Monday, February 18, 2008

remember Iraq?

THE ABSURD TIMES
 
    Have you been wondering what ever happened to the discussion about the iraq war during the debates?  Isn't it still an illegal action committed by our government in God's and our name?  I did hear a brief announcement by Barbara Starr, the CNN Chief Military Correspondent on her way to Iraq, over her cell-phone, that the Baghdad Airpost had been hit with 18-20 missles and they were being diverted.  Since then, not a word nor a repeat.
    Here's a discussion by Noam Chomsky on the subject:
 
 

  "Good News," Iraq and Beyond
 
February 16, 2008 By *Noam Chomsky*
 

Noam Chomsky's ZSpace Page </zspace/noamchomsky>
 
 
Not long ago, it was taken for granted that the Iraq war would be the
central issue in the presidential campaign, as it was in the mid-term
election of 2006.  But it has virtually disappeared, eliciting some
puzzlement.  There should be none.
 
 
 
Iraq remains a significant concern for the population, but that is a
matter of little moment in a modern democracy.  The important work of
the world is the domain of the "responsible men," who must "live free of
the trampling and the roar of a bewildered herd," the general public,
"ignorant and meddlesome outsiders" whose "function" is to be
"spectators," not "participants." And spectators are not supposed to
bother their heads with issues.  The Wall Street Journal came close to
the point in a major front-page article on super-Tuesday, under the
heading "Issues Recede in '08 Contest As Voters Focus on Character." To
put it more accurately, issues recede as candidates, party managers, and
their PR agencies focus on character (qualities, etc.).  As usual.  And
for sound reasons.  Apart from the irrelevance of the population, they
can be dangerous.  The participants in action are surely aware that on a
host of major issues, both political parties are well to the right of
the general population, and that their positions that are quite
consistent over time, a matter reviewed in a useful study by Benjamin
Page and Marshall Bouton, The Foreign Policy Divide; the same is true on
domestic policy (see my Failed States, on both domains).  It is
important, then, for the attention of the herd to be diverted elsewhere.
 
 
 
The quoted admonitions, taken from highly regarded essays by the leading
public intellectual of the 20th century (Walter Lippmann), capture well
the perceptions of progressive intellectual opinion, largely shared
across the narrow elite spectrum.  The common understanding is revealed
more in practice than in words, though some, like Lippmann, do
articulate it: President Wilson, for example, who held that an elite of
gentlemen with "elevated ideals" must be empowered to preserve
"stability and righteousness," essentially the perspective of the
Founding Fathers.  In more recent years the gentlemen are transmuted
into the "technocratic elite" and "action intellectuals" of Camelot,
"Straussian" neocons, or other configurations.  But throughout, one or
another variant of Leninist doctrine prevails.
 
 
 
For the vanguard who uphold the elevated ideals and are charged with
managing the society and the world, the reasons for Iraq's drift off the
radar screen should not be obscure.   They were cogently explained by
the distinguished historian Arthur Schlesinger, articulating the
position of the doves 40 years ago when the US invasion of South Vietnam
was in its fourth year and Washington was preparing to add another
100,000 troops to the 175,000 already tearing South Vietnam to shreds.
By then the invasion launched by Kennedy was facing difficulties and
imposing difficult costs on the United States, so Schlesinger and other
Kennedy liberals were reluctantly beginning to shift from hawks to
doves.  That even included Robert Kennedy, who a year earlier, after the
vast intensification of the bombing and combat operations in the South
and the first regular bombing of the North, had condemned withdrawal as
"a repudiation of commitments undertaken and confirmed by three
administrations" which would "gravely -- perhaps irreparably -- weaken
the democratic position in Asia." But by the time that Schlesinger was
writing in 1966, RFK and other Camelot hawks began to call for a
negotiated settlement -- though not withdrawal, never an option, just as
withdrawal without victory was never an option for JFK, contrary to many
illusions.
 
 
 
Schlesinger wrote that of course "we all pray" that the hawks are right
in thinking that the surge of the day will be able to "suppress the
resistance," and if it does, "we may all be saluting the wisdom and
statesmanship of the American government" in winning victory while
leaving "the tragic country gutted and devastated by bombs, burned by
napalm, turned into a wasteland by chemical defoliation, a land of ruin
and wreck," with its "political and institutional fabric" pulverized.
But escalation probably won't succeed, and will prove to be too costly
for ourselves, so perhaps strategy should be rethought.
 
 
 
Attitudes towards the war at the liberal extreme were well illustrated
by the concerns of the Massachusetts branch of Americans for Democratic
Action, in Cambridge, the liberal stronghold.  In late 1967, the ADA
leadership undertook considerable (and quite comical) efforts to prevent
applications for membership from people they feared would speak in favor
of an anti-war resolution sponsored by a local chapter that had fallen
out of control (Howard Zinn and I were the terrifying applicants).  A
few months later came the Tet offensive, leading the business world to
turn against the war because of its costs to us, while the more
perceptive were coming to realize that Washington had already achieved
its major war aims.  It soon turned out that everyone had always been a
strong opponent of the war (in deep silence).  The Kennedy memoirists
revised their accounts to fit the new requirement that JFK was a secret
dove, consigning the rich documentary record (including their own
version of events at the time) to the dustbin of history, where the
wrong facts wither away.  Others preferred silence, assuming correctly
that the truth would disappear.  The preferred version soon took hold:
the radical and self-indulgent anti-war movement had disrupted the sober
efforts of the responsible "early opponents of the war" to bring it to
an end.
 
 
 
At the war's end, in 1975, the position of the extreme doves was
expressed by Anthony Lewis, the most critical voice in the New York
Times.  He observed that the war began with "blundering efforts to do
good" - which is close to tautology within the doctrinal system --
though by 1969 it had become "clear to most of the world -- and most
Americans -- that the intervention had been a disastrous mistake." The
argument against the war, Lewis explained, "was that the United States
had misunderstood the cultural and political forces at work in Indochina
-- that it was in a position where it could not impose a solution except
at a price too costly to itself."
 
 
 
By 1969, "most Americans" had a radically different view.  Some 70%
regarded the war as "fundamentally wrong and immoral," not "a mistake."
But they are just "ignorant and meddlesome outsiders," whose voices can
be dismissed - or on the rare occasions when they are noticed, explained
away without evidence by attributing to them self-serving motives
lacking any moral basis.
 
 
 
Elite reasoning, and the accompanying attitudes, carry over with little
change to critical commentary on the US invasion of Iraq today.  And
although criticism of the Iraq war is far greater and far-reaching than
in the case of Vietnam at any comparable stage, nevertheless the
principles that Schlesinger articulated remain in force in media and
commentary.
 
