Thursday, March 31, 2011

#Libya, #Chomsky, and #Imperialism

I was just starting to write an edition of the Absurd Times to cover the idiocy in Libya and the confusion in Japan when the items below cam in my mailbox.  I could hardly fail to pass them along.

First, however, I've been asked if the Thorium Reactors would be better than what we have now.  The answer is that they would but the difference is so small as to be infinitesimal.  Consider that inhaling one one-millionth of one gram of Plutonium is a guarantee of lung cancer if a violent death does not happen first, we might say that the reactor might be less stupid than the ones we have now.  You have to realize, however, that this nuclear fission is still used to boil water as if it were in a tea kettle and the steam makes a turbine rotate and this produces electricity.  (The same thing is done with windmills, except the wind is free.)

But more about that later.

Here is an interview with Noam Chomsky on Libya and our motives.   The outcome is only likely if the U.S. so decides.  Left to itself, Libya would revert to full control of the Libyan people.

Also, Mousa Koussa has reportedly defected.  Ibrihim, a spokesperson said that it was ok as he was old, under stress, tired, and ill.  As best I can tell, the name could be translated to English as Moses Squash.  

Now, our article:




Noam Chomsky: On Libya and the Unfolding Crises

Interviewed by Stephen Shalom and Michael Albert
March 31, 2011



1. What are U.S. motives in international relations most broadly? That is, what are the over arching motives and themes one can pretty much always find informing U.S. policy choices, no matter where in the world we are discussing? What are the somewhat more specific but still over arching motives and themes for U.S. policy in Middle East and the Arab world? Finally, what do you think are the more proximate aims of U.S. policy in the current situation in Libya?

A useful way to approach the question is to ask what U.S. motives are NOT.  There are some good ways to find out.  One is to read the professional literature on international relations: quite commonly, its account of policy is what policy is not, an interesting topic that I won’t pursue.  
Another method, quite relevant now, is to listen to political leaders and commentators.  Suppose they say that the motive for a military action is humanitarian.  In itself, that carries no information: virtually every resort to force is justified in those terms, even by the worst monsters – who may, irrelevantly, even convince themselves of the truth of what they are saying.  Hitler, for example, may have believed that he was taking over parts of Czechoslovakia to end ethnic conflict and bring its people the benefits of an advanced civilization, and that he invaded Poland to end the “wild terror” of the Poles.  Japanese fascists rampaging in China probably did believe that they were selflessly laboring to create an “earthly paradise” and to protect the suffering population from “Chinese bandits.” Even Obama may have believed what he said in his presidential address on March 28 about the humanitarian motives for the Libyan intervention.  Same holds of commentators.

There is, however, a very simple test to determine whether the professions of noble intent can be taken seriously: do the authors call for humanitarian intervention and “responsibility to protect” to defend the victims of their own crimes, or those of their clients?  Did Obama, for example, call for a no-fly zone during the murderous and destructive US-backed Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, with no credible pretext?  Or did he, rather, boast proudly during his presidential campaign that he had co-sponsored a Senate resolution supporting the invasion and calling for punishment of Iran and Syria for impeding it?  End of discussion.  In fact, virtually the entire literature of humanitarian intervention and right to protect, written and spoken, disappears under this simple and appropriate test.

In contrast, what motives actually ARE is rarely discussed, and one has to look at the documentary and historical record to unearth them, in the case of any state.

What then are U.S. motives?  At a very general level, the evidence seems to me to show that they have not changed much since the high-level planning studies undertaken during World War II.  Wartime planners took for granted that the US would emerge from the war in a position of overwhelming dominance, and called for the establishment of a Grand Area in which the US would maintain “unquestioned power,” with “military and economic supremacy,” while ensuring the “limitation of any exercise of sovereignty” by states that might interfere with its global designs.  The Grand Area was to include the Western hemisphere, the Far East, the British empire (which included the Middle East energy reserves), and as much of Eurasia as possible, at least its industrial and commercial center in Western Europe.  It is quite clear from the documentary record that “President Roosevelt was aiming at United States hegemony in the postwar world,” to quote the accurate assessment of the (justly) respected British diplomatic historian Geoffrey Warner.  And more significant, the careful wartime plans were soon implemented, as we read in declassified documents of the following years, and observe in practice.  Circumstances of course have changed, and tactics adjusted accordingly, but basic principles are quite stable, to the present.

With regard to the Middle East – the “most strategically important region of the world,” in Eisenhower’s phrase -- the primary concern has been, and remains, its incomparable energy reserves.  Control of these would yield “substantial control of the world,” as observed early on by the influential liberal adviser A.A. Berle.  These concerns are rarely far in the background in affairs concerning this region.  

In Iraq, for example, as the dimensions of the US defeat could no longer be concealed, pretty rhetoric was displaced by honest announcement of policy goals.  In November 2007 the White House issued a Declaration of Principles insisting that Iraq must grant US military forces indefinite access and must privilege American investors.  Two months later the president informed Congress that he would ignore legislation that might limit the permanent stationing of US Armed Forces in Iraq or “United States control of the oil resources of Iraq” – demands that the US had to abandon shortly after in the face of Iraqi resistance, just as it had to abandon earlier goals.

