Showing posts with label POW. Show all posts
Showing posts with label POW. Show all posts

Thursday, June 05, 2014

EGYPT, SYRIA, MILITARY, ETC.



EGYPT, SYRIA, MILITARY, ETC.





We have a couple of Latuff's cartoons this time.  The first one, above, came to me the day after our last edition when we published the latest information over Sisi's election in Egypt.  It remains the only virtue of Sisi that he at least not claim that God told him to do what he has been doing.  Other than that, he attacks journalists, his own citizens, etc.  Naturally, the U.S. likes him.  Saudi Arabia does not and he will not return the money they sent Egypt while the Moslem Brotherhood was running the show over there.  Hardly anyone showed up to vote, and Latuff makes the point.



The one above here is Latuff's impression of the vote in Syria.  Obviously, he feels that the election was not entirely democratic.  Still, most of his enemies are either U.S. supported or religious fanatics.  Christians are especially terrified of these enemies as well as most sane Moslems.  Still, Latuff at least speaks his mind and actually has a mind to speak of.

 

Around here, things are getting even more absurd than usual, especially concerning the military, and not because the military is a force for evil, either.  Both the VA idiocy and the recent crap about a POW exchange has made most people in the mainstream media, not to mention the lunatic right, transparently subhuman, an argument for post-term abortion.  (I realize that most of them will not even get that last clause.  No matter.)

There are gloating idiocies coming from the right about the fact that the POW's home town has cancelled his welcome back.  The reason, of course, in that the town only has a population of 8,000, is in Idaho, the county is larger that a few eastern states and has a population of 22,000, and the place is simply not equipped to handle the influx of media and morons that such a celebration would cause.  They simply do not have enough electricity, for example, let alone police.

First, some important information about the POW himself.  Our administration was told during negotiations that if word leaked about the impending exchange, the POW would be executed before being released.  I would not trust our Congress to keep that secret for the 30 days they are complaining about, so Diane Feinstein is an even bigger liar than we first thought.

Second, the guy himself was hardly a deserter or a "coward," but more about cowardice later.  There is no point educating these right wingers about military justice as they should at least know that much, but they will not know.  To paraphrase, there are none so ignorant as those who *will* not know.

One of this group, now on the House Intelligence Committee thinks we need a President like Benjamin Franklin again.  Right. 

Third, the cowardice of these people is overwhelming.  The argument against letting these "prisoners" go to Qutar is that they might attack us.  I'm not afraid of them.  Why are they?  And weren't they kidnapped by us in the first place?

Forget the numbers now:  the VA is next.  It does not matter how many people the right wing manage to get fired over this.  The real criminals in the lack of treatment for veterans are those people who manufactured so many veterans in the first place by sending people to Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places without providing adequate funding for their health care when they got back.  Does anyone remember the families holding bake sales to send equipment to the sons in Iraq?

Well, another of these people wants to pass a bill providing that any woman who gets an abortion after being raped should get the same sentence as her rapist.  I am not making this up.

At any rate, here are a couple of interviews of the military subject:


THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 2014

Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl’s Idaho Hometown Cancels "Welcome Home" Celebration as Backlash Grows

The backlash over the prisoner swap involving U.S. soldier Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl and five members of the Taliban continues to grow. In Bergdahl’s hometown of Hailey, Idaho, community members have a canceled a celebration of his release over public safety concerns. In recent days, angry phone calls and emails poured into Hailey city hall and local organizations over the town’s support for the soldier. Bergdahl was captured by the Taliban in 2009 shortly after he left his military outpost in Afghanistan. Some of Bergdahl’s fellow soldiers have described him as a deserter. They have also said at least six soldiers died while searching for him, a claim the Pentagon rejects. We discuss the Bergdahl controversy and its local impact in Idaho with Larry Schoen, a county commissioner in Blaine County.

