Showing posts with label Shia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shia. Show all posts

Monday, January 04, 2016

Shia v. Sunni or Money v. People


THE ABSURD TIMES
  



Illustration: Latuff sees the Wahabbi in action

Shia v. Sunni or Money v. People
 

Nimr al- Nimr, Tiger of Tigers, was beheaded along with 46 other over the first weekend of 2016 in celebration of what we have to look forward to in this New Year. 



One of the main reasons, of course, is that oil prices have dropped, meaning that while the Royal family will retain their "share" of the loot, the remainder will be so miniscule that the people of the country, non-royal people, will have less.  In the grand tradition of Royalty, so well-portrayed by Henry IV to his son, if things are bad at home, get the people worried about things abroad.



This strategy is not limited to Royalty, of course.  Why do you think we have ISIS?  We certainly don't like this idea of people wanting a higher salary.  Why that would just complicate things a bit for the handful of people who own just about half of this country's wealth.  It is rough being in the upper .01% as the rest of the "folk" (as Obama like to put it) seem to want more.  Still, they will carry on.  And those of you who object, well, you are lucky you don't get beheaded, so shut up.



It is too boring and long-winded to go into the whole Sunni v. Shia thing other than it started with a dispute as to who would be the successor to Mohammed.  Still, the festering battle over succession was nothing compared with what you can find in Shakespeare's Richard III.  It was only until our fear of Communism, actually Stalinism, that started the whole recent series with our installation of the Shah to replace a democratically elected leader in Iran why just might have co-operated with the Soviet Union.  Allen Dulles saved us from the onerous possibility, eventually leading to the Ayatollah, but that is another story.



Here are a couple interviews on the current beheadings and the story behind the beheadings:



AMY GOODMAN: Protests have erupted across the Middle East after Saudi Arabia executed prominent Shia religious leader Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr—along with 46 others—Saturday in the country's largest mass execution in decades. The Saudi government accused Nimr of calling for the overthrow of the Saudi royal family. He had been arrested multiple times, including in 2012 after he was involved in protests after the Arab Spring uprising. Sheikh Nimr had also called for the secession of Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern Province, where the majority of the Sunni kingdom's Shia population live. After his execution Saturday, protesters in the Iranian capital Tehran responded by torching part of the Saudi Embassy. On Sunday, Saudi Arabia responded by severing ties with Iran. This is Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir.

ADEL AL-JUBEIR: [translated] The kingdom, in light of these realities, announces the cutting of diplomatic relations with Iran and requests the departure of delegates of diplomatic missions of the embassy and consulate and offices related to it within 48 hours. The ambassador has been summoned to notify them. [in English] We are determined not to allow Iran to undermine our security. We are determined not to let Iran mobilize or create or establish terrorist cells in our country or in the countries of our allies.

AMY GOODMAN: Saudi Arabia has recalled its diplomats from Tehran and given Iranian diplomats 48 hours to leave Saudi Arabia. This is Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

AYATOLLAH ALI KHAMENEI: [translated] Killing a knowledgeable man, who promoted virtue and prevented vice and had religious zeal, is certainly a crime, a great crime. It is also a mistake, because the spilled blood will undoubtedly bring divine retribution. Saudi politicians, rulers and policymakers should have no doubt that there will be divine vengeance for this blood. God almighty will not pardon those who spill the blood of the innocent.

AMY GOODMAN: Saudi Arabia's execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr also led to protests in Iraq, Bahrain and several other countries. Bahrain says it, too, is severing diplomatic ties with Iran. Earlier today, two Sunni mosques about 50 miles south of the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, were rocked by bomb blasts thought to be retaliation against al-Nimr's execution.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has called for dialogue. Analysts are watching closely to see how this will impact regional tensions. Saudi Arabia and Iran back opposing groups in Syria and Iraq, and are on opposite sides of the conflict in Yemen.

For more, we turn now to Ali al-Ahmed, the founder and director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs, one of Saudi Arabia's youngest political prisoners when he was detained at the age of 14.

Welcome to Democracy Now!, Ali al-Ahmed. Can you talk about the significance of first what took place on Saturday, one of the largest mass executions in Saudi history, and the significance of Nimr al-Nimr, the sheikh?

ALI AL-AHMED: Yes. Good morning, Amy. It's a pleasure.

The execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr is really an important development, given the fact this is the first time in Saudi history where a Shia religious leader has been executed. Fifty years ago or so, another leader was sentenced to death, but he was not executed because he was abroad. This really creates a division within the country. In the Shia communities around the world, religious leaders are most revered, because they are the leaders of the community. And they are usually chosen by—people choose them as their leaders. It's almost a democratic process.

So, for the Saudi government to recklessly execute him and others, including protesters, really is a reckless act that will have repercussions for a long time. I think this will start another chapter in the Saudi history, a chapter that I think we will see come to reality in 2016. And it will not end well for the Saudi monarchy. I think we've seen that in different areas where governments who targeted Shia religious leaders end up really with a mess on their hand, from Saddam Hussein to Gaddafi to others, who probably underestimated the will and the determination of the Shia communities to bring repercussions to them. And I believe the Saudi monarchy committed a huge mistake that is not going to work for them in the short and the long term.