While control over oil is not the sole factor in Middle East policy, it provides fairly good guidelines, right now as well.  In an oil-rich country, a reliable dictator is granted virtual free rein.  In recent weeks, for example, there was no reaction when the Saudi dictatorship used massive force to prevent any sign of protest.  Same in Kuwait, when small demonstrations were instantly crushed.  And in Bahrain, when Saudi-led forces intervened to protect the minority Sunni monarch from calls for reform on the part of the repressed Shiite population.  Government forces not only smashed the tent city in Pearl Square – Bahrain’s Tahrir Square -- but even demolished the Pearl statue that was Bahrain’s symbol, and had been appropriated by the protestors.  Bahrain is a particularly sensitive case because it hosts the US Fifth fleet, by far the most powerful military force in the region, and because eastern Saudi Arabia, right across the causeway, is also largely Shiite, and has most of the Kingdom’s oil reserves.  By a curious accident of geography and history, the world’s largest hydrocarbon concentrations surround the northern Gulf, in mostly Shiite regions.  The possibility of a tacit Shiite alliance has been a nightmare for planners for a long time.

In states lacking major hydrocarbon reserves, tactics vary, typically keeping to a standard game plan when a favored dictator is in trouble: support him as long as possible, and when that cannot be done, issue ringing declarations of love of democracy and human rights -- and then try to salvage as much of the regime as possible.  

The scenario is boringly familiar: Marcos, Duvalier, Chun, Ceasescu, Mobutu, Suharto, and many others.  And today, Tunisia and Egypt.  Syria is a tough nut to crack and there is no clear alternative to the dictatorship that would support U.S. goals.  Yemen is a morass where direct intervention would probably create even greater problems for Washington.  So there state violence elicits only pious declarations.

Libya is a different case.  Libya is rich in oil, and though the US and UK have often given quite remarkable support to its cruel dictator, right to the present, he is not reliable.  They would much prefer a more obedient client.  Furthermore, the vast territory of Libya is mostly unexplored, and oil specialists believe it may have rich untapped resources, which a more dependable government might open to Western exploitation.  

When a non-violent uprising began, Qaddafi crushed it violently, and a rebellion broke out that liberated Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, and seemed about to move on to Qaddafi’s stronghold in the West.  His forces, however, reversed the course of the conflict and were at the gates of Benghazi.  A slaughter in Benghazi was likely, and as Obama’s Middle East adviser Dennis Ross pointed out, “everyone would blame us for it.” That would be unacceptable, as would a Qaddafi military victory enhancing his power and independence.  The US then joined in UN Security Council resolution 1973 calling for a no-fly zone, to be implemented by France, the UK, and the US, with the US supposed to move to a supporting role.

There was no effort to limit action to instituting a no-fly zone, or even to keep within the broader mandate of resolution 1973.

The triumvirate at once interpreted the resolution as authorizing direct participation on the side of the rebels.  A ceasefire was imposed by force on Qaddafi’s forces, but not on the rebels.  On the contrary, they were given military support as they advanced to the West, soon securing the major sources of Libya’s oil production, and poised to move on.  

The blatant disregard of UN 1973, from the start began to cause some difficulties for the press as it became too glaring to ignore.  In the NYT, for example, Karim Fahim and David Kirkpatrick (March 29) wondered “how the allies could justify airstrikes on Colonel Qaddafi’s forces around [his tribal center] Surt if, as seems to be the case, they enjoy widespread support in the city and pose no threat to civilians.” Another technical difficulty is that UNSC 1973 “called for an arms embargo that applies to the entire territory of Libya, which means that any outside supply of arms to the opposition would have to be covert” (but otherwise unproblematic).

Some argue that oil cannot be a motive because Western companies were granted access to the prize under Qaddafi.  That misconstrues US concerns.  The same could have been said about Iraq under Saddam, or Iran and Cuba for many years, still today.  What Washington seeks is what Bush announced: control, or at least dependable clients.  US and British internal documents stress that “the virus of nationalism” is their greatest fear, not just in the Middle East but everywhere.  Nationalist regimes might conduct illegitimate exercises of sovereignty, violating Grand Area principles.   And they might seek to direct resources to popular needs, as Nasser sometimes threatened.

It is worth noting that the three traditional imperial powers – France, UK, US – are almost isolated in carrying out these operations.  The two major states in the region, Turkey and Egypt, could probably have imposed a no-fly zone but are at most offering tepid support to the triumvirate military campaign. The Gulf dictatorships would be happy to see the erratic Libyan dictator disappear, but although loaded with advanced military hardware (poured in by the US and UK to recycle petrodollars and ensure obedience), they are willing to offer no more than token participation (by Qatar).  

While supporting UNSC 1973, Africa -- apart from US ally Rwanda -- is generally opposed to the way it was instantly interpreted by the triumvirate, in some cases strongly so.  For review of policies of individual states, see Charles Onyango-Obbo in the Kenyan journal East African (http://allafrica.com/stories/201103280142.html). 

Beyond the region there is little support.  Like Russia and China, Brazil abstained from UNSC 1973, calling instead for a full cease-fire and dialogue.  India too abstained from the UN resolution on grounds that the proposed measures were likely to "exacerbate an already difficult situation for the people of Libya,” and also called for political measures rather than use of force.  Even Germany abstained from the resolution.