TRANSCRIPT

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: The backlash continues to grow over the prisoner swap involving U.S. soldier Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl and five members of the Taliban. In Bergdahl’s hometown of Hailey, Idaho, community members have canceled a celebration of his release over public safety concerns. In recent days, angry phone calls and e-mails poured into Hailey City Hall and local organizations over the town support for the soldier. Bergdahl was captured by the Taliban in 2009 shortly after he left his military outpost in Afghanistan. He was held by the Taliban or five years. Some of Bergdahl’s fellow soldiers have described him as a deserter. They’ve also claimed at least six soldiers died while searching for him. On Wednesday, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel rejected that claim.
CHUCK HAGEL: On Sergeant Bergdahl, I do not know of specific circumstances or details of U.S. soldiers dying as a result of efforts to find and rescue Sergeant Bergdahl. I am not aware of those specific details or any facts regarding that issue.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: On Capitol Hill, four top intelligence and military officials held an unusual closed-door briefing for the entire Senate on Wednesday to discuss why the White House decided to move ahead with the prisoner swap without notifying Congress. Senators were shown a recent video of Bowe Bergdahl depicting him in declining health. Meanwhile, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina warned that Republican lawmakers would call for Obama’s impeachment if you release more prisoners from Guantánamo Bay without congressional approval.
AMY GOODMAN: In another development, The Wall Street Journal reports that during the prisoner exchange negotiations, the Taliban warned that U.S. drone strikes had come close on several occasions to killing Sergeant Bergdahl while he was in captivity. To talk more about the story, we first go to Idaho where we’re joined by Larry Schoen, he’s the County Commissioner for Blaine County, Idaho. Hailey is one of the five cities in Blaine County. Welcome to Democracy Now! Can you talk first about, first, Larry, the decision to cancel the celebrations upon the return of Bowe Bergdahl, though we don’t know when that will be?
LARRY SCHOEN: Well, first thing, good morning, and thank you for having me. And I speak very mindful of all of those who have given so much in service of the best intentions of the mission in Afghanistan. I was not in on the decision-making to cancel the event. But I think there were concerns about — that the event would become too large for local officials to manage. I think some people have felt the temperature rising here as disagreements about what may have happened have come to the floor on the national stage. Really, I think nobody here wants to channel some of the nastiness that is out there. People are rushing to judgment, and I think that is inappropriate. And I think in light of circumstances today, the decision was made to cancel the event several weeks ahead of it to tamp that down.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And Larry Schoen, can you tell us something about your corner of the country where Bowe Bergdahl grew up?
LARRY SCHOEN: Well, this is a beautiful part of the country. Idaho is a state with more wilderness than any state in the lower 48. People come here to recreate and be part of the great outdoors. Our community is small. It is about 22,000, but made up of people who have come to live here and visit here from all over the world. It is home to the Sun Valley resort, which was America’s first ski resort founded back in the 1930’s. And so it is a very close-knit community, well-educated community. People support one another in tough times. And I think that was the nature of this event, is to show support for the Bergdahl family and Sergeant Bergdahl who has been held by the Taliban for five years.
AMY GOODMAN: Larry Schoen, yours is in an usual community in that you have the great wealth of the celebrities like Bruce Willis and Demi Moore, their home there — though they are divorced, but what they have there. And then you have got working-class people. You’ve got for example, you the Bergdahls who moved from California, Calvinist, homeschooled their kids both Bowe and his older sister Skye. He worked at the Zany’s coffee shop. Can you tell us a little bit about that as a community center? And actually was was well-known for his ballet performances, Bowe Bergdahl was.
LARRY SCHOEN: Right, well, people focus on the celebrity aspects of this community because people have been coming here from Southern California since the 1930’s. In fact, that was part of the marketing of this resort when it first opened. But this is a working-class community. The Zaney’s is a coffee shop owned by an old friend of mine who opened it because that’s what — she loves being with people. She loves serving people. It is a place where Bowe worked and therefore has become kind of the Mecca in town. Our county is bigger than the state of Delaware with only 22,000 people. People tend to congregate in the towns, but the Bergdahls, like I, live out in the rural parts of the county. That has been a gathering place. I think that is appropriate. I think people have tried to show their support over the course of these five years. Needed a place to do that, and Zaney’s was a good place. The job that he held there was one of the many things this young man has done in his short life.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And how has the uproar in Washington and across the media, now nationwide, over whether Bowe Bergdahl was a deserter and should have been rescued — how has that affected the town and its support for the family?
LARRY SCHOEN: I think it has, I think it’s shaking the town because I think, first and foremost and certainly I as an elected official here, think about the family and the family and their son, our native son, and what they need to get through this ordeal. The whole five years of captivity and now this ordeal in the national press, the global press. So, we are thinking first about them. And this is — from our perspective, this is not, first and foremost, about national and military policy and U.S. foreign policy, but certainly, the issues surrounding his release — this is a very complex story. There are ties to U.S. foreign policy coming out of this really hometown story about this young man. So, I think people are shaken by that. I think people are trying to not rush to judgment here locally. I think everybody knows what is right and what is wrong, and many of the different actions that have occurred. So, we have many different components to the story. There is the question of what was his state of mind when he left his base and went missing, was it appropriate for the U.S. government to release these five Taliban under the circumstances? There are many different parts of that story. We are feeling the effects of the global story, but trying to focus, I think, on the health and welfare of the Bergdahl family.
AMY GOODMAN: And Larry Schoen, you know Bowe’s parents Bob and Jani Bergdahl. Can you tell us a little about them?
LARRY SCHOEN: They are wonderful people. It is a loving family. They are loving people. I am sure they instilled in their son the best values that America has to offer. And I support them 100% through all of this.
AMY GOODMAN: Bob Bergdahl worked at, what, UPS for some — well, close to three decades.
LARRY SCHOEN: Yeah, I don’t really know how long he work for UPS, but he is well-known in town. He’s been criticized for having spoken local Afghanistan language, the Pashtun. And now he’s been criticized for a number of different things because people are just searching for things to criticize in this event. But really, Bob is a very thoughtful man. I think he — and he expressed publicly any times that his goals and intentions were to stand in solidarity with his son, and to try as best he could and as best they could to appreciate and understand his circumstances and the circumstances of his comrades in Afghanistan. I think the Bergdahls have acted with only the best intentions toward their son and this country.
AMY GOODMAN: Larry Schoen, I want to thank you for being with us, County Commissioner for Blaine County, Idaho. Hailey is one of the five cities in Blaine County. The Bergdahls live just outside Hailey b and Bowe grew up just outside Hailey and worked at this well known watering hole, Zaney’s coffee shop, which is why he was very well known in the community. This is Democracy Now! When we come back, we’re going to speak to a soldier who served years in the military. He was in Afghanistan at the same time as Bowe Bergdahl. And when he came back to the United States, he applied for conscientious objector status. Stay with us.