 
 
It is of some interest that Schlesinger himself took a very different
position on the Iraq invasion, virtually alone in his circles.  When the
bombs began to fall on Baghdad, he wrote that Bush's policies are
"alarmingly similar to the policy that imperial Japan employed at Pearl
Harbor, on a date which, as an earlier American president said it would,
lives in infamy.  Franklin D. Roosevelt was right, but today it is we
Americans who live in infamy." It would be instructive to determine how
Schlesinger's principled objection to US war crimes fared in the
tributes to him that appeared when he died, and in the many reviews of
his journals (which do not mention Vietnam until the Johnson years,
consistent with the early version of his memoirs of Camelot).
 
 
 
That Iraq is "a land of ruin and wreck" is not in question..  There is
no need to review the facts in any detail.  The British polling agency
Oxford Research Bureau recently updated its estimate of extra deaths
resulting from the war to 1.3 million - that's excluding Karbala and
Anbar provinces, two of the worst regions.  Whether that is correct, or
the true numbers are much lower as some claim, there is no doubt that
the toll is horrendous.  There are several million internally deplaced.
Thanks to the generosity of Jordan and Syria, the millions of refugees
fleeing the wreckage of Iraq, including most of the professional
classes, have not been simply wiped out.  But that welcome is fading,
for one reason because Jordan and Syria receive no meaningful support
from the perpetrators of the crimes in Washington and London; the idea
that they might admit these victims, beyond a trickle, is too outlandish
to consider.  Sectarian warfare has devastated the country.  Baghdad and
other areas have been subjected to brutal ethnic cleansing and left in
the hands of warlords and militias, the primary thrust of the current
counterinsurgency strategy developed by General Petraeus, who won his
fame by pacifying Mosul, now the scene of some of the most extreme violence.
 
 
 
One of the most dedicated and informed journalists who has been immersed
in the shocking tragedy, Nir Rosen, recently published an epitaph
entitled "The Death of Iraq," in Current History.  He writes that "Iraq
has been killed, never to rise again.  The American occupation has been
more disastrous than that of the Mongols, who sacked Baghdad in the
thirteenth century" - a common perception of Iraqis as well.  "Only
fools talk of `solutions' now.  There is no solution.  The only hope is
that perhaps the damage can be contained."
 
 
 
Though the wreckage of Iraq today is too visible to try to conceal, the
assault of the new barbarians is carefully circumscribed in the
doctrinal system so as to exclude the horrendous effects of the Clinton
sanctions - including their crucial role in preventing the threat that
Iraqis would send Saddam to the same fate as Ceasescu, Marcos, Suharto,
Chun, and many other monsters supported by the US and UK until they
could no longer be maintained.  Information about the effect of the
sanctions is hardly lacking, in particular about the humanitarian phase
of the sanctions regime, the oil-for-peace program initiated when the
early impact became so shocking that Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright had to mumble on TV that the price was right whatever the
parents of hundreds of thousands of dead Iraqi children might think.
The humanitarian program, which graciously permitted Iraq to use some of
its oil revenues for the devastated population, was administered by
highly respected and experienced UN diplomats, who had teams of
investigators all over the country and surely knew more about the
situation in Iraq than any other Westerners.  The first, Denis Halliday,
resigned in protest because the policies were "genocidal." His
successor, Hans von Sponeck, resigned two years later when he concluded
that the sanctions violated the Genocide Convention.  The Clinton
administration barred him from providing information about the impact to
the Security Council, which was technically responsible.  As Albright's
spokesperson James Rubin explained, "this man in Baghdad is paid to
work, not to speak."
 
 
 
Von Sponeck does, however, speak; in extensive detail in his muted but
horrifying book A Different Kind of War.  But the State Department
ruling prevails.  One will have to search diligently to find even a
mention of these revelations or what they imply.  Knowing too much,
Halliday and von Sponeck were also barred from the media during the
build-up to the invasion of Iraq.
 
 
 
It is true, however, that Iraq is now a marginal issue in the
presidential campaign.  That is natural, given the spectrum of hawk-dove
elite opinion.  The liberal doves adhere to their traditional reasoning
and attitudes, praying that the hawks will be right and that the US will
win a victory in the land of ruin and wreck, establishing "stability," a
code word for subordination to Washington's will.  By and large hawks
are encouraged, and doves silenced, by the good news about Iraq.
 
 
 
And there is good news. The US occupying army in Iraq (euphemistically
called the Multi-National Force-Iraq) carries out regular studies of
popular attitudes, a crucial component of population control measures.
In December 2007, it released a study of focus groups, which was
uncharacteristically upbeat.  The survey "provides very strong evidence"
that national reconciliation is possible and anticipated, contrary to
prevailing voices of hopelessness and despair.  The survey found that a
sense of "optimistic possibility permeated all focus groups . . . and
far more commonalities than differences are found among these seemingly
diverse groups of Iraqis." This discovery of "shared beliefs" among
Iraqis throughout the country is "good news, according to a military
analysis of the results," Karen de Young reported in the Washington Post
(Dec. 19).
 
 
 
The "shared beliefs" were identified in the report. To quote de Young,
"Iraqis of all sectarian and ethnic groups believe that the U.S.
military invasion is the primary root of the violent differences among
them, and see the departure of `occupying forces' as the key to national
reconciliation."  So according to Iraqis, there is hope of national
reconciliation if the invaders, who are responsible for the internal
violence, withdraw and leave Iraq to Iraqis.
 
 
 
The conclusions are credible, consistent with earlier polls, and also
with the apparent reduction in violence when the British finally
withdrew from Basra a few months ago, having "decisively lost the south
- which produces over 90 per cent of government revenues and 70 per cent
of Iraq's proven oil reserves" by 2005, according to Anthony Cordesman,
the most prominent US specialist on military affairs in the Middle East.
 
The December 2007 report did not mention other good news: Iraqis appear
to accept the highest values of Americans, which should be highly
gratifying.  Specifically, they accept the principles of the Nuremberg
Tribunal that sentenced Nazi war criminals to hanging for such crimes as
supporting aggression and preemptive war - the main charge against
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, whose position in the Nazi regime
corresponded to that of Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice.  The Tribunal
defined aggression clearly enough: "invasion of its armed forces" by one
state "of the territory of another state." The invasion of Iran and
Afghanistan are textbook examples, if words have meaning.  The Tribunal
went on to define aggression as "the supreme international crime
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself
the accumulated evil of the whole": in the case of Iraq, the murderous
sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing, the destruction of the national
culture and the irreplaceable treasures of the origins of Western
civilization under the eyes of "stuff happens" Rumsfeld and his
associates, and every other crime and atrocity as the inheritors of the
Mongols have followed the path of imperial Japan.
 