Italy too was reluctant, in part presumably because it is highly dependent on its oil contracts with Qaddafi – and we may recall that the first post-World War I genocide was conducted by Italy, in Eastern Libya, now liberated, and perhaps retaining some memories.


2. Can an anti-interventionist who believes in self determination of nations and people ever legitimately support an intervention, either by the U.N. or particular countries?

There are two cases to consider: (1) UN intervention and (2) intervention without UN authorization.  Unless we believe that states are sacrosanct in the form that has been established in the modern world (typically by extreme violence), with rights that override all other imaginable considerations, then the answer is the same in both cases: Yes, in principle at least.  I see no point in discussing that belief, so will dismiss it.

With regard to the first case, the Charter and subsequent resolutions grant the Security Council considerable latitude for intervention, and it has been undertaken, with regard to South Africa, for example.  That of course does not entail that every Security Council decision should be approved by “an anti-interventionist who believes in self-determination”; other considerations enter in individual cases, but again, unless contemporary states are assigned the status of virtually holy entities, the principle is the same.

As for the second case – the one that arises with regard to the triumvirate interpretation of UN 1973, and many other examples – then the answer is again Yes, in principle at least, unless we take the global state system to be sacrosanct in the form established in the UN Charter and other treaties.

There is, of course, always a very heavy burden of proof that must be met to justify forceful intervention, or any use of force.  The burden is particularly high in case (2), in violation of the Charter, at least for states that profess to be law-abiding.  We should bear in mind, however, that the global hegemon rejects that stance, and is self-exempted from the UN and OAS Charters, and other international treaties.  In accepting ICJ jurisdiction when the Court was established (under US initiative) in 1946, Washington excluded itself from charges of violation of international treaties, and later ratified the Genocide Convention with similar reservations – all positions that have been upheld by international tribunals, since their procedures require acceptance of jurisdiction. More generally, US practice is to add crucial reservations to the international treaties it ratifies, effectively exempting itself.

Can the burden of proof be met?  There is little point in abstract discussion, but there are some real cases that might qualify.  In the post-World War II period, there are two cases of resort to force which – though not qualifying as humanitarian intervention – might legitimately be supported: India’s invasion of East Pakistan in 1971, and Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, in both cases, ending massive atrocities.  These examples, however, do not enter the Western canon of “humanitarian intervention” because they suffer from the fallacy of wrong agency: they were not carried out by the West.  What is more, the US bitterly opposed them and severely punished the miscreants who ended the slaughters in today’s Bangladesh and who drove Pol Pot out of Cambodia just as his atrocities were peaking.  Vietnam was not only bitterly condemned but also punished by a US-supported Chinese invasion, and by US-UK military and diplomatic support for the Khmer Rouge attacking Cambodia from Thai bases.

While the burden of proof might be met in these cases, it is not easy to think of others.  In the case of intervention by the triumvirate of imperial powers that are currently violating UN 1973 in Libya, the burden is particularly heavy, given their horrifying records.  Nonetheless, it would be too strong to hold that it can never be satisfied in principle – unless, of course, we regard nation-states in their current form as essentially holy.   Preventing a likely massacre in Benghazi is no small matter, whatever one thinks of the motives.


3. Can a person concerned that a country's dissidents not be massacred so they remain able to seek self determination ever legitimately oppose an intervention that is intended, whatever else it intends, to avert such a massacre? 

Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that the intent is genuine, meeting the simple criterion I mentioned at the outset, I don’t see how to answer at this level of abstraction: it depends on circumstances.  Intervention might be opposed, for example, if it is likely to lead to a much worse massacre.  Suppose, for example, that US leaders genuinely and honestly intended to avert a slaughter in Hungary in 1956 by bombing Moscow.  Or that the Kremlin genuinely and honestly intended to avert a slaughter in El Salvador in the 1980s by bombing the US.  Given the predictable consequences, we would all agree that those (inconceivable) actions could be legitimately opposed.


4. Many people see an analogy between the Kosovo intervention of 1999 and the current intervention in Libya. Can you explain both the significant similarities, first, and then the major differences, second?
 
Many people do indeed see such an analogy, a tribute to the incredible power of the Western propaganda systems.  The background for the Kosovo intervention happens to be unusually well documented.  That includes two detailed State Department compilations, extensive reports from the ground by Kosovo Verification Mission (western) monitors, rich sources from NATO and the UN, a British Parliamentary Inquiry, and much else.  The reports and studies coincide very closely on the facts.  

In brief, there had been no substantial change on the ground in the months prior to the bombing.  Atrocities were committed both by Serbian forces and by the KLA guerrillas mostly attacking from neighboring Albania – primarily the latter during the relevant period, at least according to high British authorities (Britain was the most hawkish member of the alliance).  The major atrocities in Kosovo were not the cause of the NATO bombing of Serbia, but rather its consequence, and a fully anticipated consequence.  NATO commander General Wesley Clark had informed the White House weeks before the bombing that it would elicit a brutal response by Serbian forces on the ground, and as the bombing began, told the press that such a response was “predictable.”  

