Tuesday, February 17, 2015

Gaddafi and Isis





THE ABSURD TIMES



 


            We pointed out years ago what a positive force Gaddafi was.  Ever since we bombed the country and helped the Religious Fanatics kill him (we wanted to save the live of the innocent in Benghazi), the country has gone to hell and become a cesspool of idiocy -- about the same as Washington D.C. but without the beheadings.  During the last Republican Inquisition of Hillary the tongue Clinton, they delved into Benghazi.  A worthwhile effort if only it were directed at why Obama joined a group of military aggressors there to "defend" it from Gaddafi. 

            During the pre-slaughter hysteria we published a history of Gaddafi, but it was banned by such organizations as Facebook (idiots abound).  You can find the history at this site so there is no reason to repeat it.  All we need to do now is bring things up to date as there is once again interest in Libya as a result of ISIS or Daesh, as well as Sisi (Egypt, ISIS spelled backwards) using it to grasp at respectability.  Daesh has vowed to "cut off the tongues" of anyone who call it that,  and we can envision thousands of cut off tongues still flapping away until ravenous crows pick them up and fly away with them --  that is, unless the crows are caught and beheaded first. 

            The interviews present the case very well and there is no point summarizing them here.  [All that is left to say is, once again, 'I TOLD YOU SO!!!"]  Here they are:

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 2015

Egypt Makes Libya the New Front in Anti-ISIS War, 4 Years After NATO Left Chaos Behind

Four years after the U.S.-led bombing campaign toppled Muammar Gaddafi’s government, Libya is in a state of crisis. On Monday, Egypt bombed Islamic State targets in Libya after the group released a video showing the beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians. Egypt claims it hit ISIS targets "precisely," but at least seven civilians, including three children, were reportedly killed in the coastal city of Derna. The attacks come as Libya faces what the United Nations calls "the worst political crisis and escalation of violence" since the U.S.-backed overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011. Two different governments claim power, each with their own parliaments and armies. A number of militant groups, including the Islamic State affiliate, are scattered in between. Will foreign governments intervene in Libya again? We are joined by Democracy Now! correspondent Sharif Abdel Kouddous, who is just back from a reporting trip in Libya, and Vijay Prashad, a professor of international studies at Trinity College and author of several books, including "Arab Spring, Libyan Winter."

