
every possible occasion. Posters showed Muqtada alongside Sadr I and
Sadr II [Muqtada's father-in-law and father, both assassinated by
Saddam] against a background of the Iraqi flag. There was more here than
a leader exploiting his connection to a revered or respected parent.
Muqtada persistently emphasized the Sadrist ideological legacy:
puritanical Shia Islam mixed with anti-imperialism and populism.
*Riding the Tiger of the Sadrist Movement*
The first time I thought seriously about Muqtada was a grim day in April
2003 when I heard that he was being accused of killing a friend of mine,
Sayyid Majid al-Khoei, that intelligent and able man with whom I had
often discussed the future of Iraq. Whatever the involvement of Muqtada
himself, which is a matter of dispute, the involvement of the Sadrist
supporters in the lynching is proven and was the start of a pattern that
was to repeat itself over the years.
2003 when I heard that he was being accused of killing a friend of mine,
Sayyid Majid al-Khoei, that intelligent and able man with whom I had
often discussed the future of Iraq. Whatever the involvement of Muqtada
himself, which is a matter of dispute, the involvement of the Sadrist
supporters in the lynching is proven and was the start of a pattern that
was to repeat itself over the years.
Muqtada was always a man riding a tiger, sometimes presiding over,
sometimes controlling the mass movement he nominally led. His words and
actions were often far apart. He appealed for Shia unity with the Sunni
against the occupation, yet after the bombing of the Shia shrine in
Samarra in February 2006, he was seen as an ogre by the Sunni,
orchestrating the pogroms against them and failing to restrain the death
squads of the Mehdi Army. The excuse that it was "rogue elements" among
his militiamen who were carrying out this slaughter is not convincing,
because the butchery was too extensive and too well organized to be the
work of only marginal elements. But the Sadrists and the Shia in general
could argue that it was not they who had originally taken the offensive
against the Sunni, and the Shia community endured massacres at the hands
of al-Qaeda for several years before their patience ran out.
sometimes controlling the mass movement he nominally led. His words and
actions were often far apart. He appealed for Shia unity with the Sunni
against the occupation, yet after the bombing of the Shia shrine in
Samarra in February 2006, he was seen as an ogre by the Sunni,
orchestrating the pogroms against them and failing to restrain the death
squads of the Mehdi Army. The excuse that it was "rogue elements" among
his militiamen who were carrying out this slaughter is not convincing,
because the butchery was too extensive and too well organized to be the
work of only marginal elements. But the Sadrists and the Shia in general
could argue that it was not they who had originally taken the offensive
against the Sunni, and the Shia community endured massacres at the hands
of al-Qaeda for several years before their patience ran out.
Muqtada had repeatedly demanded that Sunni political and religious
leaders unequivocally condemn al-Qaeda in Iraq's horrific attacks on
Shia civilians if he was to cooperate with them against the occupation.
They did not do so, and this was a shortsighted failure on their part,
since the Shia, who outnumbered the Sunni Arabs three to one in Iraq,
controlled the police and much of the army. Their retaliation, when it
came, was bound to be devastating. Muqtada was criticized for not doing
more, but neither he, nor anybody else could have stopped the killing at
the height of the battle for Baghdad in 2006. The Sunni and Shia
communities were both terrified, and each mercilessly retaliated for the
latest atrocity against their community. "We try to punish those who
carry out evil deeds in the name of the Mehdi Army," says Hussein Ali,
the former Mehdi Army leader. "But there are a lot of Shia regions that
are not easy to control and we ourselves, speaking frankly, are
sometimes frightened by these great masses of people."
leaders unequivocally condemn al-Qaeda in Iraq's horrific attacks on
Shia civilians if he was to cooperate with them against the occupation.
They did not do so, and this was a shortsighted failure on their part,
since the Shia, who outnumbered the Sunni Arabs three to one in Iraq,
controlled the police and much of the army. Their retaliation, when it
came, was bound to be devastating. Muqtada was criticized for not doing
more, but neither he, nor anybody else could have stopped the killing at
the height of the battle for Baghdad in 2006. The Sunni and Shia
communities were both terrified, and each mercilessly retaliated for the
latest atrocity against their community. "We try to punish those who
carry out evil deeds in the name of the Mehdi Army," says Hussein Ali,
the former Mehdi Army leader. "But there are a lot of Shia regions that
are not easy to control and we ourselves, speaking frankly, are
sometimes frightened by these great masses of people."