The first UN-registered refugees outside Kosovo were well after the bombing began.  The indictment of Milosevic during the bombing, based largely on US-UK intelligence, confined itself to crimes after the bombing, with one exception, which we know could not be taken seriously by US-UK leaders, who at the same moment were actively supporting even worse crimes.  Furthermore, there was good reason to believe that a diplomatic solution might have been in reach: in fact, the UN resolution imposed after 78 days of bombing was pretty much a compromise between the Serbian and NATO position as it began.

All of this, including these impeccable western sources, is reviewed in some detail in my book A New Generation Draws the Line.  Corroborating information has appeared since.  Thus Diana Johnstone reports a letter to German Chancellor Angela Merkel on October 26, 2007 by Dietmar Hartwig, who had been head of the European mission in Kosovo before it was withdrawn on March 20 as the bombing was announced, and was in a very good position to know what was happening.  He wrote: 

“Not a single report submitted in the period from late November 1998 up to the evacuation on the eve of the war mentioned that Serbs had committed any major or systematic crimes against Albanians, nor there was a single case referring to genocide or genocide-like incidents or crimes. Quite the opposite, in my reports I have repeatedly informed that, considering the increasingly more frequent KLA attacks against the Serbian executive, their law enforcement demonstrated remarkable restraint and discipline. The clear and often cited goal of the Serbian administration was to observe the Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement [of October 1998] to the letter so not to provide any excuse to the international community to intervene. … There were huge ‘discrepancies in perception’ between what the missions in Kosovo have been reporting to their respective governments and capitals, and what the latter thereafter released to the media and the public. This discrepancy can only be viewed as input to long-term preparation for war against Yugoslavia. Until the time I left Kosovo, there never happened what the media and, with no less intensity the politicians, were relentlessly claiming. Accordingly, until 20 March 1999 there was no reason for military intervention, which renders illegitimate measures undertaken thereafter by the international community. The collective behavior of EU Member States prior to, and after the war broke out, gives rise to serious concerns, because the truth was killed, and the EU lost reliability.”

History is not quantum physics, and there is always ample room for doubt.  But it is rare for conclusions to be so firmly backed as they are in this case.  Very revealingly, it is all totally irrelevant.  The prevailing doctrine is that NATO intervened to stop ethnic cleansing – though supporters of the bombing who tolerate at least a nod to the rich factual evidence qualify their support by saying the bombing was necessary to stop potential atrocities: we must therefore act to elicit large-scale atrocities to stop ones that might occur if we do not bomb.  And there are even more shocking justifications.

The reasons for this virtual unanimity and passion are fairly clear.  The bombing came after a virtual orgy of self-glorification and awe of power that might have impressed Kim il-Sung.  I’ve reviewed it elsewhere, and this remarkable moment of intellectual history should not be allowed to remain in the oblivion to which it has been consigned.  After this performance, there simply had to be a glorious denouement.  The noble Kosovo intervention provided it, and the fiction must be zealously guarded.

Returning to the question, there is an analogy between the self-serving depictions of Kosovo and Libya, both interventions animated by noble intent in the fictionalized version.  The unacceptable real world suggests rather different analogies.


5. Similarly, many people see an analogy between the on-going Iraq intervention and the current intervention in Libya. In this case too, can you explain both the similarities, and differences?

I don’t see meaningful analogies here either, except that two of the same states are involved.  In the case of Iraq, the goals were those that were finally conceded.  In the case of Libya, it is likely that the goal is similar in at least one respect: the hope that a reliable client regime will reliably supported Western goals and provide Western investors with privileged access to Libya’s rich oil wealth – which, as noted, may go well beyond what is currently known.


6. What do you expect, in coming weeks, to see happening in Libya and, in that context, what do you think ought to be the aims of an anti interventionist and anti war movement in the U.S. regarding U.S. policies?

It is of course uncertain, but the likely prospects now (March 29) are either a break-up of Libya into an oil-rich Eastern region heavily dependent on the Western imperial powers and an impoverished West under the control of a brutal tyrant with fading capacity, or a victory by the Western-backed forces.  In either case, so the triumvirate presumably hopes, a less troublesome and more dependent regime will be in place.  The likely outcome is described fairly accurately, I think by the London-based Arab journal al-Quds al-Arabi (March 28). While recognizing the uncertainty of prediction, it anticipates that the intervention may leave Libya with “two states, a rebel-held oil-rich East and a poverty-stricken, Qadhafi-led West… Given that the oil wells have been secured, we may find ourselves facing a new Libyan oil emirate, sparsely inhabited, protected by the West and very similar to the Gulf's emirate states.” Or the Western-backed rebellion might proceed all the way to eliminate the irritating dictator.

Those concerned for peace, justice, freedom and democracy should try to find ways to lend support and assistance to Libyans who seek to shape their own future, free from constraints imposed by external powers.  We can have hopes about the directions they should pursue, but their future should be in their hands.


From:
Z Net - The Spirit Of Resistance Lives
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Saturday, March 26, 2011

#Libya v. Reality


Reality is not all it's cracked up to be.  That's one of the reasons the American public is willing to accept the distortions placed on it by our corporate media.  Why go to all the trouble, when you have enough trouble yourself, to straighten things out when they present you with a nice, neat, package each night and you can move on to watch basketball or screw?  At least you can not predict the outcome of most basketball games.  And isn't baseball season coming soon?

It would have been so much easier to believe that Nixon had nothing to do with Watergate.