AMY GOODMAN: You went to a memorial service for the victims of the mass execution. Can you tell us who Nimr al-Nimr, though, is, exactly what he represents, how he expressed his opposition to the Saudi regime?

ALI AL-AHMED: You're absolutely right. Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr's name—you know, a month or two months ago, nobody knew who Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr was. He was a religious leader from a small town in the eastern shore of Arabia. But since his execution, memorial services have been held for him across the United States, across Europe and different parts of the world. Sheikh Nimr is a friend of mine—was a friend of mine. I knew him probably 30 years ago. I met him. I met his family, his father. I visited their home. His brothers, younger brothers, are friends. So, I knew him.

Sheikh Nimr's experience with the Saudi government dates back to his grandfather. His grandfather was also a fiery cleric who stood in the face of the Saudi oppression of the Shia minority 50, 60 years ago. So he inherited this zeal and the resolve to object to this oppression. If you look at his speeches, he expresses this strong determination and will. His words really are amazing words. And we will be translating a selection of his words to show you that when he speaks, really, as a free man, he said, "We either live free on this land, or we die inside of the Earth." So—or he says that "We choose not to be ruled by the al-Saud. We choose to be free"—these words of freedom and dignity. And you mentioned the secession. He didn't call for secession. He said that "Our dignity is more important than the geographical borders of Saudi Arabia. Our dignity comes supreme." And I think that's correct. The dignity of man, the dignity of a human being, is much more important than political unions. And his words really shows you he's a rare individual.

And when Mr. Obama spoke about the need for Muslims to combat violence and extremism, Sheikh Nimr is a rare example of a person who calls for the people's rule in a monarchy that does not allow the individual, Shia or Sunni, to have a say. He called for people's power. And that really shows you an example, a shining example, of a religious—Muslim religious leader who is empowering people and their choices, who defended everyone, not only his community, but also he spoke of the Sunni oppressed. And he really created a new model. He said that we should not support Sunnis versus Shia or Shia versus Sunni; we should support the oppressed against the oppressor, no matter their religion, their sect and their ethnicity.

So I really think his words is going to live, and it will create this new wave. He was in the country of Saudi Arabia, which is divided around sectarian lines. He was admired by many Sunni young men for his words, for his courage. Inside a country, a kingdom of silence, his words really rang strong. And I think if you compare him to many people that we admire around the world, including the United States, you will see him really standing in the middle, in the lion's den, and speaking without fear. He was courageous and will be remembered for a long time.

AMY GOODMAN: Ali al-Ahmed, his nephew remains on death row, or threatened with execution, who was, what, 17 when he went out to a protest, Ali Mohammed al-Nimr, and also the Palestinian poet Ashraf Fayadh. What will happen with them? They were not part of the 47, is that right, who were executed?

ALI AL-AHMED: Yes, yes. The Saudi government now is trying to make these executions—although the majority of the executed people are Sunnis, they are trying to make this, frame this into a Sunni-Shia tension. It's not. It is really an attempt by the Saudi monarchy to silence their opposition and to label anybody who spoke against them as terrorists. And there is a plan to execute more people. The Saudis spread their executions across the country to—really, to spread terror in the heart of the population. The Saudi monarchy fear is that the population will rise against them. And the best way they think that they can silence this opposition and the aspiration of the young people in that country for people's power is to execute people and to—publicly, by the way—and behead them, so the people will not rise.

AMY GOODMAN: Ali al-Ahmed, we're going to break and then come back, and we'll also be joined by professor Toby Jones and arms expert Bill Hartung to talk about the U.S. relationship with their very close ally, Saudi Arabia. Stay with us.


LINKS


·                                 "Merchants of Menace: How US Arms Sales are Fueling Middle East Wars," by William Hartung


·                                 "Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia," by Toby Jones

This is viewer supported news


After Saudi Arabia executed Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr on Saturday along with 46 others, protesters in the Iranian capital of Tehran responded by torching part of the Saudi Embassy. On Sunday, Saudi Arabia responded by severing ties with Iran. With Saudi Arabia and Iran backing opposing groups in Syria and Iraq, and on opposite sides of the conflict in Yemen, we examine how this will impact both regional tensions and the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia. Under the Obama administration, the United States has entered a record $50 billion in new arms sales agreements with the Saudis. "If the Obama administration wants to show its displeasure with this execution and try to bring an end to the war in Yemen, there's got to be a distancing from Saudi Arabia, beginning with cutting off some of these arms supplies," says William Hartung, senior adviser to the Security Assistance Monitor and director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy. We also speak with Toby Jones, an associate professor of history and director of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Rutgers University and author of "Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia," and with Ali al-Ahmed, the founder and director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs.




TRANSCRIPT


This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I'm Amy Goodman, as we continue to look at Saudi Arabia's execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, along with 46 others, which could have major repercussions in the region. We're joined in Washington, D.C., by Ali al-Ahmed, the founder and director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs, one of Saudi Arabia's youngest political prisoners, detained when he was 14. Also joining us from Rutgers College—Rutgers University in New Jersey, Toby Jones, an associate professor of history and director of Middle East studies there. He's author of Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia. And here in New York, Bill Hartung is with us, senior adviser to the Security Assistance Monitor, also director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy; his latest book, Prophets of War: Lockheed Martin and the Making of the Military-Industrial Complex.