 
 
Since Iraqis attribute the accumulated evil of the whole primarily to
the invasion, it follows that they accept the core principle of
Nuremberg.  Presumably, they were not asked whether their acceptance of
American values extended to the conclusion of the chief prosecutor for
the United States, US Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, who
forcefully insisted that the Tribunal would be mere farce if we do not
apply its principles to ourselves.
 
 
 
Needless to say, US elite opinion, shared with the West generally,
flatly rejects the lofty American values professed at Nuremberg, indeed
regards them as bordering on obscene.  All of this provides an
instructive illustration of some of the reality that lies behind the
famous "clash of civilizations."
 
 
 
A January poll by World Learning/Aspen Institute found that "75 percent
of Americans believe U.S. foreign policy is driving dissatisfaction with
America abroad and more than 60 percent believe that dislike of American
values (39 percent) and of the American people (26 percent) is also to
blame." The perception is inaccurate, fed by propaganda.  There is
little dislike of Americans, and dissatisfaction abroad does not derive
from "dislike of American values," but rather from acceptance of these
values, and recognition that they are rejected by the US government and
elite opinion.
 
Other "good news" had been reported by General Petraeus and Ambassador
Ryan Crocker during the extravaganza staged on 9/11.  Perhaps we should
call the commander "Lord Petraeus," in the light of the reverence
displayed by the media and commentators on this occasion. 
Parenthetically, only a cynic might imagine that the timing was intended
to insinuate the Bush-Cheney claims of links between Saddam Hussein and
Osama bin Laden, so that by committing the "supreme international crime"
they were defending the world against terror - which increased sevenfold
as a result of the invasion, according to an analysis by terrorism
specialists Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, using data of the
government-linked Rand corporation.
 
 
 
Petraeus and Crocker provided figures to show that the Iraqi government
had greatly accelerated spending on reconstruction, reaching a quarter
of the funding set aside for that purpose.  Good news indeed -- until it
was investigated by the Government Accountability Office, which found
that the actual figure was one-sixth what Petraeus and Crocker reported,
a 50 percent decline from the preceding year.
 
 
 
More good news is the decline in sectarian violence, attributable in
part to the success of the ethnic cleansing that Iraqis blame on the
invasion; there are simply fewer people to kill in the cleansed areas.
But it is also attributable to Washington's decision to support the
tribal groups that had organized to drive out Iraqi al-Qaeda, to an
increase in US troops, and to the decision of the Mahdi army to stand
down and consolidate its gains - what the press calls "halting
aggression." By definition, only Iraqis can commit aggression in Iraq
(or Iranians, of course).
 
 
 
It is not impossible that Petraeus's strategy might approach the success
of the Russians in Chechnya, where fighting is now "limited and
sporadic, and Grozny is in the midst of a building boom" after having
been reduced to rubble by the Russian attack, C.J. Chivers reports in
the New York Times, also on September 11.  Perhaps some day Baghdad and
Falluja too will enjoy "electricity restored in many neighborhoods, new
businesses opening and the city's main streets repaved," as in booming
Grozny.  Possible, but dubious, in the light of the likely consequence
of creating warlord armies that may be the seeds of even greater
sectarian violence, adding to the "accumulated evil" of the aggression.
 
 
 
If Russians rise to the moral level of liberal intellectuals in the
West, they must be saluting Putin's "wisdom and statesmanship" for his
achievements in Chechnya.
 
 
 
A few weeks after the Pentagon's "good news" from Iraq, New York Times
military-Iraq expert Michael Gordon wrote a reasoned and comprehensive
review of the options on Iraq policy facing the candidates for the
presidential election.  One voice is missing: Iraqis.  Their preference
is not rejected.  Rather, it is not worthy of mention.  And it seems
that there was no notice of the fact.  That makes sense on the usual
tacit assumption of almost all discourse on international affairs: we
own the world, so what does it matter what others think?  They are
"unpeople," to borrow the term used by British diplomatic historian Mark
Curtis in his work on Britain's crimes of empire - very illuminating
work, therefore deeply hidden.  Routinely, Americans join Iraqis in
un-peoplehood.  Their preferences too provide no options.
 
 
 
To cite another instructive example, consider Gerald Seib's reflections
in the Wall Street Journal on "Time to Look Ahead in Iraq." Seib is
impressed that debate over Iraq is finally beginning to go beyond the
"cartoon-like characteristics" of what has come before and is now
beginning to confront "the right issue," the "more profound questions":
 
 
 
The more profound questions are the long-term ones. Regardless of how
things evolve in a new president's first year, the U.S. needs to decide
what its lasting role should be in Iraq. Is Iraq to be a permanent
American military outpost, and will American troops need to be on hand
in some fashion to help defend Iraq's borders for a decade or more, as
some Iraqi officials themselves have suggested? Will the U.S. see Iraq
more broadly as a base for exerting American political and diplomatic
influence in the broader Middle East, or is that a mistake? Is it better
to have American troops just over the horizon, in Kuwait or ships in the
Persian Gulf? Driving these military considerations is the political
question of what kind of government the U.S. can accept in Iraq….
 
 
 
No soft-headed nonsense here about Iraqis having a voice on the lasting
role of the US in Iraq or on the kind of government they would prefer.
 
 
 
Seib should not be confused with the columnists in the Journal's
"opinion pages." He is a rational centrist analyst, who could easily be
writing in the liberal media or journals of the Democratic Party like
The New Republic.  And he grasps quite accurately the fundamental
principles guiding the political class.
 
 
 
Such reflections of the imperial mentality are deeply rooted.  To pick
examples almost at random, in December 2007 Panama declared a Day of
Mourning to commemorate the US invasion of 1989, which killed thousands
of poor people, so Panamanian human rights groups concluded, when Bush I
bombed the El Chorillo slums and other civilian targets.  The Day of
Mourning of the unpeople scarcely merited a flicker of an eyelid here.
It is also of no interest that Bush's invasion of Panama, another
textbook example of aggression, appears to have been more deadly than
Saddam's invasion of Kuwait a few months later.  An unfair comparison of
course; after all, we own the world, and he didn't.  It is also of no
interest that Washington's greatest fear was that Saddam would imitate
its behavior in Panama, installing a client government and then leaving,
the main reason why Washington blocked diplomacy with almost complete
media cooperation; the sole serious exception I know of was Knut Royce
in Long Island Newsday.  Though the December Day of Mourning passed with
little notice, there was a lead story when the Panamanian National
Assembly was opened by president Pedro Gonzalez, who is charged by
Washington with killing American soldiers during a protest against
President Bush's visit two years after his invasion, charges dismissed
by Panamanian courts but still upheld by the owner of the world.
 