Creative Commons LicenseThe original content of this program is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. Please attribute legal copies of this work to democracynow.org. Some of the work(s) that this program incorporates, however, may be separately licensed. For further information or additional permissions, contact us.

THURSDAY, JUNE 5, 2014

Veteran: Politicians Using Freed POW Bowe Bergdahl as "Chess Piece to Win Political Matches"

The Obama administration is seeking to contain a congressional backlash over a prisoner exchange that saw the release of American soldier Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban leaders. On Wednesday, top intelligence and military officials held a closed-door briefing for the entire Senate showing them a recent video of Bergdahl in declining health. The administration says the video helped spur action to win his release over fears his life was in danger. Opponents of the deal say the White House failed to give Congress proper notice, and may have endangered American lives by encouraging the capture of U.S. soldiers. The criticism has exploded as news spread through right-wing media that Bergdahl may have left his base after turning against the war. We are joined by Brock McIntosh, a member of Iraq Veterans Against the War who served in Afghanistan from November 2008 to August 2009. McIntosh applied for conscientious objector status and was discharged last month.

TRANSCRIPT

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: As this controversy brews, it’s on so many different levels. You’ve got the controversial prisoner swap and the whole issue of is this leading to the closing of Guantánamo, and then you’ve got Bowe Bergdahl leaving the base, not really fully understood at this point because we have not talked to Bowe Bergdahl. And once he left the base, he was not spoken to again except through Taliban videos of him. The question is being raised, did he desert? The question is being raised and he’s being condemned in the mainstream media for his antiwar views.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Well, we’re going to talk more about the Bowe Bergdahl story. We go now to Brock McIntosh in Washington, D.C. He fought with Army National Guard in Afghanistan from November 2008 to August 2009. And was based near where Bergdahl was captured. McIntosh had later applied for conscientious objector status and joined Iraq veterans against the war. Brock McIntosh, welcome back toDemocracy Now!
BROCK MCINTOSH: Thanks for having me.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: Your initial reaction to the uproar in Congress and around the country over the prisoner swap with Bowe Bergdahl?
BROCK MCINTOSH: You just played a song called "Masters of War" and there’s a lyric where it talks about you to hide behind walls, you that hide behind desks, I just wanted to know I can see through your masks. And I think that that is a perfect description of what we’re seeing in Congress right now. These people who hide behind walls and hide behind desks, and are using a POW as a chess piece to win political matches. And that last week, used a wounded veteran with nearly 40 years of military service, General Shinseki, as a political chess piece. And so, I think it is outrageous we know nothing about the actual circumstances of why exactly Sergeant Bergdahl left. We don’t know what his intentions were. It is all speculation at this point. All we know for sure is that he was a POW and he should have been welcomed home.
AMY GOODMAN: And Brock, tell us where you were in Afghanistan in relation to Bowe Bergdahl. You served at the same time, though didn’t know each other.
BROCK MCINTOSH: Sure Amy. I served in Paktika Province initially for six months. That’s where Bowe Bergdahl went missing for six months. Spent the last three months in Khost Province. Those last three months were when Bowe Bergdahl went missing. He went missing in June 30, and I left Afghanistan in August 2009.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And in terms of this whole — the allegations that in the search for Bergdahl, all of these soldiers, several American soldiers were lost or killed. The — only The New York Times, among the commercial media, has really raised the issue that many of these soldiers are being brought out by Republican political operative and made available to the various media. Your — what you understand about these other soldiers who were killed around the same time while Bergdahl was in captivity?
BROCK MCINTOSH: Right, so I think the story that is being told in the media makes it seem as though there was a unit that received — that was briefed about some rescue mission and they went out on this rescue mission to locate and extract Sergeant Bergdahl and six people died in the process. That is really not the case. Bergdahl went missing on June 30. Those six soldiers that died died two months later in four separate missions. And it is not clear to what extent those missions had anything to do with searching for Bergdahl. They certainly were not rescue missions. I mean one of them — one of those deaths involved an American soldier being killed supporting an Afghan national security force mission. That is not a rescue mission. We don’t know why exactly the six soldiers died. There’s all sorts of things that could explain it. Let’s not forget that summer season is fighting season in Afghanistan. It could have been that they died in late August and early September because it was late in the summer, and it was right before the winter, and attacks always ramp up at that time of year. It could also be explained by the fact that in 2009, the Obama administration initiated this protracted insurgency campaign and a surge in Afghanistan. So, there are all sorts of things that could explain why the soldiers died. And I think it is unfair to assert that Bergdahl went missing and therefore these soldiers died. And another thing also, in Bergdahl’s unit, they had gone a few months without any fatalities. The first fatality was five days before Bergdahl went missing. So, it could have just been that he happened to have gone missing at a time when there were increased attacks and people were being killed. What’s unfortunate is that he is being used, again, as a political chess piece in a political game and conservatives are using the allegations of soldiers in his unit to imply that this man wasn’t a hero and therefore, President Obama is not a hero for bringing this soldier home.