So, we really can't blame our public.  In addition, they are taught from an early age to believe in and accept all sorts of historical nonsense spewed by teachers who actually know better but need to tell the lies because of the PTA. 

So now Libya, with reasons identical to those against Saddam, surrounded and attacked.  The fact that Libya attacked no one and threatened no one is irrelevant.  What is relevant is the information contained in the articles below.

So much has happened in the 20th century, trust-busting, the progressive movement, Roosevelt, Social Security, Medicare, equal rights, voting rights, unemployment insurance, all things that saved Capitalism.  Well, it seems that now is the time to repeal the 20th century.  Of course we can keep the military stuff, but all this social stuff has got to go.  Unions, especially, cause problems.

I found it curious indeed that those missiles used against Libya were listed as only costing 750 K each.  Back in the days of Iraq we were told they cost 2 million each.  Of course, those were the "smart" ones, not "dumb" like the American public.  Since they often missed, they started using "very smart" bombs at a cost of 4 million each.  Maybe we are getting a volume discount?

So why is our President, your President, waiting until Monday to make his speech?  Here's why:



When the House Comes Back, You're Gonna Get in Trouble

March 25, 2011

By Robert Naiman
Source: Huffington Post

Robert Naiman's ZSpace Page

Here is some unsolicited advice for the Obama administration: you essentially have four days to put US involvement in the Libya war on a path that doesn't look like open-ended quagmire.
 
Otherwise, when the House comes back next week, you're going to get in trouble.
 
Many people have difficulty imagining the possibility that Congress could give the Obama Administration difficulty over the Libya war. Since 2001, many people think, Congress has rolled over for both the Bush and Obama Administrations on questions of war and peace. Why should now be any different?
 
The view that Congress has only rolled over misses important history. For example, the legislative fight over a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq was a significant contributor to the fact that we have such a timetable for withdrawal today, even though such a timetable was never enacted legislatively. Congress lost the issue legislatively, but eventually won the issue politically.
 
But the more important point here that many people aren't thinking about yet is that the political dynamics of the coming debate over the Libya war could be very different from the debates over Iraq and Afghanistan. If the Libya war is going full-bore next week with heavy US involvement, there could be significant opposition in Congress, especially in the House, from both Democrats and Republicans.
 
One key difference from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is that regardless of what many regard as the "true" motivations of those conducting the Libya war - control of energy resources, maintaining U.S. domination over the Middle East, etc., which would be broadly consistent with what many have believed to be the true motivations of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars - the public presentation of the Libya war has been fundamentally different than for those wars. At the heart of the public justifications of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars there were national security stories: weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Of course, in both cases there were also humanitarian intervention stories overlaid on the national security stories. But the absence of a public national security story - a threat to Americans - for the Libya war makes it fundamentally more vulnerable politically.
 
A critic of the Libya war can't easily be accused of being soft on terrorism, or unconcerned about defending the United States. Indeed, Pentagon officials, including Defense Secretary Gates, made sharp public criticisms of calls for U.S. military intervention in Libya, and everyone knows it. So it will be extremely difficult to bully critics of the war by portraying them as soft on defense.
 
A second key difference from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is that regardless of whatever else may be true about them, they were authorized by Congress. By taking the US to war without Congressional authorization, the Obama Administration has opened itself to criticism of usurping Congressional authority. This is always a good way to make Congress angry, regardless of the issue at hand, and doing so gives Congress a political opening to pass legislation to limit the Administration's actions.
 
A third factor is that half of the House Democratic Caucus is already livid over the Obama Administration's repeated escalations of the Afghanistan quagmire. In just the last month, half of the House Democratic caucus has voted to essentially eliminate funding for the war in Afghanistan; half of the House Democratic Caucus has voted to require that US forces be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of the year. Numerically, these votes were drowned out by the fact that the overwhelming majority of House Republicans have continued to vote for the war; but on the Libya war, House Republicans aren't tied down to a previous position, and have much more room for maneuver because there is no public national security justification. Meanwhile, The Hill notes, the Libya war is burning through the cuts that House Republicans won to reduce the deficit.
 
Of course, if a significant number of Congressional Republicans turn against the Libya war, then we can expect a major effort to bully Democrats to "support the President," regardless of what they think about the merits of the war, or the fact that the Administration did not seek Congressional authorization. But it may be hard to bully some Democrats to "support the President" on the Libya war while the President is burning them on Afghanistan; indeed, many Democrats, not just the most liberal ones, have already spoken out against the Libya war and the Administration's decision to launch it without Congressional authorization.
 
Moreover, many Democrats understand that a dangerous precedent will be set if President Obama is allowed to bomb Libya without Congressional authorization; if Obama can bomb Libya without Congress' approval, a future President Palin could bomb Iran without Congress' approval.
 
If Congress decides to take action, it can do many things.
 
One thing Congress could easily do is expressly prohibit the introduction of US ground troops to Libya. Such action would be hard for the Administration to oppose politically, because it is an overwhelmingly popular position politically, and because President Obama has promised not to introduce US ground troops into Libya. So Congress would simply be nailing President Obama's promise to the wall.
 
A second thing Congress could do is prohibit US manned aircraft from flying over Libyan airspace. This would ensure that no US pilots are shot down over Libya, or crash in Libya for any other reason, as happened this week. Thus, no US pilots could be killed or injured or become hostages.
 