 
 
To take another illustration of the depth of the imperial mentality, New
York Times correspondent Elaine Sciolino writes that "Iran's
intransigence [about nuclear enrichment] appears to be defeating
attempts by the rest of the world to curtail Tehran's nuclear
ambitions." The rest of the world happens to exclude the large majority
of the world: the non-aligned movement, which forcefully endorses Iran's
right to enrich Uranium, in accord with the Non-proliferation treaty
(NPT).  But they are not part of the world, since they do not
reflexively accept US orders.
 
 
 
We might tarry for a moment to ask whether there is any solution to the
US-Iran confrontation over nuclear weapons.  Here is one idea: (1) Iran
should have the right to develop nuclear energy, but not weapons, in
accord with the NPT. (2) A nuclear weapons-free zone should be
established in the region, including Iran, Israel, and US forces
deployed there.  (3) The US should accept the NPT. (4) The US should end
threats against Iran, and turn to diplomacy.
 
 
 
The proposals are not original.  These are the preferences of the
overwhelming majority of Americans, and also Iranians, in polls by World
Public Opinion, which found that Americans and Iranians agree on basic
issues.  At a forum at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced
International Studies when the polls were released a year ago, Joseph
Cirincione, senior vice president for National Security and
International Policy at the Center for American Progress, said the polls
showed "the common sense of both the American people and the Iranian
people, [who] seem to be able to rise above the rhetoric of their own
leaders to find common sense solutions to some of the most crucial
questions" facing the two nations, favoring pragmatic, diplomatic
solutions to their differences.  The results suggest that if the US and
Iran were functioning democratic societies, this very dangerous
confrontation could probably be resolved peaceably.
 
 
 
The opinions of Americans on this issue too are not regarded as worthy
of consideration;  they are not options for candidates or commentators.
They were apparently not even reported, perhaps considered too dangerous
because of what they reveal about the "democratic deficit" in the United
States, and about the extremism of the political class across the
spectrum.  If public opinion were to be mentioned as an option, it would
be ridiculed as "politically impossible"; or perhaps offered as another
reason why "The public must be put in its place," as Lippmann sternly
admonished.
 
 
 
There is more to say about the preference of Americans on Iran.  Point
(1) above, as noted, happens to accord with the stand of the large
majority of the world.  With regard to point (2), the US and its allies
have accepted it, formally at least.  UN Security Council Resolution 687
commits them to "the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free
from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and
the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons" (Article 14).  The US
and UK have a particularly strong commitment to this principle, since it
was this Resolution that they appealed to in their efforts to provide a
thin legal cover for their invasion of Iraq, claiming that Iraq had not
lived up to the conditions in 687 on disarmament.  As for point (3), 80
percent of Americans feel that Washington should live up to its
commitment under the NPT to undertake "good faith" efforts to eliminate
nuclear weapons entirely, a legal commitment as the World Court
determined, explictly rejected by the Bush administration.  Turning to
point (4), Americans are calling on the government to adhere to
international law, under which the threats of violence that are voiced
by all current candidates are a crime, in violation of the UN Charter.
The call for negotiations and diplomacy on the part of the American
unpeople extends to Cuba, and has for decades, but is again dismissed by
both political parties.
 
 
 
The likelihood that functioning democracy might alleviate severe dangers
is regularly illustrated.  To take another current example, of great
importance, there is now justified concern about Russian reactions to US
aggressive militarism.  That includes the extension of NATO to the East
by Clinton in violation of solemn pledges to Gorbachev, but particularly
the vast expansion of offensive military capacity under Bush, and more
recently, the plans to place "missile defense" installations in Eastern
Europe.  Putin is ridiculed for claiming that they are a threat to
Russia.  But US strategic analysts recognize that he has a point.  The
programs are designed in a way that Russian planners would have to
regard as a threat to the Russian deterrent, hence calling for more
advanced and lethal offensive military capacity to neutralize them (see
George Lewis and Theodore Postol, "European Missile Defense: The
Technological Basis of Russian Concerns," Arms Control Today, Oct.
2007).  A new arms race is feared.
 
 
 
Recent polls under the direction of strategic analysts John Steinbrunner
and Nancy Gallagher "reveal a striking disparity between what U.S. and
Russian leaders are doing and what their publics desire," and again
indicate that if these countries were functioning democracies, in which
the ignorant and meddlesome outsiders had a voice, the increasingly
fragile US-Russian strategic relationship could be repaired, a matter of
species survival in this case.
 
 
 
In a free press, all of these matters, and many more like them, would
merit regular prominent headlines and in-depth analysis.
 
 
 
Having brought up Iran, we might as well turn briefly to the third
member of the famous Axis of Evil, North Korea.  The official story
right now is that after having been forced to accept an agreement on
dismantling its nuclear weapons facilities, North Korea is again trying
to evade its commitments in its usual devious way - "good news" for
superhawks like John Bolton, who have held all along that they
understand only the mailed fist and will exploit negotiations only to
trick us.  A New York Times headline reads: "U.S. Sees Stalling by North
Korea on Nuclear Pact" (January 19); the article by Helene Cooper
details the charges.  In the last paragraph we discover that the US has
not fulfilled its pledges.  North Korea has received only 15% of the
fuel that was promised by the US and others, and the US has not
undertaken steps to improve diplomatic relations, as promised.  Several
weeks later (Feb. 6), in the McClatchey press Kevin Hall reported that
the chief US negotiator with North Korea, Christopher Hill, confirmed in
Senate Hearings that "North Korea has slowed the dismantling of its
nuclear reactor because it hasn't received the amount of fuel oil it was
promised."
 
 
 
As we learn from the specialist literature, and asides here and there,
this is a consistent pattern.  North Korea may have the worst government
in the world, but they have been pursuing a pragmatic tit-for-tat policy
on negotiations with the United States.  When the US takes an aggressive
and threatening stance, they react accordingly.  When the US moves
towards some form of accommodation, so do they.  When Bush came into
office, both North Korea and the US were bound by the Framework
Agreement of 1994.  Neither was fully in accord with its commitments,
but the agreement was largely being observed.  North Korea had stopped
testing long-range missiles.  It had perhaps 1-2 bombs worth of
plutonium, and was verifiably not making more.  After 7 Bush years of
confrontation, North Korea has 8-10 bombs and long-range missiles, and
it is developing plutonium.  The Clinton administration, Korea
specialist Bruce Cumings reports, "had also worked out a plan to buy
out, indirectly, the North's medium and long-range missiles; it was
ready to be signed in 2000 but Bush let it fall by the wayside and today
the North retains all its formidable missile capability."
 