AMY GOODMAN: Looking at Buzzfeed describing who Juan was just talking about, this former Bush administration official, hired then resigned, Mitt Romney foreign policy spokesperson, played a key role in publicizing critics of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl. The involvement of Richard Grenell who once served as a key aide to Bush, to — rather to the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. ,John Bolton, later worked on Romney’s campaign. I wanted to go back, though, to 2009, to the soldiers who Bowe Bergdahl worked with in that tiny outpost that they built in Afghanistan. We had Sean Smith on a few days ago, a Guardian videographer and photographer who produced a film back in 2009 as well as one when he went to Idaho and met Bowe’s father, Bob Bergdahl, which we also played and I encourage people to go to democracynow.org to see all of that. Sean Smith spent a month embedded with Bowe Bergdahl’s unit in Afghanistan. In this clip, we hear from some of the soldiers stationed with Bowe.
SOLDIER ONE: These people just want to be left alone.
SOLDIER TWO: Yeah, they got dicked with from the Russians for 17 years and then now we’re here.
SOLDIER ONE: Same thing in Iraq when I was there. These people just want to be left alone. Have their crops, weddings, stuff like that, that’s it man.
SOLDIER TWO: I’m glad they leave them alone.
SEAN SMITH: A few weeks later, Bowe Bergdahl, pictured in this photo, disappeared. The circumstances are unclear.
AMY GOODMAN: That is from the 2009 video for The Guardian produced by Sean Smith. Michael Hastings would further right about that, the late reporter for Rolling Stone. Brock McIntosh, can you talk about your feelings when you were in Afghanistan, what was happening there? We have seen the e-mails that Michael Hastings wrote about in Rolling Stone of Bowe to his parents, talking about his disillusionment with the war. What were your thoughts and the thoughts of other soldiers? Sean Smith, a reporter for The Guardian, said it was not unusual, more so among Americans and British soldiers in Afghanistan, to be highly critical of what was happening.
BROCK MCINTOSH: It is really hard — it was really hard to hear that clip, Amy, because it reminded me so much of the conversations that I had while I was in Afghanistan. There was so much talk about — within my unit about these Afghan people and how they just want to be left alone. And we were all aware of the role the U.S. played during the Cold War. Using the Afghan people as a proxy to get back at the Soviet Union, using the lives of Afghans as political chess pieces and gamesmanship? And so to then be in Afghanistan to help people, to help the Afghan people felt very disingenuous. We never had any clear sense exactly why we were there, what it was that we were supposed to be doing, why these people are shooting at us, who was shooting at us. Who are we shooting at? Why are we shooting at them? And it really eats away at you and it becomes a situation where all you want to do is you just want to come home and want your buddies on your left and your right to come home. And it’s — what are you supposed to do in a situation where you find yourself — you find yourself in a conflict that you don’t agree with, where people are dying on both sides? What are you supposed to do? What recourse do you have? I did not know that the conscientious objector process existed. That’s one recourse you can take. But I didn’t know that that existed. There’s an overwhelming lack of awareness that there’s a formal process where you, when you have a conscientious shift, you can actually leave the military.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: And even your commanders at times are not aware of these options. Could you talk about that confronting your own commander — or your sense that you wanted to go into conscientious objector status?
BROCK MCINTOSH: Right. When I initially applied, it through my commander off guard. I actually applied on the very first day in my new unit, and so my commander was thrown off guard both because it was my first day meeting him and also because he didn’t think that that process was possible. You can’t just leave because you morally disagree with war. But it turns out you can. And to his credit, he read about the regulations and he actually drafted a document that we signed together saying I did not have to study, use or bear arms.
AMY GOODMAN: Now, what did that mean? Where were you, Brock?
BROCK MCINTOSH: Well, I had applied actually after about a year or so after I had come home. And I transferred from an Illinois National Guard unit to a D.C. state unit, and that is when I applied.
AMY GOODMAN: And what was that process you went through? You started serving in, what, November 2008, you were in Afghanistan ’til August 2009.