TRANSCRIPT

This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.
AARON MATÉ: Egypt has opened a new front in the war against ISIS. On Monday, Egyptian warplanes bombed northeastern Libya after Cairo vowed to avenge the killing of 21 Coptic Christians. Egypt claims it hit ISIS targets, quote, "precisely," but at least seven civilians, including three children, were reportedly killed in the coastal city of Derna. The bombings come after the Islamic State released a video showing the beheading of the 21 kidnapped Egyptians. The victims are led onto a beach dressed in orange jumpsuits like Guantánamo Bay prisoners. They are then beheaded one by one. The lead executioner points his knife at the camera and delivers a message to what he calls the "crusaders."
LEAD EXECUTIONER: O people, recently, you’ve seen us on the hills of as-Sham and on Dabiq’s plain, chopping off the heads that have been carrying the cross for a long time, filled with spite against Islam and Muslims. And today, we are on the south of Rome, on the land of Islam, Libya, sending another message: O crusaders, safety for you will be only wishes, especially when you’re fighting us all together.
AARON MATÉ: The victims were all migrant workers kidnapped late last year. There are now reports more Egyptians have been kidnapped inside Libya in recent days. The video is the first showing an Islamic State beheading outside of its strongholds in Syria and Iraq. ISIS is one of several militant groups that have emerged inside Libya since the U.S.-backed overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Today marks four years since the official start of the Libyan revolution, which ended in Gaddafi’s ouster and death.
AMY GOODMAN: Now the country faces what the United Nations calls "the worst political crisis and escalation of violence" since that time. Two different governments run Libya, each with their own parliaments and armies. The internationally recognized government operates from the eastern cities of Tobruk and Bayda, after a rival group called Libya Dawn seized the capital Tripoli in August. A number of militant groups, including the Islamic State affiliate, are scattered in between.
Egypt’s bombing marks the first time ISIS has been targeted with strikes outside Iraq and Syria. And although it emerged in the upheaval following the 2011 intervention, there is talk now of a new foreign operation beyond the Egyptian strikes. On Monday, Italy said it would weigh attacks on the Islamic State in Libya if U.N.-backed talks fail to reconcile Libya’s rival factions. Italian Interior Minister Angelino Alfano called for direct NATO intervention, saying, quote, "ISIS is at the door. There is no time to waste."
The current war authorization measure before the U.S. Congress also increases the prospect of direct U.S. intervention. President Obama has asked lawmakers to grant him expansive authority to target the Islamic State anywhere in the world, beyond the current campaign in Syria and Iraq. With Washington’s ally, Egypt, starting a new front, that opens the question of whether Libya is next on the U.S. target list.
For more, we’re joined by two guests. From Cairo, we’re joined by Sharif Abdel Kouddous, Democracy Now!'s correspondent and a fellow at The Nation Institute. He has just returned from a reporting trip in Libya. And joining us is Vijay Prashad, professor of international studies at Trinity College, columnist for the Indian magazine Frontline. He's the author of several books, including Arab Spring, Libyan Winter and, most recently, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South. He’s joining us from Connecticut Public Television, the PBS station in Hartford.
Professor Vijay Prashad, let’s begin with you. The significance of the Egyptian strike on Libya, ISIS’s beheading of the Christian—of the Coptic Christians from Egypt?
VIJAY PRASHAD: Amy, this is not the first Egyptian airstrike in Libya. It’s reported, although Egypt denies it, that in August of last year Egyptian fighter planes, alongside fighter planes from the UAE, struck targets near Tripoli, the capital of Libya, at that time going after the escalation by Libyan Dawn to capture the city and the parliament. Libyan Dawn is dominated—it’s a coalition, but dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is of course the group that President Sisi has seen as his main enemy inside Egypt. So, when Egypt began its second round of airstrikes on Monday, the parliament in Tripoli, again, dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, immediately condemned the airstrike as a violation of Libyan sovereignty. The problem with the Libyan air—the Egyptian airstrikes has been that in a very short time it has immediately opened up the polarization inside Libya, precisely the opposite political direction which Libya requires at this time, according to the United Nations.
AARON MATÉ: Well, Vijay, can you talk about how we’ve come to this point where, four years after the Libyan revolution began, now the Islamic State is claiming territory there and carrying out brutal attacks such as this one?
VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, it’s a great, you know, consternation and shame, I think, to the so-called international community that this NATO intervention of 2011 came on the heels of geopolitical wrangling between the Gulf Arab states and the Europeans. This intervention came in. It destroyed much of Libyan infrastructure at a crucial point, when Mr. Gaddafi was taken prisoner. If he had been allowed to surrender, for instance, there might have been a process opened up to bring different factions to a political table. Instead, of course, he was brutally killed, and the possibility of reconciliation at that point was squandered.
Secondly, there was no attempt by any party to bring the various revolutionaries, thethuwwar, into any kind of umbrella organization. They were allowed to have a fissiparous existence, returning to their various cities, creating—rather, you know, deepening their separation, deepening the kind of antipathy between—amongst them. And in this strange position, the NATO-backed government took power in Tripoli, where many opportunities by this government were also squandered. You know, there were oil worker strikes. There was the question of the armed militias. At no point did the government in Tripoli seem engaged by these pressing issues. Instead, one of the first acts of this government was to create a central bank. It was very interested in making deals for oil. But at really no point did they attempt a genuine political process of reconciliation inside the country. That has torn apart Libya. It alienated the east.
And for the first time in Libya, a sophisticated al-Qaeda-type group was allowed to flourish, and that was Ansar al-Sharia, which grew out in Benghazi. You know, the previous Islamist group, the Libyan international—Islamist Fighting Group, had by 2011 put itself at the service of the government, but that gesture was, as well, rebuffed.
So, I mean, I think a combination of Gulf Arab animosity between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the, you know, maybe really disregard by the West, and internal problems, where the government in Tripoli, that rode into power on the backs of NATO, really alienated the population from any possibility of a future.
AMY GOODMAN: I want to bring Sharif Abdel Kouddous into this conversation in Egypt’s capital, Cairo. Sharif, can you talk about the response right now in Egypt to Egypt’s bombing of Libya, where you just were, and who the people were who were killed in Egypt, the Coptic Christians, killed by ISIS there?