A third thing Congress could do is establish a timetable for the withdrawal of US military forces from the conflict.
 
A fourth thing Congress could do is establish a ceiling - for example, a billion dollars - of what the Administration can spend on the Libya war without further authorization.
 
Of course, Congress could do many other things if it so chooses, including shutting down US participation in the war immediately.
 
Making such proposals the subject of legislative debate is an intrinsic good, regardless of whether they are enacted into law; they are a form of pressure that will limit the ability of the Administration to escalate the war.
 
There are important historical precedents.
 
As a 2004 CRS report on the history of the War Powers Resolution notes, in 1990-1 the first Bush Administration tried to argue that it did not need explicit Congressional authorization to attack Iraq. Then, as now, the President argued, among other things, that he was implementing a UN Security Council resolution and that he did not need additional Congressional authority. But Members of Congress disputed this claim; 45 Democrats sought a judicial order enjoining the President from offensive military operations unless he consulted with and obtained an authorization from Congress. The request for injunction was denied, but on grounds that did not address the underlying legal claim. In the event, Congressional leaders announced that they were going to debate the issue and there was a Congressional authorization of force.
 
In October 1995, the House, by a vote of 315-103, passed a resolution asserting that "no United States Armed forces should be deployed on the ground in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to enforce a peace agreement until the Congress has approved such a deployment." In December 1995, the House narrowly defeated H.R. 2770, which would have prohibited the use of Federal funds for the deployment "on the ground" of U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina "as part of any peacekeeping operation, or as part of any implementation force," by a vote of 210-218. The House then approved H.Res. 302 reiterating "serious concerns and opposition" to the deployment of U.S. ground troops to Bosnia.
 
On April 28, 1999, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1569, by a vote of 249-180, prohibiting the use of funds appropriated to the Defense Department from being used for the deployment of "ground elements" of the U.S. Armed Forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia unless that deployment were specifically authorized by law.
 
The same day the House defeated, in a dramatic 213-213 tie vote, S.Con.Res. 21, the Senate resolution passed on March 23, 1999, that supported military air operations and missile strikes against Yugoslavia.
 
Two days later, the ACLU sent a letter to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott:
 
We are writing to urge that you insist on strict compliance with the Constitution in connection with the commitment of U.S. troops in Kosovo, Yugoslavia and surrounding areas. The possible commitment of U.S. ground troops requires prior congressional authorization under the U.S. Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. In fact, such authorization is also required for any air and missile strikes by U.S. forces in connection with any air war in Yugoslavia. Mere consultation with members of Congress, while a step in the right direction, does not meet the constitutional requirement that congressional authorization precede U.S. military intervention.
 
 
The air war was never authorized. That didn't stop it; a legal effort to block the air war on this basis was ultimately dismissed in the courts on the grounds that 1) Congressional action had sent contradictory messages, and if it had wanted to explicitly prohibit the air war from continuing, Congress could have done so and 2) the Members of Congress who sued did not have standing since they did not represent the majority of Congress.
 
Nonetheless, the failure of the House to pass the resolution in support of the air war had a salutary political effect on the Clinton Administration: it made the Administration less intransigent in international diplomacy to resolve the crisis. After the vote, President Clinton suggested that there could be a "pause" in NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia to allow space for diplomacy. There was a peace accord a month later, in which the Clinton Administration accepted terms it likely could have achieved without the bombing.
 
So far, there has been no serious diplomatic effort backed by the West to resolve the crisis in Libya without the escalation of violence; efforts by others to achieve a diplomatic resolution have been dismissed. It seems likely that the only way to convince the US, France and Britain to give negotiations a chance is to put some obstructions in the current path towards military escalation. Therefore, the best thing Congress can do to help save lives in Libya right now is to construct some political obstacles to further military escalation.

Moreover, as we all know from bitter experience, there is an intrinsic tendency of wars to escalate and expand. Those who support the current military operations, but do not want them to expand and escalate, should support efforts to prevent their expansion.

From: Z Net - The Spirit Of Resistance Lives
URL: http://www.zcommunications.org/when-the-house-comes-back-youre-gonna-get-in-trouble-by-robert-naiman


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Libya Intervention Threatens The Arab Spring

Despite its official UN-granted legality, the credibility of Western military action in Libya is rapidly dwindling.
March 24, 2011

By Phyllis Bennis
Source: Al Jazeera

Phyllis Bennis's ZSpace Page

Western air and naval strikes against Libya are threatening the Arab Spring.

Ironically, one of the reasons many people supported the call for a no-fly zone was the fear that if Gaddafi managed to crush the Libyan people's uprising and remain in power, it would send a devastating message to other Arab dictators: Use enough military force and you will keep your job.
 
Instead, it turns out that just the opposite may be the result: It was after the UN passed its no-fly zone and use-of-force resolution, and just as US, British, French and other warplanes and warships launched their attacks against Libya, that other Arab regimes escalated their crack-down on their own democratic movements.

In Yemen, 52 unarmed protesters were killed and more than 200 wounded on Friday by forces of the US-backed and US-armed government of Ali Abdullah Saleh. It was the bloodiest day of the month-long Yemeni uprising. President Obama "strongly condemned" the attacks and called on Saleh to "allow demonstrations to take place peacefully".
 