BROCK MCINTOSH: I started serving in November, August 2008. Like so many soldiers, I wanted nothing more but to just make this war work and to help the Afghan people. And again, it became increasingly frustrated when you did not know why you were there and you didn’t why these people were shooting at you or who you were supposed to be — or why you were shooting and who you were shooting. I wanted to make the war work. And so, in that process of trying to make the war work, I started reading about the history and culture of Afghanistan, just like Bowe’s father did. And like Bowe, it became really discomforting to learn about the relationship that the U.S. has had with that country for the past 30 years and all the problems it has created for the past 30 years. And there were certain first-hand experience I had — experiences I had that were unnerving, like seeing a 16-year-old bomb maker get blown up. He came to our base to be treated. And we took turns babysitting his body in one hour shifts. And when I was alone with him in this room, thinking how crazy it is that me as a 20 world and the 16-year-old are being sent to kill each other by these adult for these ideologies that we don’t quite understand. It’s just a sad situation.
JUAN GONZÁLEZ: According to Rolling Stone magazine Bergdahl sent a final e-mail to his parents on June 27, three days before he was captured. He wrote, "The future is too good to waste on lies... And life is way to short to care for the damnation of others as well as to spend it helping fools with their ideas that are wrong. I’ve seen their ideas and I’m ashamed to even be American. The horror of the self-righteous arrogance that they thrive in. Is is all revolting. I am sorry for everything here... These people need help, yet what they get is the conceited country in the world telling them that they are nothing and that they are stupid, that they have no idea how to live. The horror that is America is disgusting." In that email, he also referred to seeing an Afghan child run over by U.S. military vehicle. Your reaction to some of those words?
BROCK MCINTOSH: I want to react to one thing — to one aspect of that statement, and that was about lies. We were lied — we as veterans were lied to about the Iraq war. We were lied to by the Bush administration and with the endorsement of Congress, we went into Iraq. Nearly 5000 American soldiers were killed, well over 100,000 Iraqi civilians were killed, based on that line. There has been a lot of talk over the last few months about a lie that was told that the Phoenix VA Hospital about these secret waiting lists. I find it really ironic that Congress is so obsessed about figuring out who lied at the Phoenix VA Hospital and the circumstances of that lie that are connected to the deaths of 40 veterans, when a lie that they told killed nearly 5000 American soldiers and over 100,000 Iraqi civilians. And what they’re doing is they’re trying to defer blame from themselves. Congress is the reason that we have waiting lists. ’Congress is the reason that we deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and deployed over 2 million veterans and have this influx of veterans that are fighting to get V.A. health care.
AMY GOODMAN: You know, it is interesting you raise this, Brock, because last week at this time, everyone nonstop across all of the media was talking about whether General Shinseki would resign and about the horror of the V.A., the waits that people have when they come home from war, one to two years. And within two days, then that is all wiped off of the face of the media and this is the controversy that takes its place. But you see these as connected.
BROCK MCINTOSH: Well, I’m not sure if they’re connected. It could be that this happened at a time when the Obama administration anticipated General Shinseki stepping down. I don’t know, but I see a connection in Congress’ willingness to exploit other people’s service for political gamesmanship. Last week, they scapegoated General Shinseki, a wounded veteran who served for nearly 40 years, they scapegoated him to defer blame from themselves and the role that they played in creating these wait lists and failing to prepare for the cost of veterans coming home. When we went to Iraq and we went to Afghanistan, they did not set aside the necessary funds that would be required to care for our veterans to come home and to make the systematic changes that would need to be made. So the Congress played a huge role in creating those wait lists and the problems that the V.A. is facing and they scapegoated a veteran last week. And this week, they’re now taking advantage of a POW and using him for political games and it is pretty sick and pretty disgusting and it’s pretty shameful.
AMY GOODMAN: Brock, finally, did you ever get conscientious objector status?
BROCK MCINTOSH: I did not get conscientious objector status. You know, the process for reserve soldiers, it’s supposed to take about six months, three months for active soldiers. But, the process is always — there are always obstacles and barriers in the process. You always have to butt has with officers. They lose your paperwork. You really need to have legal assistance in order to get c.o. status because the process is so difficult. If more veterans were aware, more soldiers were where aware that c.o. process exists and if there were reforms made to the c.o. process, we may not have had a situation where a soldier had a conscientious change of heart and left his post because he didn’t realize that there were formal recourses of actions that he could have taken. Not saying that that’s the reason why Sergeant Bergdahl left, we don’t know. But, the point is, I think we could avoid potential situations like this if we reform the c.o. process and if more soldiers are made aware that that process exists.
AMY GOODMAN: Brock McIntosh we want to thank you so much for being with us. A soldier served in Afghanistan in 2008 and 2009, applied for conscientious objector status and was discharged in May of 2014. He’s a member of Iraq Veterans Against the war.