SHARIF ABDEL KOUDDOUS: Right, well, the airing of the video really struck a chord amongst many Egyptians, especially the Coptic Christian community. The nature of the message—there was no political demands made. It was an entirely sectarian message that was delivered.
But, you know, the strikes are significant. Vijay is right that there have been covert strikes before, especially in coordination with the United Arab Emirates, on Libya by Egypt. But they’re significant insofar as they’re the first publicly acknowledged foreign military intervention by Egypt, arguably, since the Gulf War, more than—or nearly a quarter of a century ago. They claim—the Libyan army claims that they hit 95 percent of their targets and they killed over 50 militants. But, you know, that’s rarely the case, that kind of accuracy, in aerial bombing. And already Human Rights Watch has said six civilians were killed, including a mother and two children. But politically, certainly domestically, the strikes were a success. Before the airing of this video, the families of the hostages held protests against the government, accusing the government of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi of not doing enough to release the hostages. But since the airstrikes, Sisi has received widespread support. He’s seen as having acted swiftly and decisively. The state and private media, which is really a vocal chorus for Sisi, is whipping up a lot of nationalist sentiment. The army has been deployed to the streets to, quote-unquote, "protect" citizens. And really, the war on terror is Sisi’s source of legitimacy. It’s hisraison d’être. So, this is all playing into that vein.
In terms of the 21 Coptic Christian men, the majority of them all came from one small village in central Egypt called Al-Our. And they were, like tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians do, migrant workers who left Egypt to search for better wages in Libya. They can earn up to seven times the paltry sums they can earn here in Egypt in Libya’s oil-rich economy. They ended up in Sirte, which is a coastal city in central Libya that was the birthplace of Gaddafi but has since become a stronghold for militants, especially groups like Ansar al-Sharia, which was accused of killing U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens in 2012, but has since been infiltrated by even more extreme militants. And survivors who evaded capture by the militants really describe a harrowing ordeal, where these militants were coming house by house, calling out these migrant workers by name, leaving the Muslims and taking the Coptic Christian men. And so, it really was—I think sent shockwaves through much of Egypt to see this video aired.
AMY GOODMAN: And the response of Egyptian society in terms of religions? Why Coptic Christians, do you think, were targeted? And the place of Coptic Christians in greater Egyptian society?
SHARIF ABDEL KOUDDOUS: Well, this is not the first time Coptic Christians have been targeted in Libya. A doctor and his wife and daughter were killed in December. There have been other incidents, as well. We can only look to the—what the statement by the Islamic State group was, and it was calling for revenge for the Coptic Christian crusade, and this very overtly sectarian nature of the attacks. Egypt has a Coptic Christian minority, which is about 10 percent of the population. And they suffer from discrimination in various types of laws, of how they can build churches and other ways of discrimination, as well, in terms of marriage laws and so forth. So, you know, this really struck a chord within the community, but I think, overall, there is now in Egyptian society this hyped-up sentiment for war, and there’s a lot of support, it seems, for these airstrikes.
AARON MATÉ: And, Sharif, you were just in Libya, this bombing coming just as the U.N. is trying to broker some kind of deal between the two rival factions that claim two different governments, with two different armies, in parliament. What can you tell us about the internal conflict inside Libya and how these Egyptian strikes might affect them?
SHARIF ABDEL KOUDDOUS: Well, you know, there’s a power struggle that’s engulfing the country, as Vijay outlined. And Libya is really—to go there, it’s really—it’s hardly a country anymore. It’s really a torn stretch of land, and Libyans have to negotiate a minefield of regional, political and tribal conflicts just in order to survive. You have these two rival coalitions, which are opposed to each other, each with their own array of militias, each with their own prime minister and government, and each claiming legitimacy. You have in the east, in Bayda and Tobruk, the internationally recognized government that is allied with Khalifa Haftar, a former general who has waged a battle against Islamist militias in Benghazi, and they were forced out of the capital in a weeks-long battle over the summer. And in the west, in Tripoli, where the Oil Ministry is, where the National Oil Corporation is, you have the self-declared government, which, very broadly speaking, is backed by an array of militias which are Islamist-aligned, but also has a tactical alliance with very extreme militias over whom they have no control.
And so, this conflict has been raging, has caused massive displacement, has created a void in which groups like the Islamic State group can flourish, really. And there was one driver that we had at one point, and he gave a telling quote, saying, "In the east, they assume I’m Fajr," which is the Libya Dawn; "In the west, they assume I’m Karama," which is Haftar’s; "And in Derna, they wanted to behead me," referring to the Islamic State group. And so, this is the kind of political situation that Libyans find themselves in. And the politicians seem to be operating in a different realm from ordinary Libyans, a realm that has everything to do with power and very little to do with governing.
AMY GOODMAN: I want to turn to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former head ofNATO. Speaking to Britain’s Channel 4 Monday, he said foreign boots will be needed on the ground in Libya.
ANDERS FOGH RASMUSSEN: The brief answer is we will need boots on the ground. It’s clear that you can’t—you can’t do the job through air campaigns alone. You need boots on the ground. The only question is, which boots? And in that respect, I do believe that countries in the region should play a major role in deploying such forces. But they can’t do that, and they won’t do that, unless the West supports.
AMY GOODMAN: That’s Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former head of NATO. Which boots on the ground, Professor Vijay Prashad? What about what he’s saying—not only should there be, but which ones?
VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, you know, it’s interesting because Mr. Rasmussen has categorically over the last four years said that NATO should not get involved in Syria, because it’s too complicated and the issue is fraught with all kinds of consequences. In Libya, on the other hand, you know, there’s an attitude towards it, which is that it’s a playground. You know, you can encourage intervention. You can let people come in.