American officials and journalists seldom showed much understanding of
Muqtada, even after [U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority head] Paul
Bremer's disastrous attempt to crush him [in 2004]. There were
persistent attempts to marginalize him or keep him out of government
instead of trying to expand the Iraqi government's narrow support base
to include the Sadrists. The first two elected Shia prime ministers,
Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki, came under intense pressure from
Washington to sever or limit their connection with Muqtada. But
government officials were not alone in being perplexed by the young
cleric. In a lengthy article on him published in its December 4, 2006,
issue, /Newsweek/ admitted that "Muqtada al-Sadr may end up deciding
America's fate in Iraq." But the best the magazine could do to assist
its readers in understanding Muqtada was to suggest that they should
"think of him as a young Mafia don."
Muqtada, even after [U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority head] Paul
Bremer's disastrous attempt to crush him [in 2004]. There were
persistent attempts to marginalize him or keep him out of government
instead of trying to expand the Iraqi government's narrow support base
to include the Sadrists. The first two elected Shia prime ministers,
Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki, came under intense pressure from
Washington to sever or limit their connection with Muqtada. But
government officials were not alone in being perplexed by the young
cleric. In a lengthy article on him published in its December 4, 2006,
issue, /Newsweek/ admitted that "Muqtada al-Sadr may end up deciding
America's fate in Iraq." But the best the magazine could do to assist
its readers in understanding Muqtada was to suggest that they should
"think of him as a young Mafia don."
Of course, Muqtada was the complete opposite to the type of Iraqi leader
who proponents of the war in Washington had suggested would take over
from Saddam Hussein. Instead of the smooth, dark-suited,
English-speaking exiles who the White House had hoped would turn Iraq
into a compliant U.S. ally, Muqtada looked too much like a younger
version of Ayatollah Khomeini.
who proponents of the war in Washington had suggested would take over
from Saddam Hussein. Instead of the smooth, dark-suited,
English-speaking exiles who the White House had hoped would turn Iraq
into a compliant U.S. ally, Muqtada looked too much like a younger
version of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Muqtada epitomized the central dilemma of the United States in Iraq,
which it has never resolved. The problem was that the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein and his Sunni regime was bound to be followed by
elections that would produce a government dominated by the Shia allied
to the Kurds. It soon became evident that the Shia parties that were
going to triumph in any election would be Islamic parties, and some
would have close links to Iran.
which it has never resolved. The problem was that the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein and his Sunni regime was bound to be followed by
elections that would produce a government dominated by the Shia allied
to the Kurds. It soon became evident that the Shia parties that were
going to triumph in any election would be Islamic parties, and some
would have close links to Iran.
The Arab Sunni states were aghast at the sight of Iran's defeat in the
Iran-Iraq war being reversed, and spoke of a menacing "Shia axis"
developing in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Much of this was ignorance and
paranoia on the part of the Arab leaders. Had the Iranians been tempted
to make Iraq a client state they would have found the country as prickly
a place for Iranians as it was to be for Americans. It was the U.S.
attempt to create an anti-Iranian Iraq that was to play into Iranian
hands and produce the very situation that Washington was trying to avoid.
Iran-Iraq war being reversed, and spoke of a menacing "Shia axis"
developing in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Much of this was ignorance and
paranoia on the part of the Arab leaders. Had the Iranians been tempted
to make Iraq a client state they would have found the country as prickly
a place for Iranians as it was to be for Americans. It was the U.S.
attempt to create an anti-Iranian Iraq that was to play into Iranian
hands and produce the very situation that Washington was trying to avoid.
The more Washington threatened air strikes on Iran because of its
nuclear program, the more the Iranians sought to make sure that it had
the potential to strike back at American forces in Iraq. Before he was
executed, Sadr I believed that he had been let down by Iran; Sadr II had
bad relations with Tehran; and at first Muqtada denounced his Shia
opponents in SCIRI and the Marji'iyyah as being Iranian stooges. But
American pressure meant that the Sadrists had to look to Iran for help,
and in a military confrontation the Mehdi Army saw Iran as an essential
source of weapons and military expertise.
nuclear program, the more the Iranians sought to make sure that it had
the potential to strike back at American forces in Iraq. Before he was
executed, Sadr I believed that he had been let down by Iran; Sadr II had
bad relations with Tehran; and at first Muqtada denounced his Shia
opponents in SCIRI and the Marji'iyyah as being Iranian stooges. But
American pressure meant that the Sadrists had to look to Iran for help,
and in a military confrontation the Mehdi Army saw Iran as an essential
source of weapons and military expertise.