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Thursday, April 10, 2008

No to McCain

THE ABSURD TIMES





One of you posted an excellent comment and I thought it deserved a more prominent place.
I agree with all of it, although much of it has to do with his murders. The most absurd thing about McCain, as our contirbuter notes, is his own decision, we are told, to remain a prisoner of war. What is to stop him from saying "I did it, why not other U.S. Citizens?"
My comment is about McCain. In Viet Nam he was one of those fly boys who dropped millions of bombs on the north VN population, right? And they did it for quite a while with impunity until finally China or russia supplied the north with missles to bring down the bombers, right? And so they got a few prisoner airboys before they changed strategy to high altitude bombing. Since they were just bombing civilians and not strategic targets, that worked fine. So, how does that make him a war hero??? Then he doesn't have sense enough to use his get out of jail card. Does that show good judgement?? He speaks with this phoney soft voice while privately he is known to have anger management issues.
Meanwhile, he is an article about another Iriqi leader who actually deserves respect. When Saddam learned that his eldest son killed this man's father, Saddam almost killed him (Uday) and said "You might just as well killed me." This is the one Shia leader who did not hide out in Iran.

Muqtada al-Sadr and the American Dilemma in Iraq
April 09, 2008 By *Patrick Cockburn*
Source: TomDispatch <http://www.tomdispatch.com>
Patrick Cockburn's ZSpace Page </zspace/patrickcockburn>
Muqtada al-Sadr is the most important and surprising figure to emerge in
Iraq since the U.S. invasion. He is the Messianic leader of the
religious and political movement of the impoverished Shia underclass
whose lives were ruined by a quarter of a century of war, repression,
and sanctions.
From the moment he unexpectedly appeared in the dying days of Saddam
Hussein's regime, U.S. emissaries and Iraqi politicians underestimated
him. So far from being the "firebrand cleric" as the Western media often
described him, he often proved astute and cautious in leading his
followers.
During the battle for Najaf with U.S. Marines in 2004, the U.S. "surge"
of 2007, and the escalating war with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council,
he generally sought compromise rather than confrontation. So far from
being the inexperienced young man whom his critics portrayed -- when he
first appeared they denigrated him as a /zatut/ (an "ignorant child," in
Iraqi dialect) -- he was a highly experienced political operator who had
worked in his father's office in Najaf since he was a teenager. He also
had around him activist clerics, of his own age or younger, who had
hands-on experience under Saddam of street politics within the Shia
community. His grasp of what ordinary Iraqis felt was to prove far surer
than that of the politicians isolated in the Green Zone in Baghdad.
*A Kleptocracy Comparable to the Congo*
Mass movements led by Messianic leaders have a history of flaring up
unexpectedly and then subsiding into insignificance. This could have
happened to Muqtada and the Sadrists but did not, because their
political and religious platform had a continuous appeal for the Shia
masses. From the moment Saddam was overthrown, Muqtada rarely deviated
from his open opposition to the U.S. occupation, even when a majority of
the Shia community was prepared to cooperate with the occupiers.
As the years passed, however, disillusion with the occupation grew among
the Shia until, by September 2007, an opinion poll showed that 73% of
Shia thought that the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq made the security
situation worse, and 55% believed their departure would make a
Shia-Sunni civil war less likely. The U.S. government, Iraqi
politicians, and the Western media habitually failed to recognize the
extent to which hostility to the occupation drove Iraqi politics and, in
the eyes of Iraqis, delegitimized the leaders associated with it.
All governments in Baghdad failed after 2003. Almost no Iraqis supported
Saddam Hussein as U.S. troops advanced on Baghdad. Even his supposedly
loyal Special Republican Guard units dissolved and went home. Iraqis
were deeply conscious that their country sat on some of the world's
largest oil reserves, but Saddam Hussein's Inspector Clouseau-like
ability to make catastrophic errors in peace and war had reduced the
people to a state in which their children were stunted because they did
not get enough to eat.
The primal rage of the dispossessed in Iraq against the powers-that-be
exploded in the looting of Baghdad when the old regime fell, and the
same fury possessed Muqtada's early supporters. Had life become easier
in Shia Iraq in the coming years, this might have undermined the Sadrist
movement. Instead, people saw their living standards plummet as
provision of food rations, clean water, and electricity faltered.
Saddam's officials were corrupt enough, but the new government cowering
in the Green Zone rapidly turned into a kleptocracy comparable to
Nigeria or the Congo. Muqtada sensed the loathing with which the
government was regarded, and dodged in and out of government, enjoying
some of the fruits of power while denouncing those who held it.
Muqtada's political intelligence is undoubted, but the personality of
this highly secretive man is difficult to pin down. While his father and
elder brothers lived he was in their shadow; after they were
assassinated in 1999 he had every reason to stress his lack of ability
or ambition in order to give the /mukhabarat/ [Saddam Hussein's secret
police] less reason to kill him. As the son and son-in-law of two of
Saddam Hussein's most dangerous opponents, he was a prime suspect and
his every move was watched.