I mean, I think it’s a very dangerous attitude for the simple reason that unless the political question is somewhat settled, talking about sending boots on the ground, whether Egyptian or Algerian, is, I think, a mistake. What I’m trying to say is that there is an Arab cold war that’s broken out in northern Africa, where, you know, on the one side you have Saudi Arabia with Egypt, perhaps, with the UAE, on the other side you have Qatar, and you have Turkey. You have these countries that are helping fuel internal disagreements. And until there’s an understanding that these external actors need to stop providing succor to internal contradictions, and until the U.N. is able to bring these internal parties to sit down and construct some kind of political dialogue which is real, to talk about sending in boots on the ground is only going to exacerbate matters.
If Egypt enters with its considerable military into Libya, this is going to create a great deal of, you know, problems with Qatar. And God knows what they would do. Meanwhile, of course, the Islamic State is looking forward to greater Egyptian intervention, because—and one of the reasons that they are going after the Copts is not only because their preferred, you know, enemy, the Shia, are nonexistent in Libya, but also they’ve been seeking a way to create greater fractures in Egypt itself, to insinuate themselves in Egypt.
So the idea of having boots on the ground, without putting great pressure on the major Arab countries in the region to sort of cool it on their own internal fights that are greatly affecting Libyan politics, until that happens, I fear that it’s naïve to talk about airstrikes, and it is incredibly naïve and duplicitous to talk about boots on the ground.
AARON MATÉ: Well, Vijay, on the issue of naïveté, looking back, Libya was hailed as a model for humanitarian intervention after Gaddafi was overthrown and killed. Now, though, I imagine, as the country unravels and descends into this resting ground for Islamist militant groups like ISIS, defenders of the NATO intervention will point back to Benghazi. At the time, there appeared to be, at least in my opinion, back then, a credible threat that Gaddafi was going to carry out a massacre in Benghazi, and the argument was that something had to be done. Now, putting aside what NATO’s actual motives were, the threat of a massacre did seem credible, but I’m wondering, looking back now, what we know in hindsight, do you think that that particular pretext of preventing atrocities in Benghazi stands up to scrutiny?
VIJAY PRASHAD: Well, you know, it depends what you’re going to look at. If you’re going to look at the evidence that Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International produced after the worst part of the NATO bombing ended, it’s not clear that the casualty rates that had been claimed by—particularly by the Saudi media, which was Al Arabiya, it’s not clear that those casualty rates were accurate. In fact, they were greatly exaggerated, so that the claim by Al Arabiya that there were already massacres in Misurata, that there was a massacre in Ras Lanuf, etc., turns out in the end not to have been true.
Now, it’s not to say that the Gaddafi government wasn’t prepared to conduct, you know, very brutal violence in the east and in cities in the center, but you have to recognize—and this is what I think the international media at the time wasn’t willing to inhale—you have to recognize that in the east Gaddafi’s military largely defected to the rebellion, so that the battalion and the air command in Benghazi was on the side of the rebellion. There had already been aerial strikes by rebel aircraft against Gaddafi boats that were in the Mediterranean.
So what I’m saying is that there was a very complicated situation at the time. You know, mainly Saudi media, and then pushed by various international media, including CNN, began to drum up this idea that there was a massacre. I remember, in the U.N. Security Council, ambassadors talking about getting their information from the international media. That struck me as really very, very disturbing, particularly given the fact that credible human rights organizations, after the fact, showed that the numbers had been greatly exaggerated by news media, particularly by Al Arabiya.
AMY GOODMAN: Sharif Abdel Kouddous, before we end this segment, could you comment, on the ground, just having been in Libya, about the humanitarian crisis there?
SHARIF ABDEL KOUDDOUS: Right. Libya—ordinary Libyans are really suffering. There is massive displacement. The U.N. estimates about 400,000 have been displaced. Many of them are living in schools. Many have left the country altogether. Many civil society activists, journalists, writers have left under threats. Those Libyans who do want to leave, because they can find no more life in Libya, find that the world has rejected them. Many complain that they can’t get visas because they’re Libyan.
And most of the displaced that we saw were from Benghazi, Libya’s second-largest city, which is the birthplace of the revolution and is now really the epicenter of the disaster. People describe completely bombed-out neighborhoods. They said it looks like Aleppo. There is neighborhood youth who are armed, manning checkpoints all over the city. And, you know, just the simple truth of where you’re from can determine your fate.
So—and just overall dysfunction has really become a way of life in Libya. Libyans are forced to bear the burden of the conflict as it tears away the last vestiges of normalcy. Traveling across the country is arduous. Delays at airports can literally take days. If you want to take a—go by car, then you’re going to risk checkpoints and kidnapping and different militias, which you have to negotiate. In the east, particularly, there’s very bad electricity shortages. There’s fuel shortages. We were in Bayda, which is the seat of the internationally recognized government. They are experiencing a huge influx of refugees there, of displaced. This has caused rents to go up, food prices to go up. There’s food shortages.
The crisis is most acutely felt in the hospital, where, for example, we went to the kidney treatment center, which is receiving now three times more patients. And so, for dialysis, they have to ration treatment. And a technician told us how this is reducing the lifespan of patients. He told it to us in English, because he was saying it as a patient was getting dialysis. He spoke of how his own niece, his newborn niece, died because they couldn’t find a very simple tube for a blood transfusion that she needed, and she died before they could even name her.
And in Tripoli, you know, you see masked gunmen at checkpoints at night for the first time. They’ve never been masked before. The streets are deserted. You speak to government officials—the defense minister, Khalifa al-Ghwel, was telling us how safe Tripoli was. The very next day, armed militants stormed the biggest hotel in Tripoli, the Corinthia Hotel, and killed nine people, including a number of foreigners. So, this is really—it’s really quite a disaster for ordinary Libyans. And there needs to be some kind of political solution on the ground, because, you know, jihadists thrive on more war, and this whole talk of more conflict, I don’t think will solve much in the long term.
AMY GOODMAN: Sharif, we want to ask you to stay with us in our next segment to briefly update us on the Al Jazeera journalists who are now going on trial, who must remain in Egypt, but they are out on bail. Sharif Abdel Kouddous, Democracy Now!'s correspondent in Cairo and a fellow at The Nation Institute, recently returned from a reporting trip inside Libya. And thank you so much to Professor Vijay Prashad, professor of international studies at Trinity College, columnist for the Indian magazine Frontline, author of a number of books, including Arab Spring, Libyan Winter and, most recently, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South. This is Democracy Now! 