 
 
The reasons for Bush's achievements are well understood.  The Axis of
Evil speech, a serious blow to Iranian democrats and reformers as they
have stressed, also put North Korea on notice that the US is returning
to its threatening stance.  Washington released intelligence reports
about North Korean clandestine program; these were conceded to be
dubious or baseless when the latest negotiations began in 2007,
probably, commentators speculated, because it was feared that weapons
inspectors might enter North Korea and the Iraq story would be
repeated.  North Korea responded by ratcheting up missile and weapons
development.
 
 
 
In September 2005, under international pressure Washington agreed to
turn to negotiations, within the six-power framework.  They achieved
substantial success.  North Korea agreed to abandon "all nuclear weapons
and existing weapons programs" and allow international inspections, in
return for international aid and a non-aggression pledge from the U.S.,
with an agreement that the two sides would "respect each other's
sovereignty, exist peacefully together and take steps to normalize
relations." The ink was barely dry on the agreement when the Bush
administration renewed the threat of force, also freezing North Korean
funds in foreign banks and disbanding the consortium that was to provide
North Korea with a light-water reactor consortium.  Cumings alleges that
"the sanctions were specifically designed to destroy the September
pledges [and] to head off an accommodation between Washington and
Pyongyang."
 
 
 
After Washington scuttled the promising September 2005 agreements, North
Korea returned to weapons and missile development and carried out a test
of a nuclear weapon.  Again under international pressure, and with its
foreign policy in tatters, Washington returned to negotiations, leading
to an agreement, though it is now dragging its feet on fulfilling its
commitments.
 
 
 
Writing in Le Monde diplomatique last October, Cumings concludes that
"Bush had presided over the most asinine Korea policy in history.  These
last years, relations between Washington and Seoul have deteriorated
drastically. By commission and omission, Bush trampled on the norms of
the historic US relationship with Seoul while creating a dangerous
situation with Pyongyang."
 
 
 
Charges against North Korea escalated in September 2007, when Israel
bombed an obscure site in northern Syria, an "act of war," as at least
one American correspondent recognized (Seymour Hersh).  Charges at once
surfaced that Israel attacked a nuclear installation being developed
with the help of North Korea, an attack compared with Israel's bombing
of the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 - which, according to available
evidence, convinced Saddam Hussein to initiate his nuclear weapons
program.  The September 2007 charges are dubious.  Hersh's tentative
conclusion after detailed investigation is that the Israeli actions may
have been intended as another threat against Iran: the US-Israel have
you in their bombsights.  However this may be, there is some important
background that should be recalled.
 
 
 
In 1993, Israel and North Korea were on the verge of an agreement:
Israel would recognize North Korea, and in return, North Korea would end
any weapons-related involvement in the Middle East.  The significance
for Israeli security is clear.  Clinton ordered the deal terminated, and
Israel had no choice but to obey.  Ever since its fateful decision in
1971 and the years that followed to reject peace and security in favor
of expansion, Israel has been compelled rely on the US for protection,
hence to obey Washington's commands.
 
 
 
Whether or not there is any truth to current charges about North Korea
and Syria, it appears that the threat to the security of Israel, and the
region, could have been avoided by peaceful means, had security been a
high priority.
 
 
 
Let us return to first member of Axis of Evil, Iraq. Washington's
expectations  are outlined in a Declaration of Principles between the US
and the US-backed Iraqi government last November.  The Declaration
allows US forces to remain indefinitely to "deter foreign aggression"
and for internal security.  The only aggression in sight is from the
United States, but that is not aggression, by definition.  And only the
most naïve will entertain the thought that the US would sustain the
government by force if it moved towards independence, going too far in
strengthening relations with Iran, for example.  The Declaration also
committed Iraq to facilitate and encourage "the flow of foreign
investments to Iraq, especially American investments."
 
 
 
The unusually brazen expression of imperial will was underscored when
Bush quietly issued yet another signing statement, declaring that he
will reject crucial provisions of congressional legislation that he had
just signed, including the provision that forbids spending taxpayer
money "to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of
providing for the permanent stationing of United States Armed Forces in
Iraq" or "to exercise United States control of the oil resources of
Iraq." Shortly before, the New York Times had reported that Washington
"insists that the Baghdad government give the United States broad
authority to conduct combat operations," a demand that "faces a
potential buzz saw of opposition from Iraq, with its…deep sensitivities
about being seen as a dependent state." More third world irrationality.
 
 
 
In brief, Iraq must agree to allow permanent US military installations
(called "enduring" in the preferred Orwellism), grant the US the right
to conduct combat operations freely, and ensure US control over oil
resources of Iraq while privileging US investors.  It is of some
interest that these reports did not influence discussion about the
reasons for the US invasion of Iraq.  These were never obscure, but any
effort to spell them out was dismissed with falsification and ridicule.
Now the reasons are openly conceded, eliciting no retraction or even
reflection.
 
 
 
Iraqis are not alone in believing that national reconciliation is
possible.  A Canadian-run poll found that Afghans are hopeful about the
future and favor the presence of Canadian and other foreign troops - the
"good news," that made the headlines.  The small print suggests some
qualifications.  Only 20% "think the Taliban will prevail once foreign
troops leave." Three-fourths support negotiations between the US-backed
Karzai government and the Taliban, and more than half  favor a coalition
government.  The great majority therefore strongly disagree with
US-Canadian stance, and believe that peace is possible with a turn
towards peaceful means.
 
 
 
Though the question was not asked, it is reasonable to surmise that the
foreign presence is favored for aid and reconstruction.  More evidence
in support of this conjecture is provided by reports about the progress
of reconstruction in Afghanistan six years after the US invasion.  Six
percent of the population now have electricity, AP reports, primarily in
Kabul, which is artificially wealthy because of the huge foreign
presence.  There, "the rich, powerful, and well connected" have
electricity, but few others, in contrast to the 1980s under Russian
occupation, when "the city had plentiful power" - and women in Kabul
were relatively free under the occupation and the Russian-backed
Najibullah government that followed, probably more so than now, though
they did have to worry about attacks from Reagan's favorites, like
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who got his kicks from throwing acid in the faces
of young women he thought were improperly dressed.
 