When Saddam fell, Muqtada stepped forward to claim his forbears'
political inheritance and consciously associated himself with them on
every possible occasion. Posters showed Muqtada alongside Sadr I and
Sadr II [Muqtada's father-in-law and father, both assassinated by
Saddam] against a background of the Iraqi flag. There was more here than
a leader exploiting his connection to a revered or respected parent.
Muqtada persistently emphasized the Sadrist ideological legacy:
puritanical Shia Islam mixed with anti-imperialism and populism.
*Riding the Tiger of the Sadrist Movement*
The first time I thought seriously about Muqtada was a grim day in April
2003 when I heard that he was being accused of killing a friend of mine,
Sayyid Majid al-Khoei, that intelligent and able man with whom I had
often discussed the future of Iraq. Whatever the involvement of Muqtada
himself, which is a matter of dispute, the involvement of the Sadrist
supporters in the lynching is proven and was the start of a pattern that
was to repeat itself over the years.
Muqtada was always a man riding a tiger, sometimes presiding over,
sometimes controlling the mass movement he nominally led. His words and
actions were often far apart. He appealed for Shia unity with the Sunni
against the occupation, yet after the bombing of the Shia shrine in
Samarra in February 2006, he was seen as an ogre by the Sunni,
orchestrating the pogroms against them and failing to restrain the death
squads of the Mehdi Army. The excuse that it was "rogue elements" among
his militiamen who were carrying out this slaughter is not convincing,
because the butchery was too extensive and too well organized to be the
work of only marginal elements. But the Sadrists and the Shia in general
could argue that it was not they who had originally taken the offensive
against the Sunni, and the Shia community endured massacres at the hands
of al-Qaeda for several years before their patience ran out.
Muqtada had repeatedly demanded that Sunni political and religious
leaders unequivocally condemn al-Qaeda in Iraq's horrific attacks on
Shia civilians if he was to cooperate with them against the occupation.
They did not do so, and this was a shortsighted failure on their part,
since the Shia, who outnumbered the Sunni Arabs three to one in Iraq,
controlled the police and much of the army. Their retaliation, when it
came, was bound to be devastating. Muqtada was criticized for not doing
more, but neither he, nor anybody else could have stopped the killing at
the height of the battle for Baghdad in 2006. The Sunni and Shia
communities were both terrified, and each mercilessly retaliated for the
latest atrocity against their community. "We try to punish those who
carry out evil deeds in the name of the Mehdi Army," says Hussein Ali,
the former Mehdi Army leader. "But there are a lot of Shia regions that
are not easy to control and we ourselves, speaking frankly, are
sometimes frightened by these great masses of people."
American officials and journalists seldom showed much understanding of
Muqtada, even after [U.S. Coalition Provisional Authority head] Paul
Bremer's disastrous attempt to crush him [in 2004]. There were
persistent attempts to marginalize him or keep him out of government
instead of trying to expand the Iraqi government's narrow support base
to include the Sadrists. The first two elected Shia prime ministers,
Ibrahim al-Jaafari and Nouri al-Maliki, came under intense pressure from
Washington to sever or limit their connection with Muqtada. But
government officials were not alone in being perplexed by the young
cleric. In a lengthy article on him published in its December 4, 2006,
issue, /Newsweek/ admitted that "Muqtada al-Sadr may end up deciding
America's fate in Iraq." But the best the magazine could do to assist
its readers in understanding Muqtada was to suggest that they should
"think of him as a young Mafia don."
Of course, Muqtada was the complete opposite to the type of Iraqi leader
who proponents of the war in Washington had suggested would take over
from Saddam Hussein. Instead of the smooth, dark-suited,
English-speaking exiles who the White House had hoped would turn Iraq
into a compliant U.S. ally, Muqtada looked too much like a younger
version of Ayatollah Khomeini.
Muqtada epitomized the central dilemma of the United States in Iraq,
which it has never resolved. The problem was that the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein and his Sunni regime was bound to be followed by
elections that would produce a government dominated by the Shia allied
to the Kurds. It soon became evident that the Shia parties that were
going to triumph in any election would be Islamic parties, and some
would have close links to Iran.
The Arab Sunni states were aghast at the sight of Iran's defeat in the
Iran-Iraq war being reversed, and spoke of a menacing "Shia axis"
developing in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Much of this was ignorance and
paranoia on the part of the Arab leaders. Had the Iranians been tempted
to make Iraq a client state they would have found the country as prickly
a place for Iranians as it was to be for Americans. It was the U.S.
attempt to create an anti-Iranian Iraq that was to play into Iranian
hands and produce the very situation that Washington was trying to avoid.
The more Washington threatened air strikes on Iran because of its
nuclear program, the more the Iranians sought to make sure that it had
the potential to strike back at American forces in Iraq. Before he was
executed, Sadr I believed that he had been let down by Iran; Sadr II had
bad relations with Tehran; and at first Muqtada denounced his Shia
opponents in SCIRI and the Marji'iyyah as being Iranian stooges. But
American pressure meant that the Sadrists had to look to Iran for help,
and in a military confrontation the Mehdi Army saw Iran as an essential