I want to bring Toby Jones into this discussion. Talk about the significance of this mass execution, this leading opposition figure in Iran, as well as 46 others, and what it means for the United States, a close ally of the Saudi regime.

TOBY JONES: Good morning, Amy. Thanks.

I'm going to say two things about this, very broadly. One is that reading this through the lens of geopolitics and the regional sort of relationship, Saudi Arabia and Iran, is, of course, critical, and it's important, especially as relations sour and things tend to fall out. But this was also about domestic politics in Saudi Arabia. Last week, Saudi Arabia announced a new budget, in which it forecast a significant budget shortfall as a result of declining oil revenues. When revenues start to fall like that in Saudi Arabia, there's pressure on the social welfare state, and Saudi Arabia anticipates that there might be pushback and opposition from within society, as Ali al-Ahmed's suggested earlier. Killing a Shiite cleric goes a long way in deflecting attention away from political, economic pressures. Sectarianism is at an all-time high, and has been over the last decade or so. And so the Saudis are seeking to capitalize, I believe, symbolically, on the killing of al-Nimr as a way to buy a little bit of time to figure out how to negotiate its way through an economic crisis. And, of course, there's also the war in Yemen and justifying a continued failing project there. Using sectarianism as a way to achieve goals there is important, too.

With respect to the U.S. relationship and how all of this figures in—and I think the U.S. is probably caught a little bit off guard here. Al-Nimr has been on death row for quite a long time. I don't think any of us really expected that the Saudis would carry through with this. It raises all kinds of questions about timing: Why now? Why kill al-Nimr alongside a bunch of al-Qaeda terrorists, as well as some of those other young Shiite men who were executed on Saturday, as well? So the U.S. is caught off guard. It's called for calm. It's called for dialogue. These are odd expressions and demands from the United States. I mean, the U.S. knows that the Saudis are not interested in dialogue with Iran. Saudi Arabia sees itself as in a tense and fraught relationship with its neighbors across the Gulf. And the U.S. also understands very well that it's precisely crisis and it's escalation of tension between Tehran and Riyadh that plays into Saudi Arabia's ways that they talk about insecurity, their regional phobias and fears. They frame everything around escalating series of crises. The U.S. understands this very well. I mean, the Saudis are masters at manipulating that kind of language in order to keep the Americans in a certain geostrategic position. But, to be clear, it's also a position that I think the United States is happy to play.

AMY GOODMAN: Bill Hartung, if you can talk about the U.S.-Saudi arms relationship? I mean, hasn't, in the last year, the U.S. been involved with the largest arms sales in their history, this to the Saudi regime?

WILLIAM HARTUNG: Yes, throughout the Obama administration, we've seen $50 billion in new arms sales agreements with the Saudis, which is a record for any kind of period like that. And so, they're all in behind the Saudi military. They're providing logistical support, bombs, refueling for the war in Yemen, U.S. companies training the Saudi National Guard, which is their internal security force. We've trained 10,000 Saudi military personnel in the last 10 years—five years, rather. So, you know, my belief is if the Obama administration wants to show displeasure with this execution, try to bring an end to the war in Yemen and so forth, there's got to be a distancing from Saudi Arabia, beginning with cutting off some of these arms supplies.

AMY GOODMAN: Aren't U.S. weapons manufacturers in their heyday right now, making record profits?

WILLIAM HARTUNG: Yes, and this is a huge boon to them, the Saudi market. They just announced a major combat ship sale, which will benefit Lockheed Martin. Boeing fighter planes are in the mix, Boeing helicopters. General Dynamics is keeping a whole tank line open through sales to Saudi Arabia. So there's both a dependency on the U.S. arms industry on Saudi sales and also huge financial benefits keeping this—you know, this gravy train running for them.

AMY GOODMAN: And how Saudi Arabia is using these weapons in Yemen?

WILLIAM HARTUNG: Well, there's been a humanitarian catastrophe of the highest order there. They've been bombing markets, hospitals, refugee camps—more than 2,000 civilian casualties, most of them from the Saudi bombing. Basically, the Saudis, many believe, are engaging in war crimes in Yemen. And the U.S. logistical and arms support is facilitating that.

AMY GOODMAN: Ali al-Ahmed, what could the U.S. do? And what—how do you assess the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia?

ALI AL-AHMED: This is a complex relationship that really is led and dominated by the Saudi ability to buy silence and support. If you look at the reaction of presidential candidates, for example, you don't see any of them speaking out against these executions. It's odd that, for example, Mr. Ben Carson would say that the Saudi government is an ally of us and we should support it, at the same time that the Saudi monarchy prevents black people from becoming diplomats or judges because they view blacks as slaves. So, really, here you see a contradiction of the—what we know as American values, is that the Saudis have been able to buy their way by giving money to a lot of politicians, to their foundations, like the Clinton Foundation, the Carter foundation, and shaping their opinion. And, unfortunately, because in America politics works on money, the Saudi monarchy has really broken that code and understood how to use it.