But while a number of Saleh's government officials resigned in protest, there was no talk from Saleh's US backers of real accountability, of a travel ban or asset freeze, not even of slowing the financial and military aid flowing into Yemen in the name of fighting terrorism.
Similarly in US-allied Bahrain, home of the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, at least 13 civilians have been killed by government forces. Since the March 15 arrival of 1,500 foreign troops from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, brought in to protect the absolute power of the king of Bahrain, 63 people have been reported missing.
 
Hillary Clinton, the US secretary of state, said: "We have made clear that security alone cannot resolve the challenges facing Bahrain. Violence is not the answer, a political process is."

But she never demanded that foreign troops leave Bahrain, let alone threatened a no-fly zone or targeted air strikes to stop their attacks. 

Legality vs. legitimacy
 
Despite its official UN-granted legality, the credibility and legitimacy of Western military action is dwindling rapidly, even in key diplomatic circles. For the Western alliance, and most especially for the Obama administration, support from the Arab League was a critical prerequisite to approving the military intervention in Libya.
 
The League's actual resolution, passed just a couple of days before the UN Security Council vote, approved a far narrower military option - essentially only a no-fly zone, with a number of stated cautions against any direct foreign intervention.
 
Of course, a no-fly zone is foreign intervention, whether one wants to acknowledge it or not, but it is not surprising that the Arab League's approval was hesitant - it is, after all, composed of the exact same leaders who are facing inchoate or massive challenges to their ruling power at home. Supporting the attack on a fellow dictator - oops, sorry, a fellow Arab ruler - was never going to be easy.
 
And as soon as the air strikes began in Libya, Arab League chief Amr Moussa immediately criticised the Western military assault. Some commentators noted the likelihood that Arab governments were pressuring Moussa out of fear of Libyan terror attacks in their country; I believe it is more likely that Arab leaders fear popular opposition, already challenging their rule, will escalate as Libyan deaths rise.
 
Overlooking the African Union

Early on, the US had also identified support from the African Union (AU) as a critical component. But as it became clear that the AU would not sign on to the kind of attack on Libya contemplated in the UN resolution, the need for that support (indeed the AU itself) disappeared from Western discourse on the issue.

Shortly after the bombing began, the five-member AU committee on the Libya crisis called for an "immediate stop" to all the attacks and "restraint" from the international community.
 
It went further, calling for the protection of foreign workers with a particular reference to African expatriates in Libya (responding to reports of attacks on African workers by opposition forces), as well as "necessary political reforms to eliminate the cause of the present crisis".
 
So within 48 hours of the bombing campaign's opening salvos, the US and its allies have lost the support of the Arab and African institutions the Obama administration had identified as crucial for going ahead.

Other countries turned against the attacks as well; the Indian government, which had abstained on the Security Council vote, toughened its stance, saying that it "regrets the air strikes that are taking place" and that implementation of the UN resolution "should mitigate and not exacerbate an already difficult situation for the people of Libya".
 
The question remains, what is the end game? The UN resolution says force may only be used to protect Libyan civilians, but top US, British and French officials have stated repeatedly that "Gaddafi must go" and that he has "lost legitimacy to rule". They clearly want regime change.
 
The military commanders insist that regime change is not on their military agenda, that Gaddafi is not "on a target list," but there is a wink-and-a-nod at ''what if'' questions about a possible bombing "if he is inspecting a surface-to-air missile site, and we do not have any idea if he is there or not".

What you ask for ain't always what you get
 
There is no question Libya's opposition, like most of the democratic movements shaping this year's Arab Spring, wants an end to the dictatorial regime in their country.
Unlike the democratic movements in neighbouring countries, the Libyan movement is fighting an armed military battle, something approaching a civil war, against the regime's forces.

That movement, facing a ruthless military assault, has paid a far higher price in lost and broken lives than the non-violent activists in the other democratic uprisings, and even with components of the military joining them, they were out-gunned and desperate. So it is not surprising that they pleaded for international support from the powerful countries and institutions most able to provide immediate military aid, even if that aid ultimately threatened their own independence.

But, what they got was probably way more than even the Libyan opposition itself anticipated. And despite the exultation over the first downed tanks, questions loom.
What if some kind of stalemate leaves Libya divided and military attacks continuing? What if the opposition realises that negotiations (perhaps under the auspices of newly democratising Egypt and Tunisia) are urgently needed, but cannot be convened because the US and French presidents have announced that the Libyan leader has no legitimacy and cannot be trusted? 
 
And what if, as earlier US-imposed no-fly zones (both unilateral and UN-endorsed) have experienced, the attack leads to rising numbers of civilian casualties, killed by Western coalition bombs and an escalating, rather than diminishing, civil war? What then?

The UN resolution clearly is looking ahead to just such an eventuality. It calls on the secretary-general to inform the UN Security Council of all military actions, instructing him to "report to the Council within seven days and every month thereafter".
 
The UN, at least, seems to be preparing for another long war - that could last far longer than this year's Arab spring.
 
 
Phyllis Bennis is a Fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies and the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam. Her books include Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN.