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Sunday, February 15, 2015

BURNING THE FAITH

THE ABSURD TIMES




Illustration:  This came out after the Jordanian pilot was burned alive for all to see by Daesh, or ISIS.

    It would seem that this action would discourage any reasonable person from even considering ISIS (Daesh) as a legitimate concern in the Middle East or anywhere else, but it did not.  It was very inane for anyone to deal with them when they said the releasse of one hostage was dependent on Jordan's releasing a prisoner and that the pilot would be executed if she were not released.  The point was that the pilot had already been executed before the threat were issued.  There is no government that could possibly negotiate with this organization given this lack of credibility.

     Furthermore, it led us to wonder why there has been such an increase of people drawn to join the group, especially since one reasonably sane fighter quit and returned to France because smoking was forbidden.  It come down to this:  you need to remember inner-city gangs with their colors and tattoos, people joining in order to belong and also to enjoy the suffering of those who did not belong.  The idea of joining a gang with some professed purpose and thus being able to inflict pain and feel masculine as a result is obviously too tempting to the hormone-ridden lower IQ scum that infest our planet.

    We have had little to say here in the last two weeks and, ironically, during that time readership has grown tremendously.   Perhaps this is because everything we have said in the past years and months has proven true, perhaps just as a coincidence.  Whatever the reason, there is a vast need for a powerful spraying of this planet with some chemical that will reduce the effects of testosterone, especially, by at least 95%.  Failing that, insanity will compound itself.

     In case you wonder, the Koran explicitly praises both Moses and Jesus, Judaism and Christianity, and clarifies some of their basic concepts, much like Einstein clarified Newton. 

     No more to say for now.  Freeze your balls off.

Wednesday, February 04, 2015

Alberto Nisman’s Death and AMIA: Who Cares About the Truth?

 We have simply heard too much nonsense about this not to see this:

 

Alberto Nisman’s Death and AMIA: Who Cares About the Truth?