 
 
These matters were discussed at the time by Rasil Basu, UN Development
Program senior advisor to the Afghan government for women's development
(1986-88). She reported "enormous strides" for women under the Russian
occupation: "illiteracy  declined from 98% to 75%, and they were granted
equal rights with men in civil law, and in the Constitution...  Unjust
patriarchal relations still prevailed in the workplace and in the family
with women occupying lower level sex-type jobs.  But the strides [women]
took in education and employment were very impressive....In Kabul I saw
great advances in women's education and employment.  Women were in
evidence in industry, factories, government offices, professions and the
media.  With large numbers of men killed or disabled, women shouldered
the responsibility of both family and country.  I met a woman who
specialized in war medicine which dealt with trauma and reconstructive
surgery for the war-wounded.  This represented empowerment to her.
Another woman was a road engineer.  Roads represented freedom - an
escape from the oppressive patriarchal structures."
 
 
 
By 1988, however, Basu "could see the early warning signs" as Russian
troops departed and the fundamentalist Islamist extremists favored by
the Reagan administration took over, brushing aside the more moderate
mujahideen groups. "Saudi Arabian and American arms and ammunition gave
the  fundamentalists a vital edge over the moderates," providing them
with military hardware used, "according to Amnesty International, to
target unarmed civilians, most of them  women and children." Then
followed much worse horrors as the US-Saudi favorites overthrew the
Najibullah government.  The suffering of the population was so extreme
that the Taliban were welcomed when they drove out Reagan's freedom
fighters.  Another chapter in the triumph of Reaganite reactionary
ultra-nationalism, worshipped today by those dedicated to defaming the
honorable term "conservative."
 
 
 
Basu is a distinguished advocate for women's rights, including a long
career with the UN during which she drafted the World Plan of Action for
Women and the draft Programme for the Women's Decade, 1975-85, adopted
at the Mexico City Conference (1975) and Copenhagen Conference (1980).
But her words were not welcome in the US.  Her 1988 report was submitted
to the Washington Post, New York Times, and Ms. magazine.  But
rejected.  Also rejected were Basu's recommendation of practical steps
that the West, particularly the US, could take to protect women's rights.
 
 
 
Highly relevant in this connection are the important investigations by
Nikolai Lanine, a former soldier in the Russian army in Afghanistan,
bringing out the striking comparisons between Russian commentary during
the occupation and that of their NATO successors today.
 
 
 
These and further considerations suggest that Afghans really would
welcome a foreign presence devoted to aid and reconstruction, as we can
read between the lines in the polls.
 
 
 
There are, of course, numerous questions about polls in countries under
foreign military occupation, particularly in places like southern
Afghanistan. But the results of the Iraq and Afghan studies conform to
earlier ones, and should not be dismissed.
 
 
 
Recent polls in Pakistan also provide "good news" for Washington.  Fully
5% favor allowing US or other foreign troops to enter Pakistan "to
pursue or capture al Qaeda fighters." 9% favor allowing US forces "to
pursue and capture Taliban insurgents who have crossed over from
Afghanistan." Almost half favor allowing Pakistani troops to do so.  And
only a little over 80% regard the US military presence in Asia and
Afghanistan as a threat to Pakistan, while an overwhelming majority
believe that the US is trying to harm the Islamic world.
 
 
 
The good news is that these results are a considerable improvement over
October 2001, when a Newsweek poll found that "Eighty-three percent of
Pakistanis surveyed say they side with the Taliban, with a mere 3
percent expressing support for the United States," while over 80 percent
described Osama bin Laden as a guerrilla and 6 percent a terrorist.
 
 
 
Events elsewhere in early 2008 might also turn out to be "good news" for
Washington.  In January, in a remarkable act of courageous civil
disobedience, tens of thousands of the tortured people of Gaza broke out
of the prison to which they had been confined by the US-Israel alliance,
with the usual timid European support, as punishment for the crime of
voting the wrong way in a free election in January 2006.  It was
instructive to see the front-pages with stories reporting the brutal US
response to a genuinely free election alongside others lauding the Bush
administration for its noble dedication to "democracy promotion," or
sometimes gently chiding it because it was going too far in its
idealism, failing to recognize that the unpeople of the Middle East are
too backward to appreciate democracy - another principle that traces
back to "Wilsonian idealism."
 
 
 
This glaring illustration of elite hatred and contempt for democracy is
routinely reported, apparently with no awareness of what it signifies.
To pick an illustration almost at random, Cam Simpson reports in the
Wall St Journal (Feb. 8) that despite the harsh US-Israeli punishment of
Gaza, and "flooding the West Bank's Western-backed Fatah-led government
with diplomatic and economic support [to] persuade Palestinians in both
territories to embrace Fatah and isolate Hamas," the opposite is
happening: Hamas's popularity is increasing in the West Bank.  As
Simpson casually explains, "Hamas won Palestinian elections in January
2006, prompting the Israeli government and the Bush administration to
lead a world-wide boycott of the Palestinian Authority," along with much
more severe measures.  The goal, unconcealed, is to punish the
miscreants who fail to grasp the essential principle of democracy: "Do
what we say, or else."
 
 
 
The US-backed Israel punishment increased through early 2006, and
escalated sharply after the capture of an Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit,
in June.  That act was bitterly denounced in the West.  Israel's vicious
response was regarded as understandable if perhaps excessive.  These
thoughts were untroubled by the dramatic demonstration that they were
sheer hypocrisy.  The day before the capture of Corporal Shalit on the
front lines of the army attacking Gaza, Israeli forces entered Gaza City
and kidnapped two civilians, the Muammar brothers, taking them to Israel
(in violation of the Geneva Conventions), where they disappeared into
Israel's prison population, including almost 1000 held without charge,
often for long periods.  The kidnapping, a far more serious crime than
the capture of Shalit, received a few scattered lines of comment, but no
noticeable criticism.  That is perhaps understandable, because it is not
news.  US-backed Israeli forces have been engaged in such practices, and
far more brutal ones, for decades.  And in any event, as a client state
Israel inherits the right of criminality from its master.
 
 
 
The US-Israel attempted to organize a military coup to install their
favored faction.  That was also reported frankly, considered entirely
legitimate, if not praiseworthy.  The coup was preempted by Hamas, which
took over the Gaza Strip.  Israeli savagery reached new heights, while
in the West Bank, US-backed Israeli operations carried forrward the
steady process of taking over valuable territory and resources, breaking
up the fragments remaining to Palestinians by settlements and huge
infrastructure projects, imprisoning the whole by takeover of the Jordan
Valley, and expanding settlement and development in Jerusalem in
violation of Security Council orders that go back 40 years to ensure
that there will be no more than a token Palestinian presence in the
historic center of Palestinian cultural, commercial, and social life.
Non-violent reactions by Palestinians and solidarity groups are
viciously crushed with rare exceptions.  And scarcely any notice.  Even
when Nobel laureate Mairead Corrigan Maguire was shot and gassed by
Israeli troops while participating in a vigil protesting the Separation
Wall - now better termed an annexation wall -  there was apparently not
a word in the English-language press, outside of Ireland.
 