source of weapons and military expertise.
*The New Iraqi Political Landscape*
On reappearing after his four-month disappearance in May 2007, Muqtada
called for a united front of Sunni and Shia and identified the U.S.
occupation and al-Qaeda in Iraq as the enemies of both communities. The
call was probably sincere, but it was also too late. Baghdad was now
largely a Shia city, and people were too frightened to go back to their
old homes. The U.S. "surge" had contributed to the sharp drop in
sectarian killings, but it was also true that the Shia had won and there
were few mixed areas left.
The U.S. commander General David Petraeus claimed that security was
improving, but only a trickle of Iraqis who had fled their homes were
returning. Muqtada was the one Shia leader capable of uniting with the
Sunni on a nationalist platform, but the Sunni Arabs of Iraq had never
accepted that their rule had ended. If Sunni and Shia could not live on
the same street, they could hardly share a common identity.
The political and military landscape of Iraq changed in 2007 as the
Sunni population turned on al-Qaeda. This started before the "surge,"
but it was still an important development. Al-Qaeda's massive suicide
bombs targeting civilians had been the main fuel for Shia-Sunni
sectarian warfare since 2003. The Sunni Arabs and many of the insurgent
groups had turned against al-Qaeda after it tried to monopolize power
within the Sunni community at the end of 2006 by declaring the Islamic
State of Iraq. Crucial in the change was al-Qaeda's attempt to draft one
son from every Sunni family into its ranks. Sunni with lowly jobs with
the government such as garbage collectors were killed.
By the fall of 2007 the U.S. military command in Baghdad was trumpeting
successes over al-Qaeda, saying it had been largely eliminated in Anbar,
Baghdad, and Diyala. But the Sunni Arab fighters, by now armed and paid
for by the United States, did not owe their prime loyalty to the Iraqi
government. Muqtada might speak of new opportunities for pan-Iraqi
opposition to the U.S. occupation, but many anti-al-Qaeda Sunni fighters
had quite different ideas. They wanted to reverse the Shia victory in
the 2006 battle of Baghdad.
A new breed of American-supported Sunni warlords was emerging. One of
them, Abu Abed, is a former member of the insurgent Islamic Army. He
operates in the Amariya district of west Baghdad, where he is a
commander of the U.S.-backed Amariya Knights, whom the U.S. calls
Concerned Citizens. His stated objectives show that the rise of the new
Sunni militias may mark only a new stage in a sectarian civil war.
"Amariya is just the beginning," says Abu Abed. "After we finish with
al-Qaida here, we will turn towards our main enemy, the Shia militias. I
will liberate Jihad [the mixed Sunni-Shia area near Amariya taken over
by the Mehdi Army], then Saadiya and the whole of west Baghdad."
The al-Sadr family has an extraordinary record of resistance to Saddam
Hussein, for which they paid a heavy price. One of the gravest errors in
Iraq by the United States was to try to marginalize Muqtada and his
movement. Had he been part of the political process from the beginning,
the chances of creating a peaceful, prosperous Iraq would have been
greater.
In any real accommodation between Shia and Sunni, the Sadrists must play
a central role. Muqtada probably represented his constituency of
millions of poor Shia better than anybody else could have done. But he
never wholly controlled his own movement, and never created as
well-disciplined a force as Hezbollah in Lebanon. None of his ambitions
for reconciliation with the Sunni could take wing unless the Mehdi Army
ceased to be identified with death squads and sectarian cleansing.
The war in Iraq has gone on longer than World War I and, while violence
diminished in the second half of 2007, nothing has been resolved. The
differences between Shia and Sunni, the disputes within the respective
communities, and the antagonism against the U.S. occupation are all as
great as ever. The only way the Sadrists and the Mehdi Army could create
confidence among the Sunni that Muqtada meant what he said when he
called for unity, would be for them to be taken back voluntarily into
the areas in Baghdad and elsewhere from which they have been driven. But
there is no sign of this happening. The disintegration of Iraq has
probably gone too far for the country to exist as anything more than a
loose federation.
/Patrick Cockburn is the Iraq correspondent for The Independent in
London. He has visited Iraq countless times since 1977 and was recipient
of the 2004 Martha Gellhorn Prize for war reporting as well as the 2006
James Cameron Memorial Award. His book *The Occupation: War and
Resistance in Iraq*, was short-listed for a National Book Critics Circle
Award in 2007. This essay is the last chapter in his new book, Muqtada:
Muqtada al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1416551476/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20>,
just published by Scribner./
*From Muqtada
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/1416551476/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20> by
Patrick Cockburn. Copyright © 2008 by Patrick Cockburn. Reprinted by
permission of Scribner, an Imprint of Simon & Schuster, Inc.*
[This article first appeared on Tomdispatch.com
<http://www.tomdispatch.com/>, a weblog of the Nation Institute, which
offers a steady flow of alternate sources, news, and opinion from Tom
Engelhardt, long time editor in publishing, /co-founder of the American
Empire Project <http://www.americanempireproject.com/>/ and author of
/The End of Victory Culture
<http://www.amazon.com/dp/155849586X/ref=nosim/?tag=nationbooks08-20>
(University of Massachusetts Press), which has just been thoroughly
updated in a newly issued edition that deals with victory culture's
crash-and-burn sequel in Iraq./]