The United States can do a few things, really, right now. They can first, for example, stop the U.S. taxpayers spending money on protecting the Saudi monarchy and Gulf monarchies. Professor Roger Stern of Princeton has a study that says that the United States has been spending over $200 billion a year in military expenditure in the Gulf. That is the largest military expenditure abroad. It is to—the effect is—the default effect is, it's protecting these monarchies. The U.S. should not be spending that money. The monarchies can spend their own money defending themselves.

Secondly is, for example, I would urge the U.S. government to intervene to ensure that the Saudi monarchy will return the body of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr to his family, because they refused to do so after the execution. I think that would be a great example of how the U.S. can use its power to bring some healing to this process, because the Middle East might implode, Saudi Arabia itself might implode, because of this. So, I think they should take some, you know, serious steps.

And I really met with the State Department over the past few weeks, and I told them—and I wrote an article about it—says, "You must take steps now. Don't wait until the executions take place," because we knew that these executions were happening. It's important to prevent any ignition in the region before it happened. But unfortunately—

AMY GOODMAN: And do you feel that the State Department took your advice?

ALI AL-AHMED: No, they didn't. They didn't. I mean, this—

AMY GOODMAN: So, Toby Jones, we have 30 seconds. Why is the U.S. not being more vocal in its criticism of Saudi Arabia?

TOBY JONES: Well, the U.S. is stuck. I mean, aside from questions of profit, the U.S. is also beholden—you know, and it's partly the product of its own making. I mean, this is a generational commitment to Saudi Arabia, in which for over three decades we've committed ourselves. Now, whether this is true or not, we've committed ourselves to protecting the flow of energy out of the Persian Gulf. It's the largest producer of oil on the planet in this one area. And the United States has tied its military fortunes, in many ways the pocketbooks of its gunmakers, as well as the Pentagon, to what comes in and goes out of the Persian Gulf. If you think about it critically, that's what needs to change, but it's also the hardest thing to re-engineer, this breaking away not only from oil dependency, but also from the massive financial and military investment that the U.S. has made in the region.

AMY GOODMAN: We're going to have—

TOBY JONES: But the bottom line is, it's not stabilizing. It's destabilizing.

AMY GOODMAN: We have to leave it there. Rutgers University professor Toby Jones, arms expert Bill Hartung and Ali al-Ahmed, director of the Institute for Gulf Affairs, thanks for joining us.

Wednesday, November 18, 2015

Isilanity, The Genesis


THE ABSURD TIMES


So we agree? God is great, you and me, King.
So you agree? We got your back, Saddam, you have our word.

ISILANITY

BY

CZAR DONIC



The illustrations above will become relevant as we proceed.



One of the more predictable results of the recent attacks on western targets by the religion if Isilanity is that mainly Republican Governors of American States are demanding that only "Proven Christians" be admitted as refugees. This leaves our state department with a singular problem or question: "What is a "proven Christian"?



I confess that I am unable to answer this as it has never been "proven" one way or another. So, for example, how am I to know what a proven Christian is? I suppose I could ask the Pope and I consider him to be a proven Christian, especially as he is supposedly an official successor of one of the original twelve disciples, but then my opinion, so far as the Republican Governors are concerned, is worthless as I would not trust the opinion on one who is not a "proven Christian." Perhaps a Lutheran or Calvinist would suffice but, again, without first being proven to be a Christian, my opinion, and hence theirs, would be worthless. The entire concept leaves us in pointland. I have borrowed this approach of reasoning from C. S. Lewis, another "proven Christian," but once again, his line of reasoning is worthless as well.



Moreover, what about Atheists and Agnostics? Should they not be deported? If so, to where? Yes, I've hear about the First Amendment, but who believe everything they read, eh?



So now, I can talk about the Genesis of Isilanity, however, as the facts are apparent.



The first step was in reaction to the Marxist definition of religion as the "Opiate of the Masses" and our desire to recruit the Sunni populations' governments to our side in our war against the Soviet Union, which had been considered as conducting its own "war on drugs," opiates, such as the God Bomb. As far back as the Reagan administration, the strategy was to elicit the Saudi or Wahabbi forces' support against the Soviet Union as the two of us both believed in God, while the Soviets did not. They were willing allies. A few of the mid-eastern leaders did not follow, people such as Nassar and Gaddafi, but eventually the all were defeated.



One of the more troubling forces for us was Saddam Hussein. Now he was valuable and welcome to us so far as he attacked the "bad Muslims" (Shias), but not when he helped the oil-rich ones (Kuwait and thus Sunni). Bush I attacked him with United Nation's approval, but left him alive. The quasi-Marxist Ba'ath party remained intact. Bill Clinton saw no point in invading to overthrow Saddam as he had his own war in support of Islam in the Balkans (and against Serbia, the atheists). Bush II came along and with some sort of Oedipal ferocity used the 9/11 attack (by Bin Laden who we first supported). He was in Afghanistan at the time and so we attacked them, but also made the case that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (we knew this as we had the receipts). The fact that Osama regarded Saddam as an "infidel" notwithstanding, Rumsfield and others helped support the idea that Saddam was now bad, not good, and therefore must be eliminated.