On 18 January the Argentine prosecutor Alberto Nisman was found dead in his apartment in Buenos Aires. A few days before he had returned from his vacations in Europe and presented a shocking and unexpected accusation. He claimed that he had proved that President Cristina Kirchner and the Foreign Minister Hector Timerman were in the process of orchestrating a cover-up in the investigation of Iran over the 1994 bombing of AMIA (the main Jewish community center of Argentina) that left 85 dead. He presented his proofs – a lengthy 289-page report – to a federal judge, who was not able to immediately reveal its content, as it mentioned Argentine intelligence agents by name. The opposition summoned Nisman to the Congress to present his findings. The meeting, scheduled for the 19 January, was never held, as Nisman died few hours before.
In the polarized political life of Argentina, the case was immediately used for political purposes. The main newspapers and TV channels, sworn enemies of the government, sparked doubts over the circumstances of Nisman’s death, suggesting that he was either murdered or pushed to commit suicide in a last-minute attempt to prevent his presentation at the Congress. Politicians in the opposition immediately fueled similar theories. Hundreds of people set to the streets carrying placards “I am Nisman” (or “Je suis Nisman” written in French, as an echo of the Charlie Hebdo demonstrations), blaming the government for the death of an honest man who had uncovered its dirty secrets. “I am Nisman” became trending topic in social networks, while anti-Kirchner intellectuals and journalists proclaimed that the murder/induced suicide of Nisman was the symbol of the death of the Republic under Kirchner’s administration. Similar stories were soon reproduced by the international media, which used the case as yet another example of the phantasmal threat of Latin American “populism” and for other purposes (including the bashing of Obama over his Iran policy).
The government officials responded clumsily, firstly rushing to proclaim that it was an obvious case of suicide (before any forensic analysis of the evidence), and shortly afterwards claiming, without any proofs, that it was a murder ordered by an obscure alliance between rogue intelligence agents and the owners of Clarín, the main news corporation of Argentina. In this explanation, the purpose of the crime was to destabilize Cristina Kirchner’s government: the murderers firstly pushed Nisman to present an absurd accusation against the president and then killed him, so as to make it look as a political assassination. Some of the pro-government intellectuals and journalists proclaimed that Nisman’s death was part of a coup d’état attemptorchestrated by the USA.
The manipulation of the information, already epidemic in Argentina, reached bizarre proportions, as several people tried to profit from this death for political or personal purposes. Newspapers published unreliable or deliberately false information (such as Clarín’s allegationthat a source from the forensic investigation said that the gun that killed Nisman was triggered at 15cm of the head and therefore was no suicide). The Buenos Aires Herald journalist Damian Patcher left the country in a hurry and found shelter in Tel Aviv – a city he nevertheless called “home” – after claiming that his life was in danger as he had ruined the plans of the government to conceal Nisman’s death (he was the first journalist who tweeted that there were strange movements in the prosecutor’s apartment, but he did that at a time when Nisman’s mother and other people were already there). Patcher’s rather imaginative story about Argentine spies following him while he was trying to escape from the country gained him international notoriety, but was not even backed by his own newspaper, which took it with a grain of salt.
Politicians were not slower at profiting from Nisman’s fate. To give but few examples, Sergio Massa (who has good chances to become Argentina’s next president), formally requested to be regarded a plaintiff in the investigation of AMIA’s bombing and/or of Nisman’s denunciation – he was unsure of which one he was talking about –, something that is legally impossible but gave him some nice newspaper headlines. The mayor of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri – another favorite for the next presidential elections – appeared in a press conference, saying he was deeply concerned for the future of the Republic and of the AMIA case. He conveniently forgot that he appointed Jorge “el fino” Palacios as chief of the new local police that he created in 2009. Palacios is currently under indictment in the AMIA court case, considered a participant in the crime of concealment, a role that was perfectly clear when Macri appointed him.
Macri himself is indicted in another case for having used his new police for illegal telephone hearings of, among others, Jorge Burstein, spokesperson of one of the associations of relatives of the AMIA victims, who was leading the campaign against Palacio’s appointment. Eight days after the prosecutor’s death, the versatile Patricia Bullrich – part of Menem’s troupe at the time of AMIA’s bombing, now Macri’s ally – had a sudden recollection. She told a newspaper that she had had a meeting with Nisman the day before his death, in which the prosecutor said that some spy linked to Iran had betrayed him – she cannot provide any names or additional information, though – which gained her invaluable press coverage. Strangely enough, she had not mentioned that fact in the several descriptions of that meetingthat she had offered to the media in previous days.
So what do we really know about this whole matter?
Who was Alberto Nisman?
Although he is portrayed as a man who died looking for the truth, Nisman was far from being a justice hero. He was the prosecutor in charge of the investigation of AMIA’s bombing for many years and his role there was indeed obscure.
Long time ago, some of the people who knew the details of that investigation pointed out that in 1994, from day one after the bombing, before any single piece of evidence was produced, Argentinean president Carlos Menem had agreed with the U.S. and Israel to blame Iran. For the U.S. and Israel, it was of an obvious geopolitical interest. For Menem, whose international policy was defined as one of “carnal relations” (sic) with the U.S., it was not only a matter of pleasing his friends, but also of covering up himself. Indeed, as we later knew, some of the hints of the initial investigation pointed to the Syrian leader Hafez al-Assad, who had financed Menem’s presidential campaign (Carlos Menem is from a Syrian-Lebanese family) and was by then deeply disappointed with his foreign policy and with other domestic promises that he had not kept.