*The New Iraqi Political Landscape*
On reappearing after his four-month disappearance in May 2007, Muqtada
called for a united front of Sunni and Shia and identified the U.S.
occupation and al-Qaeda in Iraq as the enemies of both communities. The
call was probably sincere, but it was also too late. Baghdad was now
largely a Shia city, and people were too frightened to go back to their
old homes. The U.S. "surge" had contributed to the sharp drop in
sectarian killings, but it was also true that the Shia had won and there
were few mixed areas left.
called for a united front of Sunni and Shia and identified the U.S.
occupation and al-Qaeda in Iraq as the enemies of both communities. The
call was probably sincere, but it was also too late. Baghdad was now
largely a Shia city, and people were too frightened to go back to their
old homes. The U.S. "surge" had contributed to the sharp drop in
sectarian killings, but it was also true that the Shia had won and there
were few mixed areas left.
The U.S. commander General David Petraeus claimed that security was
improving, but only a trickle of Iraqis who had fled their homes were
returning. Muqtada was the one Shia leader capable of uniting with the
Sunni on a nationalist platform, but the Sunni Arabs of Iraq had never
accepted that their rule had ended. If Sunni and Shia could not live on
the same street, they could hardly share a common identity.
improving, but only a trickle of Iraqis who had fled their homes were
returning. Muqtada was the one Shia leader capable of uniting with the
Sunni on a nationalist platform, but the Sunni Arabs of Iraq had never
accepted that their rule had ended. If Sunni and Shia could not live on
the same street, they could hardly share a common identity.
The political and military landscape of Iraq changed in 2007 as the
Sunni population turned on al-Qaeda. This started before the "surge,"
but it was still an important development. Al-Qaeda's massive suicide
bombs targeting civilians had been the main fuel for Shia-Sunni
sectarian warfare since 2003. The Sunni Arabs and many of the insurgent
groups had turned against al-Qaeda after it tried to monopolize power
within the Sunni community at the end of 2006 by declaring the Islamic
State of Iraq. Crucial in the change was al-Qaeda's attempt to draft one
son from every Sunni family into its ranks. Sunni with lowly jobs with
the government such as garbage collectors were killed.
Sunni population turned on al-Qaeda. This started before the "surge,"
but it was still an important development. Al-Qaeda's massive suicide
bombs targeting civilians had been the main fuel for Shia-Sunni
sectarian warfare since 2003. The Sunni Arabs and many of the insurgent
groups had turned against al-Qaeda after it tried to monopolize power
within the Sunni community at the end of 2006 by declaring the Islamic
State of Iraq. Crucial in the change was al-Qaeda's attempt to draft one
son from every Sunni family into its ranks. Sunni with lowly jobs with
the government such as garbage collectors were killed.
By the fall of 2007 the U.S. military command in Baghdad was trumpeting
successes over al-Qaeda, saying it had been largely eliminated in Anbar,
Baghdad, and Diyala. But the Sunni Arab fighters, by now armed and paid
for by the United States, did not owe their prime loyalty to the Iraqi
government. Muqtada might speak of new opportunities for pan-Iraqi
opposition to the U.S. occupation, but many anti-al-Qaeda Sunni fighters
had quite different ideas. They wanted to reverse the Shia victory in
the 2006 battle of Baghdad.
successes over al-Qaeda, saying it had been largely eliminated in Anbar,
Baghdad, and Diyala. But the Sunni Arab fighters, by now armed and paid
for by the United States, did not owe their prime loyalty to the Iraqi
government. Muqtada might speak of new opportunities for pan-Iraqi
opposition to the U.S. occupation, but many anti-al-Qaeda Sunni fighters
had quite different ideas. They wanted to reverse the Shia victory in
the 2006 battle of Baghdad.
A new breed of American-supported Sunni warlords was emerging. One of
them, Abu Abed, is a former member of the insurgent Islamic Army. He
operates in the Amariya district of west Baghdad, where he is a
commander of the U.S.-backed Amariya Knights, whom the U.S. calls
Concerned Citizens. His stated objectives show that the rise of the new
Sunni militias may mark only a new stage in a sectarian civil war.
"Amariya is just the beginning," says Abu Abed. "After we finish with
al-Qaida here, we will turn towards our main enemy, the Shia militias. I
will liberate Jihad [the mixed Sunni-Shia area near Amariya taken over
by the Mehdi Army], then Saadiya and the whole of west Baghdad."
them, Abu Abed, is a former member of the insurgent Islamic Army. He
operates in the Amariya district of west Baghdad, where he is a
commander of the U.S.-backed Amariya Knights, whom the U.S. calls
Concerned Citizens. His stated objectives show that the rise of the new
Sunni militias may mark only a new stage in a sectarian civil war.
"Amariya is just the beginning," says Abu Abed. "After we finish with
al-Qaida here, we will turn towards our main enemy, the Shia militias. I
will liberate Jihad [the mixed Sunni-Shia area near Amariya taken over
by the Mehdi Army], then Saadiya and the whole of west Baghdad."