Georgie sent Bremer in with order to "de-Ba'athify" (in other words, get rid of the Sunnis) and put the Shia in power. Since all the competent apparatchiks were Sunni, they found themselves out of favor and power and a job.



Then Camp Bucca was turned from an agricultural college into a torture palace and faced much unrest. Then a man named Abu Bakir Al-Bagdadi was given the position of religious teacher, or Imam, for Ba'athists and Sunnis. Bush II saw that it was good and he rested, landing on a ship, "Mission Accomplished".



Now Isilanity is not Moslem, Christian, not Judaism. It is unlike any religion that has ever existed with the possible exception of the Norse "Berserkers," a subject best left to the imagination.



The specific tenets of Isilanity are still not all that clear, but as soon as the times has them codified, we will pass them along. It is certain that one need not be able to understand Arabic nor be able to read any language, nor need one be able to understand Arabic. There is, I am told by our media, a 800 number for the Isil "hotline," but nothing further than that so far.



Here are a few interviews on the various subjects mentioned:


TRANSCRIPT

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AMY GOODMAN: France and Russia have staged a series of new airstrikes on the Syrian city of Raqqa, the de facto capital of the self-proclaimed Islamic State, or Daesh. Russia announced earlier today it would intensify strikes in Syria after Russian intelligence service said they had found conclusive proof that a bomb had brought down the Metrojet airliner in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, killing all 224 people on board last month. Meanwhile, French President François Hollande vowed to step up attacks in Syria following Friday's attacks in Paris that killed 129 people.
PRESIDENT FRANÇOIS HOLLANDE: [translated] The need to destroy Islamic State is an issue that faces the whole of the international community. I have therefore asked the Security Council to hold a meeting as quickly as possible to adopt a resolution to mark this goal shared by all to fight against terrorism.
AMY GOODMAN: Earlier today, Secretary of State John Kerry traveled to Paris to meet Hollande one day after President Obama announced the U.S. and France have agreed to step up their exchange of intelligence on potential targets. France also has invoked the European Union's mutual assistance clause for the first time, asking its partners for military help and other aid in missions in the Middle East and Africa after the Paris attacks.
Overnight, French police conducted 128 searches. France is currently in a state of emergency, which allows authorities to search homes any time without court approval. Hollande is seeking to extend the state of emergency for three months.
A massive manhunt is still underway for Salah Abdeslam, a prime suspect in the Paris attacks. He's a Belgian-born French national. French authorities have also identified Abdel-Hamid Abu Oud as the possible mastermind of the attacks. He's a Belgian of Moroccan origin believed to be in Syria.
While France, Russia and the United States bomb Syria, the United Nations is warning against escalating the regional war in the Middle East. Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein serves as the U.N. human rights commissioner.
ZEID RA'AD AL-HUSSEIN: This is a dark time, a time of great turmoil in the international—in the world of international relations. Paris bleeds. So, too, does Beirut and Aleppo and Sana'a and countless other cities. And it seems that the defenses against chaos and bloodshed that states erected at the close of the Second World War, the laws they wrote and swore to abide by, the agreements and treaties they signed, are giving way to increasingly unilateral action bound by no principle or any foresight.
AMY GOODMAN: To talk more about the Islamic State, also known as Daesh, we are joined by longtime Middle East journalist Abdel Bari Atwan in London. He served as editor-in-chief of the London-based daily Al-Quds al-Arabi for 25 years. He now edits the Rai al-Youm website. He is author of the new book, The Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate. He also recently wrote an article for Salon headlined "America Enabled Radical Islam: How the CIA, George W. Bush and Many Others Helped Create ISIS." He interviewed Osama bin Laden twice in the '90s.
Abdel Bari Atwan, welcome to Democracy Now! Can you respond to the Paris attacks and then how Western countries are responding to those attacks?
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: Yes, Amy, it's very nice to be with you again. I remember last time it was after 11th of September attacks. Here, we are talking after a Paris carnage which took place last Friday, Friday evening.
You know, what is happening now, the Islamic State is changing its strategy. Now they are adopting their savagery management phase. When I say that, in the beginning, they wanted to grab land, consolidate their grip on it and then expand. It seems, because of more than 7,000 air sortie against them, they decided to take revenge, to adopt the strategy of al-Qaeda, which they condemned in the beginning of their emergence. When I say to adopt the strategy of al-Qaeda, to export their terrorism to outside Middle East to the heart of Europe, to hit the industry, to hit the economy, to terrorize people, to take revenge from French, from United States, maybe Britain, who are bombarding their positions in Raqqa in Syria and also in Mosul and other parts in Iraq. So, this is their new strategy. It is not surprising, actually, that they are turning to this. It was expected.
And they are very, very organized in this field. You know, many people, they think those people are stupid—you know, sort of rusty beard, dirty beard, baggy trouser. No, they are not like that. You know, they are very, very intelligent. They are the remnant of Saddam Hussein security institutions, also the Republican Guards, the army. Those people, you know, when the army was dissolved, when the security organization were dissolved, the Republican Guards, they were dumped in the streets by Paul Bremer, the American ruler of Iraq, first ruler of Iraq. You know, they—actually, they were dumped, humiliated, frustrated. So, they were behind the establishment of this Islamic State.
Now, they move to the second stage, which is to take revenge. And that's why we see this eight people, eight people, a very organized cell, to attack six positions, six places in Paris in the same time, the same night. It means they are lethal, they are dangerous. And this kind—these attacks is one of four attacks which took place by the Islamic State. The first thing was in Tunisia in a resort, where about 40 people were killed. And then, you know, this—the downing of the Russian tourism aircraft—224 people were killed—to destroy the tourism industry in Egypt and in Tunisia. Now they are attacking the tourism or the jewel of the crown of Europe, which is Paris, where $70 billion, actually, the revenue of the tourism industry for France. So they know what they are doing. They are adopting, as I said, the strategy of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center. Here they are attacking the center of Europe, the capital of Europe, which is Paris. And that's why it is devastating.
AMY GOODMAN: Can you explain the term "Daesh"? You see even, well, Secretary of State Kerry is continually now talking about ISIS as what he calls "Daesh." Explain what that term means.