We still do not have the slightest clue as to who ordered AMIA’s bombing. It could well have been Iran. But the truth is that the Syrian lead was never examined and that that was a deliberate decision. The continuity of Israel’s interest in getting Syria off the hook after the initial moments and in the past recent years is not well documented, but the U.S.’ is. More importantly, there was a conspiracy to mislead the investigation of the local complicities, in which Menem and Juan José Galeano, the first judge in charge of the case (later removed and now under trial), among others, were involved.
Alberto Nisman was instrumental in both forms of judicial manipulation. As the Wikileaks affair exposed, he was practically working for the U.S. embassy in Buenos Aires, which was pushing to leave the Syrian lead in oblivion and to close the local chapter of the investigation as soon as possible. Nisman would take as undeniable facts all of the “intelligence information” that the embassy gave him without further examination. He reported every single of his decisions to the embassy before informing the new judge appointed to the case. He even took at least one of his rulings to the embassy to get it corrected before presenting it. He simply ignored the judge, who urged him repeatedly to pursue other leads apart from the Iranian and to check with other sources the information that the US was giving him.
But more importantly, Nisman was instrumental in the false accusation forged against a bunch of Argentinean policemen who had supposedly helped the Iranians in the bombing, by means of which Menem and his associates were hoping to close the local chapter of the investigation. Argentina’s intelligence agency SI was in charge of that operation, which continued under the next presidents –including Fernando de la Rúa, from the Unión Cívica Radical, and Eduardo Duhalde, whose Secretary of Intelligence, Miguel Ángel Toma, is now Sergio Massa’s close ally. As Claudio Lifschitz, the man who exposed the covering-up of the local connection, said recently, Nisman endorsed the accusation against those policemen in full knowledge that they were innocent. Luckily, the court in charge of that case dismissed the whole investigation and demanded a new one.
All this information about Nisman was perfectly known (for instance, I referred to his responsibility in the failure of the investigation in a 2009 newspaper piece). Shortly before he died two of the associations of relatives of the victims of the 1994 bombing were openly saying that Nisman was “part of the old covering-up maneuvers” (APEMIA) and that he represented “the interests not of the victims, but of those who covered up” the bombing (Memoria Activa). The sad story is that none of the main political parties in Argentina was keen on questioning Nisman’s behavior before he came up with his denunciation of Cristina Kirchner.
Santiago O’Donnell, the journalist who investigated the Wikileaks concerning Argentina, included large sections and a whole chapter exposing Nisman in his books Argenleaks (2011) and Politileaks (2014). As he recently explained in his blog, no newspaper – including the pro-Kirchner Página 12, where he still works – was willing to report on this part of the Wikileaks revelations. Both the Kirchners and the opposition backed Nisman wholeheartedly, either because they did not want to confront American and Israeli interests, or because it was comforting to believe in Nisman’s claims that he had resolved AMIA’s case. Now that his death is useful for political purposes, the opposition continues to overlook his obscure behavior. Even journalists and intellectuals who are perfectly aware of Nisman’s past – including topClarín’s columnist Jorge Lanata, who once wrote that the prosecutor’s AMIA investigation was totally fictitious – prefer not to mention it these days.
How dangerous is Nisman’s accusation against the government?
In few words, Nisman’s argument is that Cristina Kirchner masterminded a secret plan to absolve Iranian officials accused of the 1994 bombing in return for deliveries of much-needed oil from Iran. Having that goal in mind, in 2013 she obtained approval from the Congress for an international treaty of cooperation with that country, known as the Memorandum of Understanding, that established a sort of international “truth commission” with the alleged purpose of interrogating the suspects in Teheran. The real purpose – the argument goes – was to get Interpol arrest warrants against the Iranian officials dropped, which Foreign Minister Timerman tried (but failed) to do. The evidence that Nisman presented in his report rely almost entirely on telephone hearings of the alleged agents of both sides: among others one representative of the Muslim community in Argentina (speaking on behalf of the Iranians), the former piquetero leader Luis D’Elía (Cristina’s man), and an agent of Argentina’s Intelligence Agency (SI). No person in office or with formal ties with the government was included in the recordings.
By now, those who made the effort of reading Nisman’s 289-page report have concluded that it is of no legal substance. Even the newspaper La Nación, a fierce enemy of the government, had to report that the denunciation made little sense in legal terms. And it’s not just a matter of proofs being unconvincing. Some of Argentina’s best-reputed jurists said that they could not even discern which law was supposedly breached. Even if such plan existed in the president’s mind, none of the steps towards implementing it were actually made (which makes the offense abstract). The only step allegedly taken was signing the Memorandum. But an international treaty approved by law of a Congress, as they explained, can never constitute a crime. A law can certainly be a bad law, it can be stupid or harmful, it can be unconstitutional; but by definition, passing such law can never be held as a criminal act.
In terms of the proofs, Nisman’s report was also weak. As the Buenos Aires Herald put it, it “fails to fan flames of conspiracy”. Immediately after the brief was released, Ronald Noble – Secretary-General of Interpol between 2000 and 2014 and mentioned by Nisman as prospective witness – issued a strong statement saying that the prosecutor’s allegations were false, and that Timerman not only had never sought to annul the warrants issued for the Iranian suspects, but that he “passionately” requested their continuity after the Memorandum was signed. On the other hand, after the name was known, the government informed that the alleged secret agent recorded in the telephone hearings was not such thing, and that the SI had filed a lawsuit against him in the past for pretending to be one.
