A REPOST

*ZNet | Israel/Palestine*

*What Can Israel Achieve?*

*by Immanuel Wallerstein; Commentary No. 190, August 1, 2006; August

06, 2006*

The State of Israel was established in 1948. Ever since, there

has been continuous violence between Jews and Arabs in Israel,

and between Israel and its neighbors. Sometimes, the violence

was low-level and even latent. And every once in a while, the

violence escalated into open warfare, as now. Whenever full-

scale violence broke out, there was an immediate debate about

what started it, as though that mattered. We are now in the

midst of warfare between Israel and Palestine in Gaza and

between Israel and Lebanon. And the world is engaged in its

usual futile debate about how to reduce the open state of

warfare to low-level violence.

Every Israeli government has wished to create a situation in

which the world and Israel's neighbors recognize its existence

as a state and intergroup/interstate violence ceases. Israel has

never been able to achieve this. When the level of violence is

relatively low, the Israeli public is split about what strategy

to pursue. But when it escalates into warfare, the Jewish

Israelis and world Jewry tend to rally around the government.

In reality, Israel's basic strategy since 1948 has been to rely

on two things in the pursuit of its objectives: a strong

military, and strong outside Western support. So far this

strategy has worked in one sense: Israel still survives. The

question is how much longer this strategy will in fact continue

to work.

The source of outside support has shifted over time. We forget

completely that in 1948 the crucial military support for Israel

came from the Soviet Union and its eastern European satellites.

When the Soviet Union pulled back, it was France that came to

fill the role. France was engaged in a revolution in Algeria,

and it saw Israel as a crucial element in defeating the Algerian

national liberation movement. But when Algeria became

independent in 1962, France dropped Israel because it then

sought to maintain ties with a now- independent Algeria.

It is only after that moment that the United States moved into

its present total support of Israel. One major element in this

turn-around was the Israeli military victory in the Six Days War

in 1967. In this war, Israel conquered all the territories of

the old British Mandate of Palestine, as well as more. It proved

its ability to be a strong military presence in the region. It

transformed the attitude of world Jewry from one in which only

about 50% really approved of the creation of Israel into one

which had the support of the large majority of world Jewry, for

whom Israel had now become a source of pride. This is the moment

when the Holocaust became a major ideological justification for

Israel and its policies.

After 1967, the Israeli governments never felt they had to

negotiate anything with the Palestinians or with the Arab world.

They offered one-sided settlements but these were always on

Israeli terms. Israel wouldn't negotiate with Nasser. Then it

wouldn't negotiate with Arafat. And now it won't negotiate with

so-called terrorists. Instead, it has relied on successive shows

of military strength.

Israel is now engaged in the exact same catastrophic blunder,

from its own point of view, as George Bush's invasion of Iraq.

Bush thought that a show of military strength would establish

U.S. presence unquestionably in Iraq and intimidate the rest of

the world. Bush has discovered that Iraqi resistance was far

more formidable militarily than anticipated, that American

political allies in Iraq were far less reliable than he assumed

they would be, and that the U.S. public's support of the war was

far more fragile than he expected. The United States is heading

towards a humiliating withdrawal from Iraq.

Israel's current military campaign is a direct parallel of

Bush's invasion of Iraq. The Israeli generals are already noting

that Hezbollah's military is far more formidable than

anticipated, that U.S. allies in the region are already taking

wide distance from the United States and Israel (note the Iraqi

government's support of Lebanon and now that of the Saudi

government), and soon will discover that the Israeli public's

support is more fragile than expected. Already the Israeli

government is reluctant to send land troops into Lebanon,

largely because of what it thinks will be the reaction of its

own people inside Israel. Israel is heading towards a

humiliating truce arrangement.

What the Israeli governments do not realize is that neither

Hamas nor Hezbollah need Israel. It is Israel that needs them,

and needs them desperately. If Israel wants not to become a

Crusader state that is in the end extinguished, it is only Hamas

and Hezbollah that can guarantee the survival of Israel. It is

only when Israel is able to come to terms with them, as the

deeply-rooted spokespersons of Palestinian and Arab nationalism,

that Israel can live in peace.

Achieving a stable peace settlement will be extremely difficult.

But the pillars of Israel's present strategy - its own military

strength and the unconditional support of the United States -

constitute a very thin reed. Its military advantage is

diminishing and will diminish steadily in the years to come. And

in the post-Iraqi years, the United States may well drop Israel

in the same way that France did in the 1960s.

Israel's only real guarantee will be that of the Palestinians.

And to get this guarantee, Israel will need to rethink

fundamentally its strategy for survival.

[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence

Global. For rights and permissions, including translations and

posting to non-commercial sites, and contact:

rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.336.286.6606.

Permission is granted to download, forward electronically, or

e-mail to others, provided the essay remains intact and the

copyright note is displayed. To contact author, write:

immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu.

These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be

reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the

perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]