 
 
Israel's settlement and development programs on the West Bank, including
occupied East Jerusalem, are flagrantly illegal, in violation of
numerous Security Council resolutions and the authoritative jugment by
the International Court of Justice on the Separation Wall, with the
agreement of US Justice Buergenthal in a separate declaration.
 
 
 
Criminal actions by Palestinians, such as Qassam rockets fired from
Gaza, are angrily condemned in the West.  The far more violent and
destructive Israeli actions sometimes elicit polite clucking of tongues
if they exceed approved levels of state terror.  Invariably Israel's
actions - for which of course the US shares direct responsibility - are
portrayed as retaliation, perhaps excessive.  Another way of looking at
the cycle of violence is that Qassam rockets are retaliation for
Israel's unceasing crimes in the West Bank, which is not separable from
Gaza except by US-Israeli fiat.  But standard racist-ultranationalist
assumptions exclude that interpretation.
 
 
 
International humanitarian law is quite explicit on these matters.
Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1950 states that "No
protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not
personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of
intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited…Reprisals against protected
persons and their property are prohibited." Gazans are unambigously
"protected persons" under Israeli military occupation.  The Hague
Convention of 1907 also declares that "No general penalty, pecuniary or
otherwise, can be inflicted on the population on account of the acts of
individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible"
(Article 50).  Furthermore, High Contracting Parties to the Geneva
Convention are bound to "respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances," including of course the Israel and the
US, which is obligated to prevent, or to punish, the serious breaches of
the Convention by its own leaders and its client.  When the media
report, as they regularly do, that "Israel hopes [reducing supplies of
fuel and electricity to the Gaza Strip] will create popular pressure to
force the Hamas rulers of Gaza and other militant groups to stop the
rocket fire" (Stephen Erlanger, NYT, Jan. 31), they are calmly informing
us that Israel is in grave breach of international humanitarian law, as
is the US for not ensuring respect for law on the part of its client.
When the Israeli High Court grants legitimacy to these measures, as it
has, it is adding another page to its ugly record of subordination to
state power.  Israel's leading legal journalist, Moshe Negbi, knew what
he was doing when he entitled his despairing review of the record of the
courts We were like Sodom (Kisdom Hayyinu).
 
 
 
International law cannot be enforced against powerful states, except by
their own populations.  That is always a difficult task, particularly so
when articulate opinion and the Courts declare crime to be legitimate.
 
 
 
In January, the Hamas-led prison break allowed Gazans for the first time
in years to go shopping in nearby Egyptian towns, plainly a serious
criminal act because it slightly undermines US-Israeli strangulation of
these unpeople.  But the powerful quickly recognized that these events
too could turn into "good news." Israeli deputy defense minister Matan
Vilnai "said openly what some senior Israeli officials would only say
anonymously," Stephen Erlanger reported in the New York Times: the
prison-break might allow Israel to rid itself of any responsibility for
Gaza after having reduced it to devastation and misery in 40 years of
brutal occupation, keeping it only for target practice, and of course
under full military occupation, its borders sealed by Israeli forces on
land, sea and air, apart from an opening to Egypt (in the unlikely event
that Egypt would agree).
 
 
 
That appealing prospect would complement Israel's ongoing criminal
actions in the West Bank, carefully designed along the lines already
outlined to ensure that there will be no viable future for Palestinians
there.  At the same time Israel can turn to solving its internal
"demographic problem," the presence of non-Jews in a Jewish state.  The
ultra-nationalist Knesset member Avigdor Lieberman was harshly condemned
as a racist in Israel when he advanced the idea of forcing Arab citizens
of Israel into a derisory "Palestinian state," presenting this to the
world as a "land swap." His proposal is slowly being incorporated into
the mainstream.  Israel National News reported in April that Knesset
member Otniel Schneller of the governing party Kadima, "considered to be
one of the people closest and most loyal to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert,"
proposed a plan that "appears very similar to one touted by Yisrael
Beiteinu leader Avigdor Lieberman," though Schneller says his plan would
be "more gradual," and the Arabs affected "will remain citizens of
Israel even though their territory will belong to the [Palestinian
Authority and] they will not be allowed to resettle in other areas of
Israel." Of course the unpeople are not consulted.
 
 
 
In December, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, the last hope of many Israeli
doves, adopted the same position. An eventual Palestinian state, she
suggested, would "be the national answer to the Palestinians" in the
territories and those "who live in different refugee camps or in
Israel." With Israeli Arabs dispatched to their natural place, Israel
would then achieve the long-sought goal of freeing itself from the Arab
taint, a stand that is familiar enough in US history, for example in
Thomas Jefferson's hope, never achieved, that the rising empire of
liberty would be free of "blot or mixture," red or black.
 
 
 
For Israel, this is no small matter.  Despite heroic efforts by its
apologists, it is not easy to conceal the fact that a "democratic Jewish
state" is no more acceptable to liberal opinion than a "democratic
Christian state" or a "democratic white state," as long as the blot or
mixture is not removed.  Such notions could be tolerated if the
religious/ethnic identification were mostly symbolic, like selecting an
official day of rest.  But in the case of Israel, it goes far beyond
that.  The most extreme departure from minimal democratic principles is
the complex array of laws and bureaucratic arrangements designed to vest
control of over 90 percent of the land in the hands of the Jewish
National Fund, an organization committed to using charitable funds in
ways that are "directly or indirectly beneficial to persons of Jewish
religion, race or origin," so its documents explain: "a public
institution recognized by the Government of Israel and the World Zionist
Organization as the exclusive instrument for the development of Israel's
lands," restricted to Jewish use, in perpetuity (with marginal
exceptions), and barred to non-Jewish labor (though the principle is
often ignored for imported cheap labor).  This radical violation of
elementary civil rights, funded by all American citizens thanks to the
tax-free status of the JNF, finally reached Israel's High Court in 2000,
in a case brought by an Arab couple who had been barred from the town of
Katzir.  The Court ruled in their favor, in a narrow decision, which
seems to have been barely implemented.  Seven years later, a young Arab
couple was barred from the town of Rakefet, on state land, on grounds of
"social incompatibility" (Scott Peterson, Washington Post, Dec. 20,
2007), a very rare report.  Again, none of this is unfamiliar in the
US.  After all, it took a century before the 14th amendment was even
formally recognized by the courts, and it still is far from implemented.
 