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: To be honest, you know, I am really surprised when the French president used the word "Daesh." What it means, Daesh? In Arabic, it means Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. This is it. It is exactly. Now they shorten the name to Islamic State. So they don't want to call it Islamic State. You know, I have been arguing, because my book is The Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate. I was really bombarded by a lot of criticism because I used the term "Islamic State." I said to them, "Look, if your name is Amy, shall I call you Carole, for example?" They named themselves the Islamic State, and there is Islamic Army, and there is Islamic Front. Why here, when it comes to this, you know, they want to change its name to Arabic name, which has the same meaning? It is really silly. And it's—I'm really shocked by this. Its name is Islamic State. We have to call it Islamic State. Like with United States, we call it United States. So, we can't say, "No, this is barbaric," America, for example, or this is barbaric to, you know, planet or whatever. So, this is—this is the problem. Daesh, in Arabic, it is a shortening of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. That's it, you know? So, many people in the Arab world, actually, they hide the sun, you know, by a little—what we call it, you know, just a little piece of cloth or something like that. And so, this—you can't—you can't actually deny them their name.
And you cannot actually avoid—you don't defeat it by saying, "It is Daesh, it is not Islamic State." It is Islamic, and it is a state. When I say Islamic, they are adopting the worst interpretation of Islam, Wahhabism, which was originated in Najd in Saudi Arabia. And it is, you know, a state, because it has all the terminology, all actually the description of a state. They have an army, they have a police, they have an administration, they have a cabinet, they have their own currency, they have their own flag. They have 9 million or 10 million carrying their citizenship, whatever. They have their own border until now. And they are dealing with the neighboring countries. They are selling oil to Kurdistan, north of Iraq. They are selling oil to Turkey. They are selling oil even to Europe. So, people would say, "No, no, they are not a state." OK, good luck to you. But it is a state, and it is Islamic, whether we like it or not. You know, this is not a good beginning, actually. If you want to understand this state or this phenomena, this terrorist organization, this is not a good beginning. We have, actually, to be truthful. We have to be truthful to ourselves. We have to understand this phenomena, terrorism—
AMY GOODMAN: Abdel Bari—
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: —terrorist phenomena. We have to study it, and we have to fight it, not just, you know, say, "No, it's Daesh," or not even to mention its name correctly. Yes, Amy?
AMY GOODMAN: Abdel Bari Atwan, the response since the Paris attacks—the U.S. bomb, the French are bombing Syria, the Russians are bombing Syria. Do you think a military response—how do you think a military response will affect ISIS?
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: Well, Amy, you know, the problem is—sorry—when we talk about military response, you know, military alone—military solution is not actually enough. To using military solution alone, it means we are prolonging the problem. We are strengthening the Islamic State. Seven thousand sorties until now by the American and their allies. What happened? You know, the Islamic State grown up. They managed to capture Ramadi in Iraq, which is their third biggest city, and they managed to capture Palmyra in Syria, which is another very well-known as—you know, of antiquities, of history and legacy. So, this is the problem. Security solution is not good enough. See what happened. You know, the American used, you know, military solution in Afghanistan. And now, after 14 years, they are talking to Taliban, to surrender power to Taliban. And they used to call Taliban as a terrorist organization. "We are not going to talk to them. We have to root them out." They did not root them out. The same thing in Libya. They said, "OK, Gaddafi is a bloody dictator." Yes, he is a bloody dictator. They remove them—they removed him. And what happened? Chaos, anarchy, the vacuum filled by al-Qaeda and filled by the Islamic State and other terrorist militias. So, this is the problem. You know, whenever there is military intervention, whenever there is American intervention in particular, there is failed states. We have more than five failed states in the Middle East. Who will fill the vacuum? The Islamic State. And that's why they have branches in Egypt, in Sinai, they have branches in Afghanistan, branches in Pakistan, now in a very strong state in Syria. And they have also—could be soon in Palestine, the West Bank and Gaza. So, this is the problem. Military solution, intervention, military intervention, it is not actually the only way.
We have first—you know, Amy, if you'll allow me, I'll give you seven keywords, if you want to understand the Middle East and want to understand why this state is very strong and getting stronger and stronger.
First, humiliation. People are humiliated by the military intervention and by their own government, which is, you know, dictatorship.
Frustration. We have more than a hundred young people—a hundred million young people, at least, either full unemployed or partly employed. Those people are frustrated because there is no future.
The third word is marginalization. When the Americans invaded and occupied Iraq, you know, what happened? They marginalized the Sunni sect and gave advantage to the Shia sect, divided the country according to the sectarian life. So this marginalization created the incubator for the Islamic State in Iraq.
Military intervention. And I mentioned, when you intervene by military means in Arab countries, you create failed state.
The lack of—the fifth word is the lack of good governance. We don't have good governance in the Middle East. Corrupt regimes. Look at the Saudi Arabia. Look at the Gulf region. Look at the other parts of the Arab world. It is corruption everywhere. There is no democracy. There is no human rights. There is no, actually—any transparency.
And then, the other word is underestimation. Underestimation—you know, when the Islamic State was growing in Iraq and Syria, we noticed it, and we said, "This is a very dangerous phenomena." I wrote a book, After Bin Laden: Al Qaeda, the Next Generation. I predicted this. I predicted, you know, more radical organization than al-Qaeda, than Osama bin Laden.
And then, the final word is the social media. You know, people are not listening to the mainstream media anymore as they used to be. And the Islamic State is manipulating this social media, the Internet, the Twitter, the Facebook, you know, the Snapchat, everything. And they are using it to their own advantages. They are—you know, Osama bin Laden was actually a poor man, an old man sitting in front of a camera recording a videotape and then begging Al Jazeera or CNN to broadcast it. Now they don't need this. Just a press of a button, they reach millions of people. They have 100,000 tweets every day. They have 50,000 accounts on the Twitter. There are thousands, you know, maybe tens of thousands of pages on the Internet—or, on the Facebook.
So, they are very, very, very—that's why, if you want to understand the Middle East, we have to put these seven words into consideration. We will have better idea, and definitely we will know how to fight this Islamic State, not by military means only, but also by other means, by ideological means, by social means, by economic means.



AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about the role of Saudi Arabia? President Obama held a bilateral meeting with Saudi Arabia's King Salman at the G20 summit in Turkey Sunday.
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: You know, Saudi Arabia is the origin of radicalism, Islamic radicalism, in the Middle East and the whole world and the whole Islamic world. Why? Because al-Qaeda ideology—sorry, Islamic State ideology is the same Wahhabi ideology which adopted by the Saudi kingdom. This is—you know, they go back to the time of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in 1704, you know, so they are doing—doing exactly the same. They are doing in Syria and Iraq this brutality, this savagery, the Wahhabism of the Saudi regime in 1705 and '06, when they actually invaded Karbala and Najaf. They committed the same massacres.
So, Saudi Arabia, actually, now, they are—they are, actually, with Qatar and with Turkey. They have some sort of alliance. And they started the problem in Syria. They poured billions in Syria, hoping to topple the Assad regime for personal revenge, not for political means, not for actually, you know, a strategic move from their side. They just want to take revenge, personal revenge, because Assad insulted them in a way or another, and also because they thought that they can topple him in a few weeks, few months maximum. So they poured billions of weapons. And also, they encouraged a hundred—sorry, tens of thousands of volunteers to go through Turkey to Syria to fight against the Assad regime.
This is—all this was happening while the West actually don't understand. They were misled by Turkey and Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This is a fact. When I said they misled, because they did not actually manage to understand this phenomena. They underestimated the emergence of such a radical organization or a state like the Islamic State, which we are witnessing now. This is—this is the problem. Saudi Arabia, until now, they are saying, "We must topple Assad regime." You know, OK, topple Assad regime, you topple the Gaddafi regime, you topple the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime in Yemen. So what happened? Where is the plan B? Have you built—rebuilt Libya, for example? Did you set a good example in Iraq, in Libya, in Yemen, in Syria? What's the plan after Assad, for example? Who will rule Syria? Is it going to be democracy? Or is it going to be like Libya? Is it going to be like Iraq, divided on the sectarian lines? This is the problem.
Yes, Saudi Arabia now, they managed to influence the American White House, the American position, because in your country—this is the problem. Now—you know, until now, the American policy in the Middle East is a complete shamble. You know, there is no policy, honestly. In six months ago, they said we should give the priority of rooting out the Islamic State. Said, "OK, great." And then, now, because of the Saudi-Turkish-Qatari influence, they said, "No, we have to actually—there is no future for Assad in the political process." Where is this political process? Has it started? Why didn't it start, say, five years ago, when the problem started in Syria? Why we are waiting until now? You had five years to sort it out. You know, you did not sort it out.
AMY GOODMAN: It's not only—
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: And then, when the Russians intervened in Syria to protect their man—
AMY GOODMAN: It is not only—
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: —now they are saying—sorry, yes?
AMY GOODMAN: It's not only, Abdel Bari Atwan, that the U.S. is working with Saudi Arabia. I mean, they just sealed the largest weapons deal in history with Saudi Arabia.
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: Yes. Yeah, you are absolutely right. You know, it's a history there. The problem is, you know, when they were feeding radicalism in the Islamic world, introducing the Wahhabism as the Puritan interpretation of Islam and sharia law, the West used to work with them. They worked with them in Afghanistan, and it was very clear. And what happened after that? They toppled the communist regime in Kabul, and then, you know, they left anarchy there, bloody anarchy, Arab—so-called Arab mujahideen. And al-Qaeda emerged. Now, you know, they intervene in Syria. What happened? The Islamic State emerged. They intervened in Iraq. The same thing, al-Qaeda again, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad organization emerged. So, usually, when there is uncalculated and underestimated intervention, actually, that's what will happen in the Middle East. This is the problem.
AMY GOODMAN: How do you think the U.S.—
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: And we keep repeating the same mistakes, one after one. Yes?
AMY GOODMAN: How do you think the U.S. can put pressure on Saudi Arabia?