The al-Sadr family has an extraordinary record of resistance to Saddam
Hussein, for which they paid a heavy price. One of the gravest errors in
Iraq by the United States was to try to marginalize Muqtada and his
movement. Had he been part of the political process from the beginning,
the chances of creating a peaceful, prosperous Iraq would have been
greater.
Hussein, for which they paid a heavy price. One of the gravest errors in
Iraq by the United States was to try to marginalize Muqtada and his
movement. Had he been part of the political process from the beginning,
the chances of creating a peaceful, prosperous Iraq would have been
greater.
In any real accommodation between Shia and Sunni, the Sadrists must play
a central role. Muqtada probably represented his constituency of
millions of poor Shia better than anybody else could have done. But he
never wholly controlled his own movement, and never created as
well-disciplined a force as Hezbollah in Lebanon. None of his ambitions
for reconciliation with the Sunni could take wing unless the Mehdi Army
ceased to be identified with death squads and sectarian cleansing.
a central role. Muqtada probably represented his constituency of
millions of poor Shia better than anybody else could have done. But he
never wholly controlled his own movement, and never created as
well-disciplined a force as Hezbollah in Lebanon. None of his ambitions
for reconciliation with the Sunni could take wing unless the Mehdi Army
ceased to be identified with death squads and sectarian cleansing.
The war in Iraq has gone on longer than World War I and, while violence
diminished in the second half of 2007, nothing has been resolved. The
differences between Shia and Sunni, the disputes within the respective
communities, and the antagonism against the U.S. occupation are all as
great as ever. The only way the Sadrists and the Mehdi Army could create
confidence among the Sunni that Muqtada meant what he said when he
called for unity, would be for them to be taken back voluntarily into
the areas in Baghdad and elsewhere from which they have been driven. But
there is no sign of this happening. The disintegration of Iraq has
probably gone too far for the country to exist as anything more than a
loose federation.
diminished in the second half of 2007, nothing has been resolved. The
differences between Shia and Sunni, the disputes within the respective
communities, and the antagonism against the U.S. occupation are all as
great as ever. The only way the Sadrists and the Mehdi Army could create
confidence among the Sunni that Muqtada meant what he said when he
called for unity, would be for them to be taken back voluntarily into
the areas in Baghdad and elsewhere from which they have been driven. But
there is no sign of this happening. The disintegration of Iraq has
probably gone too far for the country to exist as anything more than a
loose federation.
/Patrick Cockburn is the Iraq correspondent for The Independent in
London. He has visited Iraq countless times since 1977 and was recipient
of the 2004 Martha Gellhorn Prize for war reporting as well as the 2006
James Cameron Memorial Award. His book *The Occupation: War and
Resistance in Iraq*, was short-listed for a National Book Critics Circle
Award in 2007. This essay is the last chapter in his new book, Muqtada:
Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1416551476/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20>,
just published by Scribner./
London. He has visited Iraq countless times since 1977 and was recipient
of the 2004 Martha Gellhorn Prize for war reporting as well as the 2006
James Cameron Memorial Award. His book *The Occupation: War and
Resistance in Iraq*, was short-listed for a National Book Critics Circle
Award in 2007. This essay is the last chapter in his new book, Muqtada:
Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1416551476/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20>,
just published by Scribner./
*From Muqtada
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1416551476/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20> by
Patrick Cockburn. Copyright © 2008 by Patrick Cockburn. Reprinted by
permission of Scribner, an Imprint of Simon & Schuster, Inc.*
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1416551476/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20> by
Patrick Cockburn. Copyright © 2008 by Patrick Cockburn. Reprinted by
permission of Scribner, an Imprint of Simon & Schuster, Inc.*
[This article first appeared on Tomdispatch.com
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/>, a weblog of the Nation Institute, which
offers a steady flow of alternate sources, news, and opinion from Tom
Engelhardt, long time editor in publishing, /co-founder of the American
Empire Project <http://www.americanempireproject.com/>/ and author of
/The End of Victory Culture
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/155849586X/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20>
(University of Massachusetts Press), which has just been thoroughly
updated in a newly issued edition that deals with victory culture's
crash-and-burn sequel in Iraq./]
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/>, a weblog of the Nation Institute, which
offers a steady flow of alternate sources, news, and opinion from Tom
Engelhardt, long time editor in publishing, /co-founder of the American
Empire Project <http://www.americanempireproject.com/>/ and author of
/The End of Victory Culture
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/155849586X/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20>
(University of Massachusetts Press), which has just been thoroughly
updated in a newly issued edition that deals with victory culture's
crash-and-burn sequel in Iraq./]