 
 
For Palestinians, there are now two options.  One is that the US and
Israel will abandon their unilateral rejectionism of the past 30 years
and accept the international consensus on a two-state settlement, in
accord with international law - and, incidentally, in accord with the
wishes of a large majority of Americans.  That is not impossible, though
the two rejectionist states are working hard to render it so.  A
settlement along these lines came close in negotiations in Taba Egypt in
January 2001, and might have been reached, participants reported, had
Israeli Prime Minister Barak not called off the negotiations
prematurely.  The framework for these negotiations was Clinton's
"parameters" of December 2000, issued after he recognized that the Camp
David proposals earlier that year were unacceptable.  It is commonly
claimed that Arafat rejected the parameters.  However, as Clinton made
clear and explicit, both sides had accepted the parameters, in both caes
with reservations, which they sought to reconcile in Taba a few weeks
later, and apparently almost succeeded.  There have been unofficial
negotiations since that have produced similar proposals.  Though
possibilities diminish as US-Israeli settlement and infrastructure
programs proceed, they have not been eliminated.  By now the
international consensus is near universal, supported by the Arab League,
Iran, Hamas, in fact every relevant actor apart from the US and Israel.
 
 
 
A second possibility is the one that the US-Israel are actually
implementing, along the lines just described.  Palestinians will then be
consigned to their Gaza prison and to West Bank cantons, perhaps joined
by Israeli Arab citizens as well if the Lieberman-Schneller-Livni plans
are implemented.  For the occupied territories, that will realize the
intentions expressed by Moshe Dayan to his Labor Party cabinet
colleagues in the early years of the occupation: Israel should tell the
Palestinian refugees in the territories that "we have no solution, you
shall continue to live like dogs, and whoever wishes may leave, and we
will see where this process leads." The general conception was
articulated by Labor Party leader Haim Herzog, later President, in 1972:
"I do not deny the Palestinians a place or stand or opinion on every
matter...But certainly I am not prepared to consider them as partners in
any respect in a land that has been consecrated in the hands of our
nation for thousands of years.  For the Jews of this land there cannot
be any partner."
 
 
 
A third possibility would be a binational state.  That was a feasible
option in the early years of the occupation, perhaps a federal
arrangement leading to eventual closer integration as circumstances
permit.  There was even some support for similar ideas within Israeli
military intelligence, but the grant of any political rights to
Palestinians was shot down by the governing Labor Party.  Proposals to
that effect were made (by me in particular), but elicited only
hysteria.  The opportunity was lost by the mid-1970s, when Palestinian
national rights reached the international agenda, and the two-state
consensus took shape.  The first US veto of a two-state resolution at
the Security Council, advanced by the major Arab states, was in 1976.
Washingon's rejectionist stance continues to the present, with the
exception of Clinton's last month in office.  Some form of unitary state
remains a distant possibility through agreement among the parties, as a
later stage in a process that begins with a two-state settlement.  There
is no other form of advocacy of such an outcome, if we understand
advocacy to include a process leading from here to there; mere proposal,
in contrast, is free for the asking.
 
 
 
It is of some interest, perhaps, that when advocacy of a unitary
binational state perhaps had some prospects, it was anathema, while
today, when it is completely unfeasible, it is greeted with respect and
is advocated in leading journals.  The reason, perhaps, is that it
serves to undermine the prospect of a two-state settlement.
 
 
 
Advocates of a binational (one-state) settlement argue that on its
present course, Israel will become a pariah state like apartheid South
Africa, with a large Palestinian population deprived of rights, laying
the basis for an civil rights struggle leading to a unitary democratic
state  There is no reason to believe that the US, Israel, or any other
Western state would allow anything like that to happen.  Rather, they
will proceed exactly as they are now doing in the territories today,
taking no responsibility for Palestinians who are left to rot in the
various prisons and cantons that may dot the landscape, far from the
eyes of Israelis travelling on their segregated superhighways to their
well-subsidized West Bank towns and suburbs, controlling the crucial
water resources of the region, and benefiting from their ties with US
and other international corporations that are evidently pleased to see a
loyal military power at the periphery of the crucial Middle East region,
with an advanced high tech economy and close links to Washington.
 
 
 
Turning elsewhere, major polls are not such good news for conventional
Western doctrine.  Few theses are upheld with such passion and unanimity
as the doctrine that Hugo Chavez is a tyrant bent on destroying freedom
and democracy in Venezuela, and beyond.  The annual polls on Latin
American opinion by the respected Chilean polling agency Latinobarometro
therefore are "bad news." The most recent (November 2007) had the same
irritating results as before.  Venezuela ranks second, close behind
first-place Uruguay, in satisfaction with democracy, and third in
satisfaction with leaders.  It ranks first in assessment of the current
and future economic situation, equality and justice, and education
standards.  True, it ranks only 11th in favoring a market economy, but
even with this flaw, overall it ranks highest in Latin America on
matters of democracy, justice, and optimism, far above US favorites
Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Chile.
 
 
 
Latin America analyst Mark Turner writes that he "found an almost total
English speaking blackout about the results of this important snapshot
of [Latin American] views and opinions." That has also been true in the
past.  Turner also found the usual exception: there were reports of the
finding that Chavez is about as unpopular as Bush in Latin America,
something that will come as little surprise to those who have seen some
of the bitterly hostile coverage to which Chavez is subjected, in the
Venezuelan press as well, an oddity in this looming dictatorship. 
Editorial offices have been well aware of the polls, but evidently
understand what may pass through doctrinal filters.
 
 
 
Also receiving scant notice was a declaration of President Chavez on
Dec. 31, 2007, granting amnesty to leaders of the U.S.-backed military
coup that kidnapped the president, disbanded parliament and the Supreme
Court and all other democratic institutions, but was soon overturned by
a popular uprising.  That the West would have followed Chavez's model in
a comparable case is, to put it mildly, rather unlikely.
 
 
 
Perhaps all of this provides some further insight into the "clash of
civilizations" - a question that should be prominent in our minds, I think.
 
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      *Did you know Steinem endorsed Hillary?*
      By Patton, Eric </zspace/ebpatton>
 
/
 
"[Basu's] 1988 report was submitted to ... Ms. magazine.  But rejected."
 
Ah, the elite liberal left.  Thankfully, so much has changed since
1988.  *cough*
 
/
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