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: Oh, yes, they can. You know, they can. You know, President Obama was actually absolutely correct when he told to the Saudis, "Look, you know, we are not going to bomb Iran, you know, because you want us to bomb Iran. You know, OK, yeah, we can protect you from any Iranian danger. But, you know, your problem is your people. It is an internal problem. You have a population which is dissatisfied, those population completely marginalized. You know, those people are unemployed, and they have no future. They don't have any role in actually determining their future." So, this is—this is the problem. There are huge problems inside.
The United States can put pressure on Saudi Arabia, and they can put pressure on Qatar, and they can put pressure on Turkey and say, "Look, listen, you know, we can't actually, you know, to continue argument with which is first, the chicken or the egg? The Islamic State or Assad regime?" They have to make up their mind. You know, if it's the Islamic State is a priority, go for it. If Assad is a priority, go for it.
But you cannot actually keep arguing, and while thousands—hundreds of thousands of people are killed, and 7,000 sorties. We don't know what these air sorties are killing, for example. How many innocent people are killed because of it? I don't believe there are these 7,000 air sorties killing al-Qaeda—sorry, Islamic State members. Definitely they are killing innocent people, civilians. Who will tell us how many civilians were killed? It is a completely taboo to talk about the deaths, civilian deaths, because of this allied bombardment of Syria and Iraq, you know, the Islamic State areas, while until now, also, in the same time, we don't have any accurate figures by U.S. administration about how many people were killed in Iraq because of the American invasion of Iraq. This is the problem. You know, once—if the death among your enemy, nobody counts. If the death among the American, among the British, among the French, it is well calculated, one by one. You know, this is discrimination. How can the people of the Middle East believe this kind of policy? How they are not going to fight this kind of hypocrisy in a way or another? We are giving, actually, ammunition to radical terrorist organization like al-Qaeda, like the Islamic State, by this kind of policies.
AMY GOODMAN: Abdel Bari Atwan, I want to get your response—
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: We have to be truthful to our people.
AMY GOODMAN: I want to get your response to the comment made by presidential candidate Bernie Sanders at Saturday's Democratic presidential debate in Iowa.
SEN. BERNIE SANDERS: I would argue that the disastrous invasion of Iraq—something that I strongly opposed—has unraveled the region completely and led to the rise of al-Qaeda and to ISIS.
AMY GOODMAN: Abdel Bari Atwan, can you respond, you who interviewed Osama bin Laden twice?
ABDEL BARI ATWAN: Yes, Amy, he is absolutely correct. I am personally proud to have American candidate saying the truth. We need the truth. Yes, the American invasion of Iraq created al-Qaeda, or strengthening al-Qaeda and created—or it created the incubator for the Islamic State, because, you know, they—as I said, under the banner of de-Baathification, they thrown millions of Iraqi ex-soldiers, ex-officers on the streets, without any hope, without any dignity, without any pension, nothing at all. And this is the hardcore of the Islamic State. That's why those people are full of revenge, full of anger, full of blood. So, this is—yes, the American—I agree with Sanders. This is the invasion which created most of the problems.
OK, maybe it solved one problem—toppling a dictator, who—he was a dictator, no question about that. But what's—how is Iraq now? Iraq is completely dismembered. Iraq is a failed state now. This is the problem. Do you believe that the Americans, the greatest superpower, the most sovereign, the most actually modern power, cannot actually fix Iraq, cannot create a democracy there, cannot create coexistence among the people? And what happened is the opposite, dividing them—this is Sunni, this is Shia. So, this is—this is the problem. Yes, it is—you know, we have to say the truth. The American invasion of the Middle East—Iraq, in particular—creating the environment, the best environment for the Islamic State and for al-Qaeda to continue their savagery, their terrorism, their brutalism against the people of that region.
AMY GOODMAN: Abdel Bari Atwan, I want to thank you for being with us, author of the new book, The Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate, longtime journalist who served as editor-in-chief of the London-based daily Al-Quds al-Arabi for 25 years, now runs the Rai al-Youm website, recently wrote an article, and we'll link to it, atSalon, "America Enabled Radical Islam: How the CIA, George W. Bush and Many Others Helped Create ISIS." We'll have Part 2 of our discussion later this week. We'll be back in a minute.