From: Z Net - The Spirit Of Resistance Lives
URL: http://zcommunications.org/libya-intervention-threatens-the-arab-spring-by-phyllis-bennis

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

Gaddafi, #Libya, Socialism, and Colonialism, Part 2


Here is one of the better overviews of the so-called "Oddessey Dawn," (which both insults Homer and sound like a nightclub stripper).  It does have the obligatory mention of how cruel Gaddafi is, but hey, she knows what happened to Norman Finkelstein:







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Stop Bombing Libya


Since Saturday night, the United States, France, and Britain have been bombing Libya with cruise missiles, B-2 stealth bombers, F-16 and F-15 fighter jets, and Harrier attack jets. There is no reliable estimate of the number of civilians killed. The U.S. has taken the lead in the punishing bombing campaign to carry out United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973.
 
The resolution authorizes UN Member States “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” The military action taken exceeds the bounds of the “all necessary measures” authorization.
 
“All necessary measures” should first have been peaceful measures to settle the conflict. But peaceful means were not exhausted before Obama began bombing Libya. A high level international team – consisting of representatives from the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity, and the UN Secretary General – should have been dispatched to Tripoli to attempt to negotiate a real cease-fire, and set up a mechanism for elections and for protecting civilians.
 
There is no doubt that Muammar Qaddafi has been brutally repressing Libyans in order to maintain his power. But the purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. The burgeoning conflict in Libya is a civil war, which arguably does not constitute a threat to international peace and security.
 
The UN Charter commands that all Members settle their international disputes by peaceful means, to maintain international peace, security, and justice. Members must also refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
 
Only when a State acts in self-defense, in response to an armed attack by one country against another, can it militarily attack another State under the UN Charter. The need for self-defense must be overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. Libya has not attacked another country. The United States, France and Britain are not acting in self-defense. Humanitarian concerns do not constitute self-defense.
 
The UN Charter does not permit the use of military force for humanitarian interventions. But the UN General Assembly embraced a norm of “Responsibility to Protect” in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit. Paragraph 138 of that document says each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Paragraph 139 adds that the international community, through the United Nations, also has “the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”
 
Chapter VI of the Charter requires parties to a dispute likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to “first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Chapter VIII governs “regional arrangements,” such as NATO, the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity. The chapter specifies that regional arrangements “shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements . . .”
 
It is only when peaceful means have been tried and proved inadequate that the Security Council can authorize action under Chapter VII of the Charter. That action includes boycotts, embargoes, severance of diplomatic relations, and even blockades or operations by air, sea or land.
 
The “responsibility to protect” norm grew out of frustration with the failure to take action to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, where a few hundred troops could have saved myriad lives. But the norm was not implemented to stop Israel from bombing Gaza in late 2008 and early 2009, which resulted in a loss of 1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians. Nor is it being used to stop the killing of civilians by the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
 
There is also hypocrisy inherent in the U.S. bombing of Libya to enforce international law. The Obama administration has thumbed its nose at its international obligations by refusing to investigate officials of the Bush administration for war crimes for its torture regime. Both the Convention Against Torture and the Geneva Conventions compel Member States to bring people to justice who violate their commands.
 
The United States is ostensibly bombing Libya for humanitarian reasons. But Obama refuses to condemn the repression and government killings of protestors in Bahrain using U.S.-made tanks and weaponry because that is where the U.S. Fifth Fleet is stationed. And Yemen, a close U.S. ally, kills and wounds protestors while Obama watches silently.
 
Regime change is not authorized by the resolution. Yet U.S. bombers targeted the Qaddafi compound and Obama said at a news conference in Santiago that it is “U.S. policy that Qaddafi needs to go.” The resolution specifically forbids a “foreign occupation force.” But it is unlikely that the United States, France and Britain will bomb Libya and leave. Don’t be surprised to hear there are Western forces on the ground in Libya to “train” or “assist” the rebels there.
 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates pegged it when he said that a “no-fly zone” over Libya would be an “act of war.” Although the Arab League reportedly favored a no-fly zone, Amr Moussa, Secretary General of the Arab League, said that “what is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone.” He added, “What we want is the protection of civilians and not the shelling of more civilians.” He plans to call a new meeting of the league to reconsider its support for a no-fly zone.
 
The military action in Libya sets a dangerous precedent of attacking countries where the leadership does not favor the pro-U.S. or pro-European Union countries. What will prevent the United States from stage-managing some protests, magnifying them in the corporate media as mass actions, and then bombing or attacking Venezuela, Cuba, Iran, or North Korea? During the Bush administration, Washington leveled baseless allegations to justify an illegal invasion of Iraq.
 
Moreover, Obama took military action without consulting Congress, the only body with the Constitutional power to declare war. It is not clear what our mission is there or when it will end. Congress – and indeed, the American people – should debate what we are doing in Libya. We must not support a third expensive and illegal war. There is a crying need for that money right here at home. And we should refuse to be complicit in the killing of more civilians in a conflict in which we don’t belong.
 
 
Marjorie Cohn is a professor of law at Thomas Jefferson School of Law, past president of the National Lawyers Guild, and deputy secretary general of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. Her latest book is “The United States and Torture: Interrogation, Incarceration, and Abuse” (NYU Press).

From: Z Net - The Spirit Of Resistance Lives
URL: http://www.zcommunications.org/stop-bombing-libya-by-marjorie-cohn