As for Luis D’Elía, he is a notorious member of the kirchnerist movement. In 2003 Néstor Kirchner had appointed him in a minor position in his government, but D’Elía was asked to resign in 2006 after he voiced his support for Iran’s controversial president Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Since 2006 he has had no formal place in government, although it is true that he consorts with important state officials. A well-known pro-Iran speaker, in the telephone hearings he appears promoting the end of the sanctions against the Iranians, promising forthcoming results, and showing off his good connections with the government. A notorious man often accused of being an anti-Semite (even by renowned members of the government) and scorned by the press every second day, he is an unlikely choice for the role of an International Man of Mystery. Even the CIA believes, according to Clarín, that Nisman’s denunciation is inconsistent and that D’Elía should not be taken seriously.
Finally, the whole purpose of the conspiracy that Nisman denounced sounds weird. After many years actively endorsing Argentina’s case against Iran in all the international forums, in 2013 Cristina Kirchner suddenly changed her mind and started to mastermind a secret plan to leave Iran off the hook. What for? For oil, Nisman argued. But Argentina does not need or import oil in relevant quantities and it has never imported it from Iran (as, for technical reasons, Iran’s oil cannot be processed in Argentinean refineries). When the country had to import oil in the past it did it from other sources, such as Bolivia, Nigeria or Angola. Argentina does import large quantities of fuel oil and gas from other countries but not from Iran, which is not even capable of exporting such items.
So how did Nisman die?
The judicial investigation has not concluded yet, so basically nobody knows anything on solid grounds. The evidence analyzed so far has concluded that Nisman died of a gunshot triggered at less than 1cm of his head, and that it came from the gun that was found under his body, in the bathroom where he died. The rest of the evidence analyzed so far strongly suggests that Nisman killed himself: the door of the bathroom was closed and blocked by the prosecutor´s own body and there is no evidence that the corpse could have been moved there from some other place. No-one else’s DNA was found in the bathroom and no relevant hint of a murder was yet presented. If it was suicide, then the investigators will have to check if it was somehow induced or if, as some commentators have argued, it was the reaction of a desperate man who understood that the denunciation he had just presented was not going to convince anyone and that his career was sinking (Ronald Noble’s statement discrediting his allegations and the criticism of APEMIA and Memoria Activa were aired just before his death).
If it was an induced suicide, a key person to resolve the mystery seems to be Diego Lagomarsino, the man who took the killing gun to the prosecutor’s apartment few hours before the death. Lagomarsino was one of Nisman’s closest associates, and he claims that he lent the weapon at the request of the prosecutor, who told him that he needed it in case “some lunatic attacked him on the street”. Nobody knows who Lagomarsino really is, but two informants have already said that he worked in the intelligence business.
Of course, murder cannot be dismissed as a hypothesis. After all, Nisman was working in a case in which the Argentinean intelligence agency (SI) and the CIA were involved and had strong interests of their own. Suspected framed suicides are not unknown to Argentina or to other countries, including the US or the UK (take for instance the recent cases of Theodore S. Westhusing and David Kelly, both related to Middle Eastern affairs). Although assassination is a rather common practice among CIA agents, no hints indicate that the US may have been involved this time (at least not directly).
As for the SI, it has been out of control for a long time. A month before Nisman’s death, the government had decided to purge it, by removing several agents, including its chief-in-the-shadows Antonio “Jaime” Stiusso. Stiusso had been working at the SI since 1972 and was highly appreciated by the CIA and the Mossad (the Israeli intelligence agency). Besides, he was Nisman’s main source of information in the AMIA case for the past ten years, as the prosecutor publicly acknowledged several times, and also in his recent denunciation against the Cristina Kirchner. The government is now pointing to Stiusso as the hidden hand behind Nisman’s death, and has now decided to dissolve the SI altogether and create a wholly new intelligence agency under the supervision of the Congress. Other non-kirchnerist voices havealso pointed to Stiusso and even the CIA allegedly believes that Nisman’s death is somehow related to internal disputes within the SI.
Again in this case, politicians of all persuasions seem to have discovered now that the SI is out of control (with the exception of Miguel Angel Toma, who set out to support Stiusso, which seems to confirm earlier speculations that the agent is now working for Sergio Massa). But many of them profited from its services in all these years and turned a blind eye when Gustavo Béliz, one of Néstor Kirchner’s Ministers, denounced Stiusso in 2004 for using illegal telephone hearings to blackmail magistrates and politicians (after that Béliz was asked to quitand felt he needed to live abroad for a decade).
In the past several years the Congress special commission in charge of monitoring the activities and budget of the SI was almost inactive. That commission is composed by deputies and senators of all political parties; after 2010 it was presided by an anti-kirchnerist.
These are some of the awkward facts behind a story in which the distinction of good and evil is a lot more complicated than it first appears. Unfortunately, the majority of the local and international voices that we have heard so far seem to be primarily interested in Argentina’s coming elections and/or in the future of the Middle East. Finding the truth about the two most important issues at stake here –AMIA’s bombing and the circumstances of Nisman’s death– is not the main point in their agenda.